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ities by promulgating Rule lOb-51 pursuant to the authority
granted to the SEC by Congress in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 2 Section 10(b), however,
does not provide an express private right of action. Recognizing
that private individuals needed redress for securities fraud and
the utility of permitting private parties to enforce the antifraud
provisions of section 10(b), 3 the federal courts implied a private
right of action under Rule lOb-5. 4 Despite widespread judicial
acceptance of the implied right of action under section 10(b) and
1. Rule lOb-5, promulgated in 1948 and amended in 1951, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
2. Section 10 of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). For a discussion of the legislative history of § 10(b), see
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN.

L.

REV.

385 (1990).

3. As the former SEC Chairman, David Ruder, stated: "The benefit of private actions comes in part from plaintiffs obtaining damages or injunctive relief,
but more importantly from lawyers who counsel their clients on measures to be
taken in order to avoid both SEC and private actions." David S. Ruder, Securities
and Exchange Commission Enforcement Practices, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 607 n. 1
(1991).
4. The implied right of action was first recognized in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court has
expressly approved of implied private rights of action under Rule lOb-5. See,
e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (stating that through
"Ijiudicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time" a private right of action exists under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975))); see also Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that "a private right of action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 has been consistently recognized
for more than 35 years").
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Rule lOb-5, the lower courts disagreed on the applicable limitations period for such actions.
Before 1988, the lower courts uniformly followed the traditional rule, which was to borrow the most closely analogous state
law limitations period to fill any gaps in federal causes of action.
The borrowing practice naturally caused variation among the
lower federal courts with respect to the limitations period for
Rule lOb-5 actions. These divergences led to forum shopping
and costly litigation. Concerned about these problems, three circuit courts of appeal ultimately adopted a uniform federal statute
of limitations for Rule lOb-5 actions. 5 The uniform limitations
period chosen by the three circuits was the so-called "one-andthree-year" rule expressly contained in other limitations provisions within the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the
Exchange Act. The one-and-three-year rule requires the plaintiff
to bring an action within one year after discovery of the alleged
violation, but no later than three years after the alleged violation
occurred.
OnJune 20, 1991, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
had a dramatic impact on the limitations period for Rule lOb-5
claims. In Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,6 the
Supreme Court adopted the one-and-three-year rule as the uniform federal limitations period for Rule lOb-5 actions. On the
same day it decided Lampf, the Court also decided James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia.7 In a fractured decision, the Beam Court
held that when the judiciary announces a new rule of law in civil
cases, that rule must be applied to all claims based upon events
arising before the decision, except for claims barred by res judicata or on procedural grounds.
Because the Supreme Court applied the Lampf rule to the litigants in that case, the lower courts interpreted Lampf and Beam as
requiring courts to apply the Lampf rule to all lOb-5 cases pending when Lampf and Beam were decided. The retroactive application of the Lampf rule led courts to dismiss many lOb-5 actions as
untimely. These dismissals precluded plaintiffs from trying cases
on the merits in which they sought more than four billion dollars
in damages. Many of the dismissed claims had been brought
5. For a discussion of the traditional borrowing practices and the uniform
limitations period adopted by the three circuits, see infra notes 26-69 and accompanying text.
6. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
7. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
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against high profile securities fraud defendants and major partici8
pants in the recent savings and loan debacle.
Congress reacted quickly to the double whammy of Lampf
and Beam by enacting section 27A of the Exchange Act. 9 In effect,
section 27A returned the law to its pre-Lampf and pre-Beam state
for all qualifying cases filed before Lampf and Beam. Under section 27A, the statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions filed
before the Lampf decision is the limitations period that was in effect in thejurisdiction before the Lampf decision. In addition, section 27A provides that the principles of retroactivity governing
section 10(b) suits filed before the Beam decision are the principles that were in effect in the jurisdiction before Beam was decided.' 0 Significantly, section 27A also permitted the courts to
reinstate many of the cases that had been dismissed under the
Lampf rule.' I
Plaintiffs have utilized section 27A to defend against motions
to dismiss and to seek reinstatement of cases previously dismissed
under Lampf and Beam. The reliance on section 27A to protect
8. See Kevin G. Salwen, Many Securities-FraudSuits Are Likely to Go Unheard
With High Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1991, at A3.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. III 1991). Section 27A, entitled "Special provision relating to statute of limitations on private causes of action," provides:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under
[§ 10(b)] of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991,
shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed
on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under [§ 10(b)] of this title that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June
19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation
period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19,
1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days
after December 19, 1991.
Id.
10. The provision permitted the lower courts that had previously adopted
the one-and-three-year rule to use pre-Beam law to decide whether that new rule
would apply retroactively or prospectively. For a discussion of the retroactive or
prospective application of a new rule of law, see infra notes 112-50 and accompanying text.
11. A case qualified for reinstatement if it was filed before the Lampf decision and would have been timely under the limitations rule and retroactivity
principles in effect in that jurisdiction prior to the Court's decisions in Lampf and
Beam. For a discussion of the operation of § 27A, see infra notes 200-03 and
accompanying text.
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existing claims and resuscitate previously dismissed claims
brought a flurry of constitutional challenges from aggrieved defendants. These defendants have raised two major constitutional
challenges. First, defendants contend that section 27A deprives
them of vested property rights in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment. Second, they argue that section 27A violates the
separation of powers doctrine because: (1) section 27A imposes a
rule of decision on the judiciary contrary to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in a Civil War case, United States v.
Klein,12 and (2) section 27A legislatively overrules the Beam decision. These constitutional challenges have had only limited success. To date, most of the district courts and the four circuits that
have directly addressed the question have upheld the constitu13
tionality of section 27A.
This Article discusses whether section 27A is constitutional.
In particular, the discussion focuses on whether section 27A divests defendants of vested property interests in contravention of
the Fifth Amendment or violates the separation of powers doctrine. Part II presents a historical account of the applicable limitations periods for lOb-5 actions, culminating with a discussion of
the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf. Part III examines the law
concerning the retroactive or prospective application of new judicially announced rules like Lampf, with particular emphasis on the
Court's most recent decision on retroactivity in Beam. Part IV explores the legislative history and purposes behind section 27A
and discusses the operation of section 27A. Part V analyzes
whether defendants have vested property rights that arise from
the Lampf rule itself or from final judgments of dismissal based on
the Lampf rule. This part concludes that section 27A may unconstitutionally deprive defendants of vested rights. Part VI delves
into the separation of powers doctrine and discusses whether section 27A violates that doctrine. This part concludes that section
27A does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN
RULE

A.

10B-5

LITIGATION

Statutes of Limitation and Statutes of Repose In General

Statutes of limitation are typically characterized as remedial
12. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
13. For a discussion of these constitutional challenges to § 27A, see infra
notes 228-412 and accompanying text.
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or procedural rules that bar the remedy associated with a cause of
14
action while leaving the underlying substantive right intact.
The distinctions between right and remedy and between substance and procedure originated in conflicts of law jurisprudence. 15 Under conflicts of law analyses, the court uses the
forum's choice of law method to determine the law governing the
substantive issues but generally applies forum law to procedural
issues.' 6 In order to ascertain which law governs a case and the
extent to which that law applies, the court must first characterize
each issue as substantive or procedural.' 7 Statutes of limitation
are generally characterized as procedural or remedial (that is, affecting the remedy) because they eliminate an otherwise available
remedy for policy reasons that include protecting the judiciary
from the problems encountered in resolving stale claims.' 8
14. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988) (identifying long-established support for proposition that statutes of limitation do "not
extinguish the underlying right but merely cause[] the remedy to be withheld,"
and therefore are procedural rather than substantive); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (noting that Supreme Court had previously
"adopted as a working hypothesis, as a matter of constitutional law, the view that
statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy, not to destruction of fundamental
rights" (discussing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885))); Davis v. Mills, 194
U.S. 451, 454 (1904) (stating that ordinarily statutes of limitation are viewed as
procedural, "affecting the remedy only and not the right").
15. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 722-29 (reaffirming ability of courts to characterize statutes of limitation as procedural based upon traditional choice of law practices); Margaret R. Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws: Modern
Analysis, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9-11 (noting that statutes of limitation protect
forum from need to adjudicate stale claims and defendant citizens from need to
defend for unlimited periods; such interests affect remedy not right, and therefore are characterized as procedural for conflict of laws purposes).
16. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (1934) (forum
uses its conflict of laws rule to determine if issue is substantive or procedural);
id. § 585 (once issue is determined to be procedural, law of forum applies). The
modern conflict of laws approaches pertaining to statutes of limitation issues
continue to follow this substantive-procedural dichotomy. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (Supp. 1971) (statute of limitations of
forum determines whether or not issue is barred); id. § 143 (only if foreign statute of limitations bars "the right and not merely the remedy" will it be applied).
The major distinction between the original and the modern conflict of law rules
is the method used to determine the proper substantive law to apply. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (Revisions 1988) (general rule

continues to be that forum applies its statute of limitations). For a further discussion of this complex area of conflict of laws jurisprudence, see EUGENE F.
& PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.8-.12 (1982); RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.2CI-C2 (3d ed. 1986);
SCOLES

Grossman, supra note 15, at 19-43.
17. Grossman, supra note 15, at 3-9 (following characterization of issue as
either substantive or procedural, court applies law of forum to matters of procedure and law of situs of injury to matters of substance).
18. As the Fourth Circuit noted:
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Notwithstanding the normal characterization of statutes of
limitation as procedural or remedial, 19 the courts developed exceptions to the traditional approach and sometimes characterized
limitations periods as substantive. 20 Courts use two main tests to
Statutes of limitation represent a public policy judgment by a State as
to the time at which an action becomes too stale to proceed in its
courts. States rightly may be concerned about the prosecution of
fraudulent claims and reliability of judgments rendered upon old
claims, where memories may have faded, witnesses may have died, and
evidence may have been lost. It has also been said that statutes of limitation also serve the interest of allowing defendants to rest assured
that, after a certain period of time, their exposure to liability has ended.
It is felt, and we agree, that the principal purpose of limiting statutes is
the prevention of stale claims, and that the repose of defendants is
merely an incidental benefit of such statutes. Statutes of limitation,
then, are primarily instruments of public policy and of court management, and do not confer upon defendants any right to be free from
liability, although this may be their effect.
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations and footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); see also Paul D. Carrington,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 290
(statutes of limitation serve as devices of judicial administration).
19. Courts and commentators have criticized the utility of characterizing
statutes of limitation as procedural or remedial because the labels can be
manipulated to achieve the court's desired disposition of the case. 3 ERNST
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 520 (2d ed. 1964). Professor Rabel identified the "fundamental inadequacy of the distinction between
'extinguishing the right' and only affecting the 'remedy' " as promoting characterization that can turn "upon the result sought." Id. (citing Edgar H. Ailes,
Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MICH. L. REV. 474, 493 n.116
(1933)); see also Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904) (observing that in cases
where statute of limitations can reasonably be considered substantive, court may
be willing to eliminate defendant's liability after limitations period expires);
Donna A. Boswell, Comment, The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of
Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447, 1465 n.99
(1988) ("The convenient fiction that rights have perpetual lives, while remedies
have a limited duration, [has] allowed courts to 'waive' the bar [of a statute of
limitations], or 'revive' the remedy [for a cause of action] in the interest of justice, without creating a new right upon which to base the plaintiff's recovery
once the statutory period ha[s] lapsed.").
The Fourth Circuit, however, has suggested that "the labels serve a useful
purpose in describing the various interests underlying the two types of laws."
Goad, 831 F.2d at 511. As the Supreme Court observed in Chase:
The abstract logic of the distinction between substantive rights and remedial or procedural rights may not be clear-cut, but it has been found
a workable concept to point up the real and valid difference between
rules in which stability is of prime importance and those in which flexibility is a more important value.
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
20. For an overview of the judicial exceptions to the general rule that statutes of limitation are procedural in nature, see Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154-56 (2d Cir. 1955) (describing various tests for characterizing statutes of limitation as procedural or substantive); SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 16, §§ 3.10-.11 (discussing two exceptions to general rule, substantive
characterization of limitations periods and borrowing statutes, both designed to
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determine whether statutes of limitation are substantive: the
"built-in" test and the "specificity" test. 2 ' Under the "built-in"
test, if a limitations period is contained in the same statute that
creates the cause of action, then the time limit is considered a part
of the substantive cause of action and its running extinguishes the
underlying right.2 2 Under the broader "specificity" test, even
though the limitations period is not included in the statute creating the action, but in a different statute, the limitations period
qualifies the right if it specifically relates to the particular cause of
action at issue. 23 Under either test, if the limitations period affects the substantive right and extinguishes an otherwise available
cause of action, the statute of limitations is considered substantive
for choice of law purposes.
limit forum shopping); Grossman, supra note 15, at 12-13 (examining four tests
used to determine whether foreign statute of limitations should be characterized
as substantive).
21. See Grossman, supra note 15, at 12-13.
22. United States v. Gammache, 713 F.2d 588, 592 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating
that if limitations period was incorporated into statute creating right then running of limitations period extinguished right); see also The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199, 214 (1886) (noting that limitations period incorporated in statute was condition attached to right to sue); Carrington, supra note 18, at 290-91 (observing
that "built-in" limitations period is "dimension of that right or claim" and is
therefore properly characterized as substantive).
23. Grossman, supra note 15, at 12-13. The specificity exception was first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Mills:
[T]he fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or the
same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is merely a
ground for saying that the limitation goes to the right created and accompanies the obligation everywhere. The same conclusion would be
reached if the limitation was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying
that it qualified the right.
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904); see also Mackey v.Judy's Foods, Inc., 654
F. Supp. 1465, 1480 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (indicating that so long as limitations
period is "directed specifically to the statutorily created liability" it can be considered substantive), aff'd, 867 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1989).
Some courts apply a liberal version of the test, finding that a statute of limitations extinguishes a substantive right "if it specifically relates to a particular
cause of action." Hafer v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F. Supp. 1216,
1218 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 554 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977). In Kalmich, the Seventh Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation of the specificity test. The court held that an Illinois statute of
limitations was directed to a statutory war crimes cause of action with sufficient
specificity to be regarded as a substantive part of the cause of action, even
though the limitations period had to be applied through an intermediary statute
and the various statutes involved were enacted at different times. Id. Other
courts have developed a restrictive formulation of the specificity test so that, to
be considered substantive, a statute of limitations "must be so inextricably
bound up in the statute creating the right that it is deemed a portion of the
substantive right itself." Thomas v. FMC Corp., 610 F. Supp. 912, 915 (M.D.
Ala. 1985).
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As noted, a statute of limitations generally bars any remedy
unless the cause of action is brought within a specified time period after the occurrence or discovery of an injury. In contrast, a
statute of repose terminates the cause of action after a specific
time period has elapsed, regardless of whether any injury has occurred or has even been discovered.2 4 Unlike the procedural or
remedial statutes of limitation that do not meet the built-in or
specificity tests, statutes of repose are characterized by the majority of jurisdictions as substantive. 2 5
24. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). In Menne v. Celotex Corp.,
the district court stated:
Statutes of limitation and repose may be distinguished both by
their method of operation and their underlying purpose ....
Statutes
of repose run from an arbitrary event such as the date of a product's
purchase, and do not use the date of the injury as a factor in computing
the limitation period. Statutes of limitation, on the other hand, generally "set much shorter time periods which run from the time the cause
of action accrues."
Statutes of limitation and repose may also be distinguished by their
respective purposes. In ordinary statutes of limitation, any repose provided to defendants is merely incidental. The main purpose of such
statutes is the prevention of stale claims . . . . Statutes of repose, in
contrast, operate as a grant of immunity [for a potential defendant] ....
Menne v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 662, 665-66 (D. Kan. 1989) (citations
omitted) (quoting Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 401-02 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985)); see also Wayne v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that "statutes [of repose]
acquire a substantive nature, barring rights of action even before injury has occurred if the injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Alves v. Siegel's Broadway Auto Parts, Inc., 710 F.
Supp. 864, 869 (D. Mass. 1989) ("[W]hen a statute of repose extinguishes a
cause of action, . . . '[t]he injury need not have occurred, much less have been
discovered.' " (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Mass. 1982))).
25. See, e.g., Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that in statutes of repose "the time for filing suit is engrafted onto a
substantive right created by law" and that "[s]tatutes of repose are meant to be
'a substantive definition of rights as distinguished from a procedural limitation
on the remedy used to enforce rights' " (quoting Bolick v. American Barmag
Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1982))), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); City
of Bluefield v. Autotrol Corp., 723 F. Supp. 362, 365 (S.D. W. Va. 1989) (analogizing statutes of repose to architects' and builders' statutes which create outer
limits of time within which statutes of limitation operate; once outer time limit
expires so does substantive right to bring suit); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500 v.
United States Gypsum Co., 719 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (D. Kan. 1989) (distinguishing statute of repose from statute of limitations by its effect on substantive
rights); Crouch v. General Elec. Co., 699 F. Supp. 585, 591 n.5 (S.D. Miss. 1988)
(holding that statute of repose extinguishes substantive right).
The procedural/substantive distinction for statutes of limitation and statutes of repose has important ramifications for potential litigants. A plaintiff may
be required to affirmatively plead satisfaction of a statute of repose as an essential element of the cause of action. See Wayne, 730 F.2d at 402 (requiring plaintiff
to prove claim filed within statute of repose period before cause of action under
Tennessee statute could be established); Condus v. Howard Say. Bank, 781 F.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/1

10

Palm: The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange A

1992]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION

B.

27A

1223

Statutes of Limitation in Rule 1Ob-5 Actions

Because section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do not expressly provide for a private right of action, it is not surprising that the provisions lack an express statute of limitations governing the
timeliness of private actions brought pursuant to them. 26 The
courts obviously needed to remedy the deficiency. Traditionally,
when Congress did not include an express statute of limitations
Supp. 1052, 1059 (D.N.J. 1992) (construing one-and-three-year limitations period of § 13 of Exchange Act as statute of repose to be applied to § 10(b) securities actions in light of Lampf and therefore requiring litigant to plead limitations
period as element of cause of action). A procedural statute of limitations is a
defense that is waived if not raised by the defendant, while a substantive statute
of repose is generally considered non-waivable. See Luzadder v. Despatch Oven
Co., 834 F.2d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that statute of repose "is a nonwaivable right, contrary to a statute of limitations, which is waived, if not alleged,
in a responsive pleading" (quoting Fetterhoffv. Fetterhoff, 512 A.2d 30, 32 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986))), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1988). This rule is consistent with
the substantive characterization of statutes of repose because the time limitation
is such an integral component of the substantive right that its protection cannot
be relinquished.
The majority of courts find critical differences between statutes of limitation
and statutes of repose. See, e.g., Goad, 831 F.2d at 510-11. Nonetheless, a minority of courts reject the substantive characterization of statutes of repose and regard both types of statutes as strictly procedural or remedial in nature. See
Wesley Theological Seminary v. United States Gypsum Co., 876 F.2d 119, 122
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting as "somewhat metaphysical" distinction between
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, based upon idea that statute of repose confers substantive rights, while statute of limitations governs purely procedural rights), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); see also Habenicht v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 660 F. Supp. 52, 53 (D. Conn. 1986) (rejecting majority view and
stating that statutes of repose, like statutes of limitation, simply prescribe time
period within which certain rights could be enforced); Hansen v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 574 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (emphasizing that statute of repose is procedural rule that only affects remedy). According to this perspective,
a statute of repose is analogous to a statute of limitations and characterized as a
procedural time limit which functions independently of any substantive cause of
action. The Supreme Court has suggested, in the context of a land sale contract
forfeiture action, that a statute of repose may function as a remedial device, altering a remedy rather than an obligation. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497, 506 n.9 (1965). The courts which have espoused this remedial characterization, however, have failed to provide any consistent rationale for this
viewpoint.
As will be discussed later, if the limitations period is considered substantive,
the cause of action is extinguished when the time period expires and cannot be
revived by legal or private means. On the other hand, if the limitations period is
procedural, the remedy is withheld upon the running of the period but can be
reinstated in a number of ways, including legislative modification of the limitations period. For a discussion of this procedural/substance distinction, see infra
notes 233-88 and accompanying text.
26. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Section 10(b) itself grants rulemaking authority to the SEC; because it
does not create a right of action, it is not accompanied by a statute of limitations."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
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period for violations of federal statutory law, courts "borrowed"
the most analogous limitations period of the forum state as the
27
applicable limitations period.
Before the decision in Lampf, courts generally utilized the
borrowing rule in lOb-5 actions. The application of the borrowing doctrine led to significant variations in the limitations periods
within and among the circuits for two reasons.28 First, even if the
courts chose the same type of cause of action as analogous, the
27. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773, 2778 (1991) (Justice Blackmun commenting that "[i]t is the usual rule that
when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of
action, a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to
the case at hand" (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895))); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395
(1946) (stating that courts interpreted congressional silence as encouraging federal practice of adopting local limitations periods).
This borrowing practice is also based on the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). See Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (noting that practice of borrowing statute of limitations from most analogous state cause of action derives
from Rules of Decision Act); Short, 908 F.2d at 1387 (stating that when Congress
is silent, Rules of Decision Act directs court to look to state law for limitations
period); see also Thomas H. Stewart, Note, One Statute, One Statute of Limitations; At
Last Uniformityfor Section 10(b) Claims: Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 533, 539 (1991) (observing that Rules of Decision Act provided impetus for practice of borrowing
state limitations period for federal cause of action).
Possible sources for an applicable statute of limitations include: using one
of the federal catchall limitations periods, adopting an applicable local law of
limitations, or applying a statute of limitations found in a similar section in the
federal securities law. For a discussion of the third option, see infra notes 59-68
and accompanying text. The federal catchall provisions which might be applicable include: 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988) (stating that civil actions against United
States must be brought within six years, subject to certain exclusions); id. § 2415
(limiting time period in which specified actions may be brought by United
States); and id. § 2462 (limiting time period in which actions for "enforcement
of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture" may be brought). None of the federal
catchall limitation periods, however, are applicable to private actions brought
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See Allison D. Garrett, The Ramshackle Edifice: Limitations Periodsfor Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 28 Duo. L. REV. 1, 2 &
n.6 (1989).
Garrett indicates that although § 2462(a) could apply to private actions
under Rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court has refused to extend its application. Id.
at 2 n.6. In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., the Supreme Court, in reference to the
predecessor of § 2462, stated:
The words "penalty or forfeiture" in this section refer to something
imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law, and do not
include a liability imposed for the purpose of redressing a private injury, even though the wrongful act be a public offense and punishable
as such.
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915).
28. The limitations period varied from as little as one year to as long as ten
years. See Garrett, supra note 27, at 19 n.116.
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limitations period for that cause of action often differed from
state to state. 29 Second, the courts disagreed on which type of
state limitations period to apply. 30 Although each court attempted to select a statute of limitations that effectuated the policy of the private cause of action under Rule lOb-5, they
disagreed on the best approach. For example, courts adopted the
state's fraud limitations period, 3' the state's blue sky limitations
period,3 2 the state's "general" or catchall limitations period 33 or
determined the applicable limitations period on a case-by-case
34
basis.
In addition to choosing different limitations periods for
lob-5 cases, the courts adopted different tolling rules.3 5 Tolling
rules determine what events suspend or temporarily stop the accrual or running of a limitations period. Tolling rules differ in
29. Compare Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Texas has two-year statute of limitations for fraud) with Marx v. Centran Corp.,
747 F.2d 1536, 1551 (6th Cir. 1984) (Ohio has four-year statute of limitations
for fraud), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
30. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task
Force on Statute of Limitationsfor ImpliedActions, 41 Bus. LAw. 645 app. A at 659-61
(1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (listing borrowing practice of each circuit).
31. Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 648-49. The authors indicate that a
state's common law fraud limitations period was often favored because it was
longer than the blue sky laws. Id. at 648. Moreover, the courts following this
view perceived the longer limitations period as more consistent with the liberal
approach to § 10(b) actions often taken by the federal courts. Id.; see, e.g., United
Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.) (favoring longer period because it served "broad remedial policies of federal securities laws"), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
32. Blue sky laws, like Rule lob-5, often include provisions prohibiting
fraud in the sale of securities. Some courts have relied on the state blue sky laws
because those laws have "a common purpose with the federal securities laws."
Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 13-14 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998
(1981); see also Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 1424 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (stating that blue sky statutes are more analogous to securities fraud than common
law fraud statutes); Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 650 (indicating that at time
of writing, four federal circuits applied blue sky laws).
33. Garrett, supra note 27, at 24-25 & n.151.
34. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1388 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Some [courts] borrow from the statute generally applicable to fraud;
some [courts] borrow from state blue sky laws; some courts use a little of each,
depending on the particulars of the claim under Rule lOb-5."), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2887 (1991); see also Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule
lOb-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 235, 243 (1989)
(describing district court opinion where court concluded, based on absence of
contrary language in circuit court opinions, that limitations period for lOb-5 action should be decided on case-by-case basis); Task Force Report, supra note 30, at
651 (acknowledging Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' practice of making case-by-case
determinations).
35. See Garrett, supra note 27, at 29-34.
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significant ways, including who has the burden of proofP6 and
whether the stacking of tolling events is permitted. 3 7 In choosing
tolling rules for lOb-5 actions, some courts adopted the federal
tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment.3 8 Other courts
adopted state tolling doctrines,3 9 which differ from the federal
tolling rules with respect to the events that toll the running of the
statute, the burden of proving concealment and the standard for
discovery of the fraud. Finally, some courts combined aspects of
40
both the federal and state tolling doctrines.
The variation of limitations periods and tolling doctrines applied by the courts created several problems. Because the events
constituting Rule lOb-5 violations often involved interstate trans42
actions, 4 ' at least two sets of state statutes had to be considered.
Once the court decided which state's law governed the limitations
period, it then had to decide if that state's conflict of laws rules
mandated the use of another state's statute of limitations. 4 3 Because many litigants often joined in a common suit with operative
facts arising from events that took place in different states, the
borrowing doctrine sometimes required the application of differ44
ent limitations periods to different litigants in the same case.
36. See, e.g., General Builders Supply Co. v. River Hill Coal Venture, 796
F.2d 8, 11-14 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, plaintiff
has burden of pleading compliance with statute of limitations, including any tolling issues).
37. "Stacking" of tolling events refers to the ability of a plaintiff to combine
the protections of federal and state equitable tolling doctrines. See Norris v.
Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
38. See, e.g., Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th
Cir. 1975) (relying on federal doctrine of equitable concealment in Rule lob-5
action). This doctrine allows tolling of the statute of limitations in a securities
action until the plaintiff knows or, with reasonable diligence, should have known
of the facts constituting the fraud. Id. at 1268. An exception to the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment exists when the fraud is actively concealed. Id. If the
defendant actively conceals the fraud, the statute of limitations period is tolled
until the plaintiff actually discovers the fraud. Id. The courts were divided over
the issue of whether the plaintiff in an actual concealment case had to use reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the fraud. See Garrett, supra note 27,
at 32 & n.195 (comparing cases supporting both views).
39. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland tolling provisions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
40. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.
1990) (stating that practice of court prior to adopting one-and-three-year limitations period was to utilize "overlay of tolling principles from state and federal
law"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
41. Id. at 1388 (explaining that transaction must first involve interstate
commerce for securities law to apply).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 n.21
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The problem was further compounded by the need to determine
which specific statute of limitations to borrow4 5 and which tolling
standard to apply. 4 6 The borrowing practices thus encouraged
forum shopping as plaintiffs searched for the venue with the longest statute of limitations 4 7 and most favorable tolling rules. 48 The
borrowing approach caused substantial uncertainty and excessive
litigation with respect to the applicable limitations period for
49
lOb-5 actions.
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that litigants in 26 states were subject to separate limitations periods as result of state borrowing doctrine).
45. As noted earlier, the courts usually had more than one state cause of
action from which to choose. Often the choice was among the limitations period
for the state's blue sky laws, the period for common law fraud actions or a "general" limitations period. For a discussion of these choices, see supra notes 27-34
and accompanying text.
46. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1389 ("Translating state periods of limitations to
federal court also has led to difficult questions concerning whose tolling and
estoppel doctrines apply: the state's, the federal court's, or both?"); see also Garrett, supra note 27, at 29-34 (discussing problems with respect to federal and
state tolling doctrines).
47. The venue provision of § 27 of the Exchange Act, "allows actions to be
brought where the violation occurred or where the defendant is found, is an
inhabitant, or transacts business." 15 U.S.C. § 7822 (1988). Thus, the problem
of forum shopping in Rule lOb-5 actions is exacerbated because venue for
§ 10(b) actions may be proper in many districts. Garrett, supra note 27, at 21.
48. Tolling doctrines differ significantly. For example, some tolling doctrines place the burden of persuasion on the party asserting the doctrine. See
Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir.) (asserting party bears burden of
persuasion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685,
695 (1st Cir. 1978) (assigning burden of proving compliance with limitations
period to plaintiff). Moreover, the legal standard determining when a plaintiff
had notice of the fraud differs under each tolling doctrine. Under some tolling
doctrines, a subjective legal standard is applied thereby allowing the court to
consider the plaintiff's sophistication. See, e.g., Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall,
Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979) (stating that "some
weight [is given] to ... the legal sophistication of the party involved"), aff'd, 651
F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). Other tolling doctrines
apply an objective legal standard which requires the plaintiff to exercise the diligence of a reasonable investor to discover the fraud. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1982) (indicating that under facts
of case, diligent plaintiff would have been apprised of fraud). Finally, stacking of
tolling events is not permitted under all tolling doctrines even though under
some tolling doctrines the statute of limitations is tolled for the duration of two
consecutively occurring events. Garrett, supra note 27, at 30 n.180.
49. Considerable judicial time and resources were devoted to deciding the
statute of limitations issues in lOb-5 cases. Professor Louis Loss commented
that "[t]his reference to state law makes for a great amount of utterly wasteful litigation." Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1168
(1983). In Norris, Judge Easterbrook, a critic of the borrowing practices in
§ 10(b) actions, noted that "[d]eciding which features of state periods of limitation to adopt for which federal statutes wastes untold hours." Norris, 818 F.2d at
1332. The ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities commented
that "[v]ast amounts ofjudicial time and attorneys' fees are wasted." Task Force
Report, supra note 30, at 647.
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These problems with the borrowing doctrine prompted many
commentators to call for a uniform federal limitations period for
lOb-5 actions. 50 In response, between 1988 and 1990, the Second, Third and Seventh Circuits adopted a uniform federal limitations period. 5 1 Deviating from the traditional borrowing rule,
these circuits relied on an alternative approach set out by the
Supreme Court in the 1987 case of Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff & Associates, Inc. 52
In Agency Holding, the Court announced an analytical framework for courts to use in choosing an appropriate statute of limitations to fill congressional gaps. 53 Under the Agency Holding
50. See, e.g., Hal M. Bateman & Gerald P. Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L.
REV. 165, 181 (1974) (offering critique that "[a] federal cause of action, derived
from a federal statutory policy and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts should be governed by an appropriate federal statute of limitations");
Garrett, supra note 27, at 34-40 (discussing alternatives to present "state of confusion" and calling for Supreme Court or congressional guidance regarding
Rule lOb-5 limitations period); David S. Ruder & Neil S. Cross, Limitations on
Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1151 ("A uniform federal
statute of limitations should replace the present system of searching for the applicable state statute."); Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 656 (indicating that
either judicial or legislative action was necessary to resolve problems); Gordon
W. Stewart, Note, Statutes of Limitation for Rule JOb-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1021, 1044-46 (1982) (proposing use of Federal Securities Code, if adopted by
Congress, as uniform Rule lob-5 limitations period); see also Short, 908 F.2d at
1389 ("Loud calls for reform issue from scholars and the bar. With a unanimity
unmatched in any other corner of securities law, everyone wants a simpler wayand to everyone that means a uniform federal statute of limitations.").
51. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding that application of state statutes of limitation to claims under Exchange
Act was inappropriate and that Congress would have intended uniform national
limitations period); Short, 908 F.2d at 1389 (holding that federal rather than
state law should control Rule lob-5 limitations period); In re Data Access Sys.
Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1545 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (concluding that Exchange
Act provisions are more analogous than state statutory limitations periods), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
52. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). One commentator characterized the Agency Holding approach as "The Well Kept Secret." Bloomenthal, supra note 34, at 246. In
Short, the court commented that the "[f]ederal courts are so accustomed to turning to state periods of limitations that we (and our colleagues in other circuits)
did this on auto-pilot, without discussing whether something differentiated securities laws from other statutes." Short, 908 F.2d at 1387.
53. The Agency Holding framework had evolved from a series of earlier court
decisions. The Supreme Court began to erode the general practice of borrowing the most analogous state statute of limitations in 1958. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958). In McAllister, the Court created a
narrow exception to the local borrowing rule, holding that a state's statute of
limitations would not be applied when doing so would deny a party the full benefit of a federal law. Id. at 225-26.
The Supreme Court expanded the exception in 1983. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the Court held
that the state borrowing rule would not be applied "when a rule from elsewhere
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framework, a court first decides whether the federal statute requires uniform treatment of all claims arising under the statute or
whether the statute of limitations issue should be decided on a
case-by-case basis. 54 If the court decides a uniform period is required, it then determines whether state or federal law provides
the most appropriate limitations period. 55 Although the Agency
Holding Court reaffirmed the general rule of borrowing the local
limitations period, 56 it held that if the court determines that Congress would not have intended the use of a state statute of limita57
tions, then a federal limitations period should be selected.
in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and
when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." Id. at
172. The DelCostello Court stressed that the exception was very limited and acknowledged that the state borrowing practice was still the norm. Id. at 171.
In a 1985 revisitation of the issue, the Court stated that, in selecting a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the court must first consider
whether all claims arising out of the federal action "should be characterized in
the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon
the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual
case." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). The Court also observed that
the characterization of a federal claim for statute of limitations purposes was a
question of federal law. Id. at 269-70. Using this framework, the Wilson Court
determined that the federal interest in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation" required the adoption of a uniform rule for determining which limitations period applied to actions brought under § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. The Wilson
Court characterized § 1983 claims as tort actions for the recovery of damages
for personal injuries and required the district courts to borrow the most closely
analogous state statute of limitations pertaining to personal injury actions. Id. at
276. Thus, the Court established a uniform federal rule with respect to the specific type of state limitations law borrowed when a court needs to choose from
more than one state statute of limitations.
Finally, in the 1987 Agency Holding decision the Supreme Court combined
the Wilson test and the DelCostello exception. Commenting on the Supreme
Court's holding in Agency Holding, the Second Circuit has observed:
Among the themes to be distilled from the Supreme Court's recent
borrowing discussions are that selection of a uniform federal limitations period may be warranted (1) where the statutory claim in question
covers a multiplicity of types of actions, leading to the possible application of a number of different types of state statutes of limitations, (2)
where the federal claim does not precisely match any state-law claim,
(3) where the challenged action is multistate in nature, perhaps leading
to forum shopping and inordinate litigation expense, and (4) where a
federal statute provides a very close analogy.
Ceres, 918 F.2d at 357.
54. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147.
55. Id.
56. Id. (reaffirming general assumption that Congress intended, through its
silence, to encourage local borrowing practices).
57. Id. at 147-48. Applying this analytical framework to the litigants in the
Agency Holding case, the Court held that the adoption of a uniform statute of
limitations was justified by the need for uniformity and certainty in the federal
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Thus, the statute of limitations issue was subtly transformed from
a selection process that automatically borrowed state law to one
in which courts attempted to determine congressional intent in
situations where Congress had remained silent.
Applying the Agency Holding framework to lOb-5 claims, 58 the
Second, Third and Seventh Circuits determined that the federal
interest in uniformity, certainty and the minimization of litigation
dictated a uniform approach to lOb-5 actions. 59 Noting that the
Exchange Act, the statute from which the implied cause of action
sprang, contained express causes of action similar to those arising
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and that those express causes
of action had express limitations periods, 60 these circuits concluded that the selection of a federal limitations period was appropriate. 6 ' Because state statutes of limitation were not
designed with a federal cause of action in mind, the three circuits
reasoned that the federal limitations periods found in other sections of the Exchange Act provided a better analogy to Rule
lOb-5 than state alternatives. 6 2 The three circuits also recognized
that the confusion, forum shopping and wasteful litigation crecourts. Id. at 149. Unlike the ultimate disposition in Wilson, however, the Agency
Holding Court found that a federal statute, the Clayton Act, rather than a state
statute provided the best analogy for the civil RICO action before it. Id.
58. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 356-60 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing Agency Holding as support, Second Circuit joined Third and Seventh Circuits in applying federal limitations period to claims brought under Exchange
Act); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1388 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that DelCostello and Agency Holding indicate that when federal law provides closer analogy than state statutes, federal limitations period is more appropriate), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843
F.2d 1537, 1543 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (stating that previous approach utilized by
court must be modified in light of Agency Holding), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849
(1988); see also Bloomenthal, supra note 34, at 266-69 (examining Third Circuit's
acceptance of uniform limitations period in Data Access).
59. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 360-61 (holding that "judicial selection of a uniform
nationwide limitations period is what Congress would have intended for private
rights of action judicially implied under those laws"); Short, 908 F.2d at 1389
(agreeing with commentators calling for uniform federal statute of limitations);
Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543-44 (noting that uniform statute of limitations
would reduce uncertainty and excessive litigation).
60. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362 (concluding that § 9(e) and § 18(a) of Exchange
Act were most analogous and noting that these provisions had same limitations
period); Short, 908 F.2d at 1392 (stating that § 13, with its express limitations
period, was most analogous to Rule lob-5 actions); Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548
(indicating that § 9(e), § 16(b), § 18(c) and § 29(b) were companion provisions
to § 10(b) and were more analogous than state statutes).
61. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 364; Short, 908 F.2d at 1388; Data Access, 843 F.2d at
1545.
62. E.g., Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362; Short, 908 F.2d at 1392; Data Access, 843 F.2d
at 1548.
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ated by the local borrowing practices in 1Ob-5 actions provided
additional justification for the adoption of a uniform federal rule
as "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." 6 3 The three circuits rejected the normal local borrowing rule and adopted a uniform federal limitations period for
lOb-5 actions.
The uniform federal limitations period chosen by the three
circuits was a one-and-three-year rule, which is the repose period
for a number of the express statutory causes of action in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. 6 4 This limitations period requires that an action be brought within one year after discovery of
the violation and no later than three years after the violation occurs. 6 5 The courts found that the purposes underlying the ex-

press actions to which the express one-and-three-year limitations
period applied provided the closest analogy to the purposes be66
hind lOb-5 actions.
The three circuits also found that the doctrine of equitable
67
tolling was incompatible with the three-year period of repose.
63. DataAccess, 843 F.2d at 1542 (citing DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983)); see also Ceres, 918 F.2d at 355; Short, 908
F.2d at 1389; Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539.
64. The Second Circuit found that the limitations periods of § 9(e) and
§ 18(a) of the Exchange Act provided the best analogy. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362.
The Seventh Circuit determined that § 13 of the Securities Act, as amended by
the Exchange Act, provided the closest analogy to lob-5 actions. Short, 908 F.2d
at 1392. The Third Circuit generally adopted the one-and-three-year limitations
period from the Exchange Act, citing to the "companion provisions" § 9(e),
§ 16(b), § 18(c) and § 29(b), three of which contained the express limitations
period adopted. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548.
The three circuits rejected the SEC's position that § 20A(b)(4) of the Exchange Act, which provides a five-year limitations period for certain insider trading actions, was the most appropriate of the federal securities acts limitations
periods to apply. See Ceres, 918 F.2d at 362-63; Short, 908 F.2d at 1388, 1390-93;
Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548-49. For example, the Second Circuit rejected
§ 20A because it was restricted to insider trading, which represented only one
aspect of § 10(b). Ceres, 918 F.2d at 363. The court thought that the other sections of the Exchange Act were more closely analogous to § 10(b) actions. Id. at
362-63.
65. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550.
66. For example, the Data Access court observed that § 10(b) and the other
selected Exchange Act provisions reflected the same purpose: to "provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes." Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975)); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988).
67. See Ceres, 918 F.2d at 361-63 (observing that three-year period was most
appropriate as outside limit); Short, 908 F.2d at 1391 (determining that if equitable tolling of three-year period of repose were allowed, then period of repose
would be useless); Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1546 (indicating that there were valid
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Consequently, once the limitations period begins to run, no equitable principles stop or suspend the limitations clock. In other
words, if the 1Ob-5 action is not brought within three years of the
alleged violation, the action is time-barred regardless of when the
violation is discovered. The three-year period acts as a statute of
repose; once the time to bring suit expires, the substantive right
to bring the action is extinguished. 6
The other circuits refused to follow the lead of the Second,
Third and Seventh Circuits, and maintained the customary local
borrowing practice. 69 Thus, the confusion, waste and forum
shopping surrounding lOb-5 actions continued in those circuits.
These problems were compounded by the emergence of another
possible limitations period-the new one-and-three-year rule
adopted by the three circuits.
C.

The Lampf Decision

On June 20, 1991, the United States Supreme Court finally
addressed the problem of the limitations period for 10b-5 actions
in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.70 In Lampf,
the Supreme Court adopted the uniform one-and-three-year rule
as the law of the land for 10b-5 private actions.
The facts of Lampf are simple. From 1979 to 1981, the plaintiffs purchased interests in seven limited partnerships in Connecticut. 7 1 The partnerships failed. After an IRS investigation, the
reasons for three-year period of repose in companion provisions of Exchange
Act).
68. The Seventh Circuit noted that the reason for extinguishing substantive
rights in securities fraud actions was "to curtail the extent to which the securities
laws permit recoveries based on the wisdom given by hindsight." Short, 908 F.2d
at 1392. The Seventh Circuit further noted:
Prices of securities are volatile. If suit may be postponed indefinitely
on equitable grounds [because the applicable limitations period is a
procedural statute of limitations], then investors may gamble with other
people's money. An investor... may sell her shares for a price certain.
If the firm does poorly, she keeps the money; if it does well, she sues
and asks for the increase in value.
Id.
69. See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines &Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that precedent required application of state limitations
period); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to adopt
uniform federal limitations period until issue was addressed by Circuit en banc);
Smith v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding
that "statute of limitations for section 10(b) claims is the period that the forum
state applies to the most closely analogous state claim").
70. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
71. Id. at 2776.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/1

20

Palm: The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange A

1992]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION

27A

1233

plaintiffs were denied certain claimed federal tax benefits. 72 The
plaintiffs brought suit against the New Jersey law firm of Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow, and others, alleging that the
defendants made material misrepresentations in the offering
73
memorandum in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
The plaintiffs commenced their action on November 3, 1986,
74
in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
The plaintiffs alleged that they first learned of the misrepresentations in 1985. 7 5 The district court found that the plaintiffs were
on inquiry notice of the violations as early as October 1982,76 and
that there was insufficient evidence of concealment to trigger equitable tolling. 7 7 After deciding that the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations was Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, the district court held that the plaintiffs'
claims were untimely and granted summary judgment for the
78
defendants.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
72. Id. The plaintiffs had purchased the partnership interests for federal
tax reasons. When the partnerships failed, the IRS denied the plaintiffs the
claimed tax benefits because the partnership assets were overvalued and there
was insufficient showing of a profit motive. Id.
73. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the misrepresentations included assurances by the defendants that the limited partnership investments would bring
substantial tax benefits and that the computer products offered for sale were
readily marketable and would generate a profit. Id. at 2776-77.
74. Id. at 2776.
75. Id. at 2777. According to the plaintiffs, they received notice of the alleged misrepresentations for the first time when the IRS disallowed the tax benefits claimed. Id.
76. Id. The district court found that the plaintiffs were furnished with periodic reports showing declines in the financial status of the partnerships. In addition, the court determined that the general partners knew of the allegations of
misconduct as early as October 1982, and therefore the plaintiffs were on "inquiry notice" as to fraud at that time. Id.
77. Id. The plaintiffs argued that reports provided by the defendants and
the installation of a particular individual as the general partner combined to
fraudulently conceal from the limited partners the extent of the misrepresentation regarding the tax shelter status of the limited partnerships. Brief for Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. D at 42A, Lampf, 111 S.
Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. The trial
court rejected this argument, noting that in order to toll the statute of limitations through a fraudulent concealment allegation the "plaintiff must demonstrate affirmative conduct on the defendant's part which, under the
circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe he did not have a
claim." Id. at 41A.
78. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777. The trial court followed circuit precedent in
finding the local statute of limitations for fraud to be the most analogous period
to apply to federal securities claims. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 77, at
35A; see also Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1980).
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that Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for fraud was the applicable limitations period for lOb-5 actions. 79 The appellate
court reversed, however, finding that there were unresolved
factual issues concerning when the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of the alleged misrepresentations.8 0
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held
that the statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions is the one-andthree-year limitations period found in a number of express limitations provisions in other sections of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. 8 l The Court applied the new rule to the litigants
in Lampf and dismissed the case because the plaintiffs had not
commenced the action within three years of the alleged
82
misrepresentations.
The majority acknowledged that the normal judicial practice
was to borrow the limitations period of the most closely analogous local law when a federal statute did not contain an express
limitations period.8 3 The Court, however, reaffirmed the vitality
of the exception to the local borrowing rule that it had announced
in Agency Holding.84 The Lampf Court reiterated the three-step
procedure it had announced in Agency Holding for lower courts to
79. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777. In adopting the Oregon state statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a uniform
federal statute of limitations should apply. Id.
80. Id. For the text of the unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion, see Petition
for Certiorari, supra note 77, at app. B.
81. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
82. Id. at 2782. Although not addressed in the majority opinion in Lampf,
the litigants did brief the retroactive effect of the Court's decision. Brief for
Respondents at 45-48, Lampf, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333); Reply Brief
for Petitioner at 18-20, Lampf, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333). The plaintiffs argued that the application of the test announced in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), dictated prospective application of the new limitations period. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2787. For a discussion of the Chevron Oil case,
see infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
83. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion
and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall and White. Id.
at 2776. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion in which he concurred in all parts of the
decision, including the judgment, except for the Court's decision to borrow an
analogous federal statute of limitations. Id. at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 2778-79. For a discussion of the Agency Holding framework as an
exception to the local borrowing rule, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying
text.
Although Justice Scalia concurred, he rejected the Agency Holding framework. In Justice Scalia's opinion, when an express cause of action lacks an express limitations period provided by Congress, then either the local borrowing
rule is utilized or, if there are no analogous state statutes from which to derive a
limitations period, no limitations period is applied to the cause of action. Id. at
2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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use in determining the appropriate limitations period for federal
claims in situations where Congress did not provide an express
limitations period.8 5 First, the court must determine if the cause
of action requires a uniform statute of limitations. 8 6 Second, the
court considers the risk of forum shopping to determine if the
borrowed limitations period should be based on federal or state
law.8 7 Third, even when this geographical factor weighs in favor
of borrowing a federal limitations period, the court must determine whether the federal statute provides a "closer fit" than the
applicable state statute of limitations before the court abandons
the normal practice of borrowing the state rule. 88 The Lampf

Court indicated that each step should be analyzed with the purpose of furthering the goal and operation of the underlying sub89
stantive federal law.

After detailing the analytical framework for the normal case,
the Court observed that lOb-5 actions are judicially implied and
therefore present a distinguishable situation from other federal
causes of action that lack an express limitations period. 90 Because
the cause of action is implied, it is difficult to ascertain the intent
of Congress concerning the appropriate limitations period. 9'
85. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
86. Id. at 2779. The Court stated:
Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to "encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" such that a single state limitations period may not be consistently applied within a jurisdiction, we
have concluded that the federal interests in predictability and judicial
economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for
borrowing purposes.
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1985)).
87. Id. The Court noted that when a claim was multistate in nature, thereby
increasing the risk of multiple limitations periods, the selection of a federal limitations period was preferable to minimize the dangers of forum shopping and
protracted, expensive litigation. Id. (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)).
88. Id.
89. Id. In summing up the three-step analysis, Justice Blackmun observed
that "[a]lthough considerations pertinent to [the court's] determination will necessarily vary depending upon the federal cause of action and the available state
and federal analogues, such factors as commonality of purpose and similarity of
elements will be relevant." Id.
90. Id.
91. The fictitious search for nonexistent congressional intent in the case of
an implied right of action is odd. As noted above, Agency Holding provides a
framework for choosing a limitations period in situations where Congress provides an express private right of action but omits a statute of limitations. Gleaning what limitations period Congress would want in such situations makes some
sense. Relying on any notion of congressional intent when dealing with an implied private right of action, like a Rule lOb-5 action, borders on the ludicrous.
Undaunted by the task, the Lampf Court stated:

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 1

1236

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1213

Therefore, according to the Court, when the cause of action is
implied under a statute and the statute of origin contains other
express causes of action with express limitations periods, a court
should look first to the statute of origin for an analogous limitations period. 92 The Court stated that lower courts should resort
to the local borrowing practice in such situations only if there is
no analogous cause of action in the statute of origin. 93 This holding constituted an important new exception to the traditional borrowing rule but was consistent with recent prior holdings, at least
to the extent that it reaffirmed the search for congressional intent.
Applying the new exception to the lOb-5 case before it, the
Court noted that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act contain
a number of express provisions with a one-and-three-year limitations period. 94 Specifically, the Court pointed to the language of
sections 9(e) 95 and 18(c) 9 6 of the Exchange Act, which deal with
the willful manipulation of stock prices and misleading filings, respectively. The Court reasoned that borrowing the limitations
period from these provisions was appropriate because these sec'9 7
tions "target the precise dangers that are the focus of § 10(b)."
In a case such as this, we are faced with the awkward task of discerning
the limitations period that Congress intended courts to apply to a cause
of action it really never knew existed. Fortunately, however, the drafters of § 10(b) have provided guidance [in other sections of the Securities and Exchange Acts].
Id. at 2780.
92. Id. Although the Court mentioned the factors of the Agency Holding
framework that when applied will often lead the court to apply the local borrowing rule, the Court's new exception for implied causes of action essentially created a strong preference for adopting a borrowed federal provision. "We can
imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced the policy
considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by
the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections." Id. Therefore,
although the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as the three circuits
that adopted the one-and-three-year limitations period prior to Lampf, the
Court's reasoning was significantly different because it created a previously unrecognized exception to the local borrowing doctrine.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Section 9(e) of the Exchange Act provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within
three years after such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988).
96. Section 18(c) of the Exchange Act provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and
within three years after such cause of action accrued." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c)
(1988).
97. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court noted the similarities of the provisions in that "[e]ach was intended to facilitate a central goal: 'to protect inves-
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The Court also took note of the one-and-three-year limitations
period contained in section 13 of the Securities Act, which covers
actions brought under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. 98
Acknowledging the slight differences in the language of the express limitations provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Court observed that if the variation ever became
relevant, the language of section 9(e) of the Exchange Act would
control. 99

The Court rejected the SEC's argument that the five-year period of repose contained in section 20A of the Exchange Act' 0 0
was the most appropriate limitations period.' 0 ' The Court emphasized that section 20A, which accompanied the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (Insider
Trading Act), was enacted fifty years after the other sections of
the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. 10 2 In addition, the
Court noted that section 20A dealt only with the specific
problems involved in insider trading cases, and therefore did not
have as broad a reach as Rule lOb-5.10 3 As a result, the Court
decided that the provisions of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act containing the one-and-three-year limitations period pro10 4
vided a better analogy for lOb-5 actions.
The Court next addressed the applicability of equitable tolltors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions
upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.' " Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976)).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
99. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4) (1988) (added to Exchange Act in 1988). The
relevant language of the section provides: "No action may be brought under this
section more than 5 years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject
of the violation." Id.
101. Lampf, 111 S.Ct. at 2781.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Court recognized that § 20A was drafted to deal with the
unique problems implicated by insider trading, particularly evidentiary and detection problems. Id. The Court also believed that the drafters of § 20A did not
intend it to have application beyond the Insider Trading Act. Id. To support
this conclusion, the Court cited § 20A(d), which states that "[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring
an action to enforce a requirement of this chapter or the availability of any cause
of action implied from a provision of this chapter." Lampf, 111 S.Ct. at 2781
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1988)).
104. The Second, Third and Seventh Circuits in adopting the one-andthree-year limitations period also had rejected the SEC's argument that § 20A
provided the closest analogy. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349,
363 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th
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ing to the new rule.l 0 5 The Court found that the doctrine of equitable tolling was "fundamentally inconsistent with the 1-and-3year structure."1 0 6 Because the one-year period did not begin to
run until after the facts constituting the fraud were discovered,
equitable tolling was unnecessary with respect to the one-year
limit.10 7 The Court thought that the application of the doctrine
of equitable tolling was inconsistent with the three-year period of
repose because the underlying purpose of the three-year rule was
to provide an outside limit after which no action could be
maintained. 0
Four Justices dissented. 0 9 In Justice O'Connor's dissent,
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I 1I S. Ct. 2887 (1991); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig.,
843 F.2d 1537, 1550 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
105. Lampf, III S.Ct. at 2782.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of equitable tolling and an evaluation of the equitable tolling discussion in Lampf, see Lyman Johnson, Securities
Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 607.
The Lampf Court's refusal to apply equitable tolling principles was consistent with the approach taken by other courts in actions governed by § 9(e) of the
Exchange Act. See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 792
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding three-year limitations period to be absolute bar), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); see also Bloomenthal, supra note 34, at 288 (discussing how incorporation of both one-year and three-year periods could only mean
three-year period supplied absolute outside limit).
109. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. Lampf, 111 S. Ct.
at 2783 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens thought the majority's decision
allowed courts to assume the role of lawmaker and saw two problems with such
judicial action. First, Justice Stevens noted that "[wihen the Court ventures into
this lawmaking arena.., it inevitably raises questions concerning the retroactivity of its new rule that are difficult and arguably inconsistent with the neutral,
non-policy making role of the judge." Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he believed that precedent required the continuation of the local borrowing doctrine, a doctrine which had been recognized for "several decades"
and had its basis in the Rules of Decision Act. Id. at 2784 & n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Although Justice Stevens agreed that a uniform federal statute of
limitations was warranted, he thought that Congress, rather than the Court,
should decide whether policy concerns dictated the abandonment of the local
borrowing rule in lOb-5 litigation. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
also rejected the exception created in DelCostello and refined in Agency Holding.
Id. at 2784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this exception to the
local borrowing rule, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
Justice Kennedy also dissented separately, joined by Justice O'Connor.
Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy agreed with
much of the majority opinion in that he recognized the need for a uniform statute of limitations, agreed that the proper procedure in an implied cause of action was to look first to the statute of origin and also agreed with the exception
established in DelCostello. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, although Justice Kennedy accepted adoption of the limitations period of one year from discovery of the fraud, he disagreed with the adoption of the three-year period of
repose. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Justice Kennedy, the three-
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she argued that the new rule should not be applied to the litigants
in the Lampf case, but that the Court should follow its holding in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 11o and apply the Lampf rule prospectively.Il' Unswayed by Justice O'Connor's dissent, the Court applied the new uniform federal statute of limitations to the litigants
in Lampf and dismissed the case without specifically addressing
whether the new rule would be given retroactive or prospective
effect in other pending lOb-5 cases. The legal principles governing the decision to adopt a new judicial rule retroactively or
prospectively are explored in the next part.
III.
A.

CHOICE OF LAW FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONs ANNOUNCING A
NEW RULE OF LAW

Retroactive or Prospective Application of a New Rule of Law

When a court announces a new rule of law, the court must
determine who will be affected by that new law. Of course, all
claims arising after the announcement of the new rule of law will
be governed by it. When faced with a claim that arose before the
date of the new rule of law, the court must decide whether the
new law or the old law applies. This question is often referred to
year period of repose was contrary to the purpose of Rule lOb-5 because it created an absolute time-bar on private § 10(b) actions which
conflict[ed] with traditional limitations periods for fraud-based actions,
frustrate[d] the usefulness of [§] 10(b) in protecting defrauded investors, and impose[d] severe practical limitations on a federal implied
cause of action that ha[d] become an essential component of the protection the law gives to investors who have been injured by unlawful
practices.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). For a discussion of the Chevron Oil analysis, see
infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
111. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor stated that nothing in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.
Ct. 2439 (1991) compromised the vitality of Chevron Oil in the Lampf case. Lampf,
111 S. Ct. at 2787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She then applied the Chevron Oil
framework to the Lampf case as follows:
First, in adopting a federal statute of limitations, the Court overrules
clearly established Circuit precedent; the Court admits as much. Second, the Court explains that "the federal interes[t] in predictability"
demands a uniform standard. I agree, but surely predictability cannot
favor applying retroactively a limitations period that the respondent
could not possibly have foreseen. Third, the inequitable results are obvious. After spending four-and-one-half years in court and tens of
thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, respondents' suit is dismissed
for failure to comply with a limitations period that did not exist until
today.
Id. at 2787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal references omitted).
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as a choice of law issue.' 2 The next section discusses the options
available to the courts when making this choice of law determination. The Article then reviews the principal Supreme Court cases
on the issue concluding with the Court's recent decision in Beam.
1. Judicial Options for Applying a New Rule of Law
Retroactive application of a newly announced rule of law is
the normal practice." 13 If the new judicial rule is applied retroactively, it is applied to all nonfinal claims, including: the claims
made in the case in which the new rule is announced," 4 all pending cases containing the same causes of action at the time of the
decision,' ' 5 and claims arising from facts predating the announce112. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443
(1991) ("Since the question is whether the court should apply the old rule or the
new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice
of law."). In Beam, Justice Souter identified three methods of dealing with a
choice of law issue; retroactivity, prospectivity and selective prospectivity. Id. at
2443-44. Other authorities have recognized additional possible options. For
example, the court may choose prospective-prospective application of a new decision where the court announces a new rule of law in a particular case but
grants a time delay between that case and the time when application of the new
rule of law begins. See Cameron S. DeLong, Note, Confusion in Federal Courts:
Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive-Prospective Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L.
REV. 117, 127; Note, Prospective-ProspectiveOverruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 81
(1966).
113. See DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 119, 125. The decision to apply a
new rule retroactively comports with a number of generally accepted theories
about the judiciary's proper function in our legal system. First, retroactivity requires courts to decide all cases based upon the court's current understanding of
the law as it exists at the time of the decision. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443;
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 119. In Beam, Justice Souter relied on Justice
Harlan's opinion in Mackey. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443. Second, retroactive application of a new law is consistent with the courts' established role of interpreting
the law, and not assuming the legislative role of making law. Id. (noting that
declaratory theory of law means that judges do not make law, rather they find
law as it always was). Justice Harlan noted that the power of the Court to "disregard current law in adjudicating cases before [the Court] that have not already
run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that [the
Court's] constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring). In other words, when a
change in the law is announced, theoretically, the changed law was actually the
law as it always was, and therefore was the law that applied to claims which arose
prior to the announcement of a change in the law. Finally, retroactive application arguably treats all similarly situated individuals equally. See Beam, 111 S.
Ct. at 2444 (noting that when court practices selective prospectivity, court
breaches principle that all litigants are to be treated equally).
114. Beam, I IS. Ct. at 2443.
115. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987)
("The usual rule is that federal cases should be decided in accordance with the
law existing at the time of decision."); Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,
311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) (holding that in diversity case in which there was inter-
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ment of the new rule." 6 Retroactive application of a judicial
change in the law does not, however, revive- either claims barred
by res judicata or claims otherwise barred by a procedural barrier
7
such as a statute of limitations.''
Instead of giving a new pronouncement retroactive effect, the
court could give the new rule purely prospective effect. In such a
case, the new rule applies only to claims arising after the date of
the decision."I 8 The new rule does not apply to the litigants in
veningjudicial change in law, appellate court must decide case based on current
state of law, not law as it was when lower court decided case); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935) (vacating lower court's judgment and remanding because law on which lower court had relied was changed by subsequent
decision); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801) ("[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the
law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied."); cf Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969). In Thorpe, the Court recognized the general rule
that "an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision." Id. at 281. The Court went on to state that the "same reasoning has
been applied where the change was constitutional, statutory, or judicial." Id. at
282 (footnotes omitted).
116. See DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 125 ("[A] new rule [is applied]
retroactively when all conduct open to some form ofjudicial review is subject to
the new rule.").
117. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443; see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final,
unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may
have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
375 (1940) (holding that final decree based on statute later found unconstitutional was not to be overturned because decision was final and relitigation was
barred by res judicata).
The exception to retroactive application arises from the policy of protecting
the finality of litigation. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2447. In Beam, the Court expressed
that "[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of that contest, and that
matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties."
Id. (quoting Federated Dept Stores, 452 U.S. at 401); see also American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 212 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When
the legal rights of parties have been finally determined, principles 'of public policy and of private peace' dictate that the matter not be open to relitigation every
time there is a change in the law." (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at
401)).
118. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443 (stating that under pure prospective application, new rule affects only conduct or events occurring after date of decision);
Smith, 496 U.S. at 187 (holding that prospective application of decision declaring
flat highway tax unconstitutional meant that new rule applied to taxation which
occurred after case in which new rule of law announced); DeLong, Note, supra
note 112, at 126 ("Pure prospective overruling occurs when a new rule governs
only claims arising after the court's decision." (footnotes omitted)); Comment,
Prospective Application ofJudicialDecisions, 33 ALA. L. REV. 463,470 (1982) (observing that pure prospective ruling does not apply to parties before court or to facts
or transactions that occurred prior to ruling).
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the case announcing the new rule of law, nor to any similarly situated litigants whose claims arose before the decision. This choice
of law method recognizes that people rely on precedent and that,
in some circumstances, it is unfair to apply a change in the law to
people whose actions or inactions were shaped by the law existing
at the time those events occurred." 9 Although critics object to
purely prospective application of new judicial rules on both constitutional and policy grounds, 20 courts have applied both crimi2
nal and civil rules prospectively.' '
Occasionally, courts engage in selective or modified prospecThroughout this Article, the term "prospective" means purely prospective
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
119. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2444 (noting that in some cases in which party has
relied on old rule, application of new rule would "offend basic notions ofjustice
and fairness").
120. See generally Comment, supra note 118, at 470-71. One of the primary
criticisms of prospective adjudication is that the court does not fulfill its adjudicatory function by giving a law pure prospective effect, because such an approach is more consistent with the legislative role of making the law rather than
the judicial role of interpreting the law. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2444. The Court
recently observed that prospective application of a new law does violence to the
doctrine of stare decisis by making it too easy for the courts to make new law.
Id.; see also Comment, supra note 118, at 471 (stating that critics have labeled
prospective technique as "judicial legislation").
Another major concern with respect to pure prospective rulings is that
when a court adjudicates in this way, a court exceeds the power granted through
Article III of the United States Constitution that gives courts the authority to
decide "cases and controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Arguably, when a
court does not apply the law to the litigants in the case in which the law is announced, a court is not deciding a case or controversy and therefore the rule of
law announced is technically dicta or merely an advisory opinion. See Comment,
supra note 118, at 471. Prospective application also contravenes the principle
that courts must decide cases based on their best current understanding of the
law. Id. Critics also claim that pure prospectivity is a disincentive for litigants to
argue for a change in the law. This assertion is based on the belief that a litigant
will not expend resources to argue for the adoption of a new rule of law if that
litigant will not benefit from the new law. Id.
121. Although not presently used, the Supreme Court has utilized pure
prospectivity in the civil sphere. See Smith, 496 U.S. at 187 (declaring that decision invalidating state highway use tax would not be applied retroactively);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88
(1982) (concluding that prior decision granting broad jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1471 was unconstitutional and should not be applied
retroactively); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 207-09 (1973) (declining to
retroactively apply prior decision that declared state statute unconstitutional,
thereby allowing reimbursement to nonpublic sectarian schools for services performed prior to ruling); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971)
(holding decision requiring adoption of state's one-year statute of limitations
should not be applied retroactively); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1964) (refusing to apply prior holding that
when claim is brought in state court and fully adjudicated, claim is precluded in
federal court). The Court has also applied pure prospectivity in criminal cases.
See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (holding that Court's
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tivity.122 Selective prospectivity occurs when the court applies the
new rule to some, but not all, of the nonfinal claims that arose
before the date of the decision announcing the new rule. Selective prospectivity arose in response to the perceived constitutional problems of purely prospective adjudication. The reliance
of some but not all litigants on the old rule is the primary justification for applying a new rule in a selectively prospective manner.12 3 Those litigants who relied on the old rule ought to have
their actions judged in accordance with that rule and those litigants who did not rely on the old rule ought to have no claim that
the old rule should govern their case. By applying the new rule to
the litigants in some cases, typically at least in the case in which
the new law is announced, the courts eliminated the criticism that
pure prospectivity permitted the courts to render advisory opinions in contravention of Article III's "case or controversy"
24
requirement. 1
2.

The Chevron Oil Test

At the time Lampf was decided, courts were using the test developed by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 125 to
decide whether a new judicially announced rule of law should be
given retroactive or prospective application in civil cases. In Chevron Oil the issue was whether the Supreme Court would retroactively apply a new rule of law it had announced in an earlier
decision to determine the relevant statute of limitations applica26
ble to the Chevron Oil litigants.'
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), excluding evidence seized in
violation of Fourth Amendment, would not apply retroactively).
122. Beam, Ill S. Ct. at 2444 (recognizing that selective prospectivity was
first utilized by Court in criminal cases); see, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31,
32 (1975) (holding that new rule announced in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975), which was applied to party in Taylor, would not be applied retroactively to appellants whose convictions occurred prior to date of Taylor holding);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (holding that new rule of law announced in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which was applied to
party in Wade, would not be applied retroactively); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (holding that decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), should be applied
retroactively only to cases in which trial was commenced after dates of those
decisions). Selective prospectivity has been referred to as quasi-prospectivity by
some commentators. See, e.g., DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 127-28.
123. DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 127-28.
124. Id. at 128.
125. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
126. Id. at 105. In the earlier decision, the Court announced that all cases
arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act) would not be
governed by general admiralty law as prior cases had held, but would be gov-
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The Chevron Oil Court developed a three-factor test to determine whether a new rule of law should be given prospective effect. First, a court considers whether the rule at issue in fact
establishes a new principle of law or overturns clear past precedent. 12 7 The announcement of a new rule is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the prospective application of this rule.
Second, a court evaluates the prior history of the rule to determine whether retroactive application will enhance or diminish the
rule's effectiveness.' 28 Third, a court evaluates whether retroactive application of the new rule "could produce substantial inequitable results" that weigh in favor of applying the new rule
prospectively. 2 9 Applying this three-factor test to the facts in
Chevron Oil, the Court held that the new rule of law at issue should
be applied prospectively.

13 0

erned by the laws of the adjacent state, to the extent that those laws were "applicable and not inconsistent" with federal laws. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 357 (1969).
In Chevron Oil, the plaintiff Huson's injuries occurred more than three years
before the decision in Rodrigue, and he filed his suit over a year before that decision. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 105. At the time Huson filed suit, admiralty law
provided only for a laches defense in cases brought under the Lands Act. The
Rodrigue decision required the federal courts to apply the borrowing rule instead
of considering laches. Id. at 101. Applying the Rodrigue rule retroactively to
Huson's case, the district court found that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions applied, barring Huson's suit. Id. at 99. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the admiralty doctrine of laches
applied to Huson's suit and that the doctrine did not require dismissal of Huson's case. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd,
404 U.S. 97 (1971). The court stated that the limitations period was procedural
because it was not closely tied to the substantive personal injury issue. The
court also found that because the appropriate federal law had sufficient procedural rules, there was no gap for the local limitations period to fill. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that although the
Rodrigue decision changed the law and required the district court to adopt the
adjacent state's statute of limitations, this decision would not be given retroactive application to the litigants in Chevron Oil. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107-08.
127. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106.
128. Id. at 106-07.
129. Id. These criteria have been referred to as the reliance, purpose and
inequity factors. DeLong, Note, supra note 112, at 123 (citing John B. Corr,
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C. L. REv. 745,
747 (1983)). These factors were essentially the same factors that the Court used
in ruling that constitutional criminal rules need not necessarily be given retroactive effect. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (holding that previous decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), did not apply retroactively
to defendant who was collaterally attacking conviction on that ground).
130. In justifying the prospective application of the Rodrigue rule, the Chevron Oil Court noted that the change in the law was unforeseeable in light of a
long line of Fifth Circuit cases holding that the admiralty doctrine of laches applied in suits arising under the Lands Act. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107. In addition, the Court found that the purpose of the Lands Act was furthered by
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Application of Chevron Oil in Civil Cases

For two decades following the Chevron Oil decision, the Court
applied the Chevron Oil test when determining whether a judicially
announced rule would be applied prospectively or retroactively. 3 1 In 1990, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the
prospective application of the new rule, and that the equities favored prospective application because Huson had not "slept on his rights." Id. at 108.
131. For example, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Third Circuit's decision to prospectively apply a new rule governing
statutes of limitations for 28 U.S.C. § 1981 actions. Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). The background of the Saint FrancisCollege case is
somewhat complex. In the 1985 case of Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985), the Supreme Court decided that when choosing a statute of limitations
for § 1983 actions the courts must borrow the state limitations period applicable
to personal injury torts. The same year, the Third Circuit held that the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilson should apply to § 1981 cases as well, and therefore
held that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations would govern § 1981 actions. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd,
482 U.S. 656 (1987). The Goodman court noted that before the Supreme Court
decision in Wilson, the precedent in the Third Circuit was firmly established that
a plaintiff had six years to bring a § 1981 action. Id. at 118 (observing that prior
to Wilson decision, actions involving employment discrimination claims were
viewed as more akin to contract actions, and therefore most analogous limitations period was state six-year contract limitations period); see, e.g., Davis v.
United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying state sixyear statute of limitations to § 1981 employment discrimination claim).
In Saint Francis College, the plaintiff initiated his § 1981 claim prior to the
Wilson and Goodman decisions. See AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d
505, 513 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). The Third Circuit applied
the Chevron Oil test to determine whether or not the Goodman decision should be
given retroactive effect as to the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 512-14.
The Third Circuit decided that Goodman should be applied prospectively under
the Chevron Oil test, particularly because Goodman overruled established circuit
precedent and because retroactive application would be inequitable to the plaintiff. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit's decision not to apply the
Goodman decision retroactively. Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 609 ("We perceive no good reason for not applying Chevron where Wilson has required a Court
of Appeals to overrule its prior cases. Nor has petitioner persuaded us that
there was any error in the application of Chevron in the circumstances existing in
this case.").
The new rule governing § 1981 statute of limitations periods had been announced by the Third Circuit in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The
Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of the new statute of limitations to the litigants of that case. Goodman, 482 U.S. 656, 662-63 (1987). The
Court noted that it was only after Goodman filed his suit, but before the
Supreme Court's decision in Wilson, that the Third Circuit decided a solid line of
cases holding that the appropriate statute of limitations was six years. Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that Goodman could not have relied on the
six-year statute of limitations and, therefore, Chevron Oil did not require prospective application of the rule in Goodman's case. Id.
Despite upholding the retroactive application of the statute of limitations in
Goodman, the Supreme Court upheld the prospective application of the same
statute of limitations to the litigants in Saint Francis College. At least on its face, it
appears that the Court was applying selective prospectivity. The cases may be
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civil retroactivity doctrine in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Smith.' 3 2 The case produced no majority opinion, underscoring
the metamorphosis of some of the Justices' views and the serious
division among them with respect to the Chevron Oil test. In fact,
this decision was a harbinger of the end of the Court's solid backing of the Chevron Oil decision.
In Smith, the plaintiffs brought suit in the Arkansas state
courts in 1983, challenging the constitutionality of a state highway tax on Commerce Clause grounds. 3 3 In a previous decision
in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner,' 3 4 the Supreme Court
had declared a similar Pennsylvania tax to be unconstitutional. 35
The Arkansas Supreme Court found the Arkansas highway tax
unconstitutional in light of Scheiner, but held that a refund of all
the taxes paid by the plaintiffs was required only if the Scheiner
decision was retroactively applied.13 6 After considering the Chevconsistent with the notion of pure prospectivity or retroactivity however, because in Goodman, there was no "new rule" because essentially there was no settled old rule. In both cases, the Supreme Court approved the Third Circuit's
application of the Chevron Oil test.
132. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
133. Id. at 171. The plaintiffs alleged that the tax imposed by the Arkansas
Highway Use Equalization Tax Law (HUE), unconstitutionally favored in-state
truckers by placing a heavier tax burden on out-of-state truckers. Id. at 172; see
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-35-205 (Michie 1987) (repealed 1991). The Arkansas
Supreme Court denied the petitioner's claims on the merits and held that the
HUE tax was constitutional. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Gray, 707
S.W.2d 759, 761-64 (Ark. 1986) (rejecting Commerce Clause, Equal Protection,
and Privileges and Immunities challenges to HUE tax), vacated, 483 U.S. 1014
(1987). The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which held the case in
abeyance pending determination of the constitutionality of a similar Pennsylvania HUE tax in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987).
134. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
135. After the Scheiner decision, the plaintiffs in Smith moved to enjoin further collection of the Arkansas HUE tax, or in the alternative, to establish an
escrow for the payment of the taxes pending the Arkansas Supreme Court's redetermination of the constitutionality of the HUE tax. Smith, 496 U.S. at 173.
Denied relief by the Arkansas courts, the motion to enjoin or establish an escrow
was appealed to Justice Blackmun, acting as Circuit Justice. American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1306, 1307-08 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1987).
Justice Blackmun ordered the HUE taxes to be escrowed until the Arkansas
Supreme Court reached a decision on the merits. Id. at 1310. Justice Blackmun
concluded that there was "a significant possibility that the Arkansas courts will
declare the HUE tax unconstitutional . . . [or,] [i]f they fail to do so, I believe
that there is a significant possibility that fourJustices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to note probable jurisdiction and [the Supreme Court] will
reverse the decision." Id. at 1309.
136. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Gray (Gray II), 746 S.W.2d 377, 378
(Ark. 1988), rev'd in part, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167
(1990).
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ron Oil factors, the Arkansas court determined that Scheiner should
i3 7
be applied prospectively.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor delivered the plurality opinion of the Court.' 3 8 She
narrowly defined the issue before the Court as whether the Arkansas Supreme Court had properly applied the Chevron Oil test in
determining that Schemer would be applied prospectively. 139 The
plurality concluded that the Arkansas Supreme Court had cor140
rectly applied the Chevron Oil test.
137. Id. at 378-79. Applying the first Chevron Oil factor, the court indicated
that it was reasonable for the court to have relied on prior interpretations of the
constitutional reach of the Commerce Clause, and that such interpretations
could be characterized as clear past precedent. Id. at 378. Second, the court
stated that prospective application of the Scheiner decision would help achieve
the goal of free trade among the states under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 379.
Finally, under the third Chevron Oil factor, the court found that the "equities
favor[ed] disallowing refund of the tax money already paid into the state treasury." Id. As a result of this analysis, the court decided that taxes paid before
Justice Blackmun's escrow order would not be refunded, but taxes paid into escrow after the August 14, 1987 escrow order would be refunded. Id.
138. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
139. Id. at 178. Justice O'Connor distinguished the case before the Court
in Smith from the remedial issues faced by the Court in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). Smith, 496 U.S. at
178. The distinction relates to the question of whether the issue before the
Court was one in which it was required to decide the retroactive or prospective
application of a new rule of law or whether the issue was what impact retroactive
or prospective application had on remedial issues. In McKesson, the Court held
that when a party is taxed pursuant to a law that was unconstitutional under
existing precedent, then federal law requires that certain minimum relief be
given to that party. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22. Justice O'Connor noted that the
Smith Court was not yet at the stage of McKesson because the Court was not deciding a remedial issue as in McKesson, but instead was deciding whether the
Arkansas court properly applied the Chevron Oil factors to the tax refund issue.
Smith, 496 U.S. at 178-79. Because the Smith Court ultimately found that the
Arkansas Supreme Court had misapplied the Chevron Oil factors, the case was
remanded so that the state court could decide the remedial issues. Id. at 179.
140. Smith, 496 U.S. at 179-86. As an initial matter, Justice O'Connor held
that when the issue before the Court involved a determination of the retroactive
or prospective application of a constitutionaldecision (as was present in Smith), such
determination was a matter of federal law. Id. at 177. Therefore, the issue in
Smith presented a federal question-whether the Arkansas Supreme Court properly applied the Scheiner decision prospectively. Id. at 178. After performing a
Chevron Oil analysis,Justice O'Connor agreed that the Scheiner decision was properly prospectively applied only to HUE taxes assessed after June 23, 1987, the
date of the Scheiner decision. Id. at 179-83.
Of particular importance, the Court found that the Scheiner decision did not
apply to taxes paid prior to June 23, 1987, the date of the Scheiner decision, but
that principles of retroactivity required that once the Scheiner decision was given
prospective application, it applied to all HUE taxes assessed from the date of the
Scheiner decision onward, regardless of when the taxes were actually collected.
Id. at 187. Therefore, the Court determined that the Arkansas court misapplied
the principles of retroactivity when it refunded only the taxes paid into the es-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 1

1248

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1213

Justice Scalia concurred.' 4 ' Although he did not rely on the
test for prospective overruling established in Chevron Oil, he

avoided applying Scheiner retroactively by relying on the principle
of stare decisis. 1 4 2 Justice Scalia agreed with the dissent, however, that courts exceed their powers when they overrule prece3
dent prospectively. 14
Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices
crow account mandated by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 186-87. This misapplication
occurred because all taxes assessed after June 23, 1987, not just the taxes paid
into the escrow fund, were subject to the prospective application of the Scheiner
decision. Id. at 187.

141. Id. at 200 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 204-05 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Scalia disagreed with both
the Scheiner decision and "the so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia thought that the modern jurisprudential interpretation of the Commerce Clause was judicially
unsound and beyond the courts' powers. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Justice Scalia contended that the negative
use of the Commerce Clause by courts was improper because the Commerce
Clause is "nothing more than a grant of power to Congress." Smith, 496 U.S. at
202 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Scalia thought that the power of the
courts in Commerce Clause cases was limited to deciding whether a state law
conflicts with a congressional rule of law issued pursuant to the power created in
Congress to regulate trade under the Commerce Clause. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
According to Justice Scalia, when a court utilizes the theory of the negative
Commerce Clause, the court is not interpreting the Constitution, but is instead
implying law from congressional silence. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The court,
therefore, acts as a legislature, asking what a "reasonable federal regulator of
commerce" would intend. Id. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, noting that this judicial activism has resulted in laws that are constantly in flux,
stated that "[t]he 'negative' Commerce Clause is inherently unpredictable-unpredictable not just because we have applied its standards poorly or inconsistently, but because it requires us and the lower courts to accommodate, like a
legislature, the inevitably shifting variables of a national economy." Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the constant change surrounding
"negative" Commerce Clause jurisprudence continually upsets the expectations
of litigants. Therefore, he believes that it would be contrary to stare decisis to
apply a law-changing decision to transactions and occurrences that had taken
place under the old law. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Out of respect for stare decisis, Justice Scalia found the post-Scheiner taxation in Smith unconstitutional. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Because, in Justice
Scalia's view, the courts are not interpreting the Constitution when applying the
Commerce Clause but are implying the intention of Congress, he did not feel
compelled to find that taxes imposed prior to Scheiner were unconstitutional. Instead, Justice Scalia thought that, because he had dissented in Scheiner, he was
obligated to "persist in that position (at least where his vote [was] necessary to
the disposition of the case) with respect to action taken before the overruling
occurred." Id. at 205 (Scalia,J., concurring). Therefore, he retained his opinion
that flat taxes do not violate the Constitution concerning transactions prior to
the Scheiner decision.
143. Smith, 496 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/1

36

Palm: The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange A

1992]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 27A

1249

Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. m44 Injustice Stevens' opinion,
because the courts had never recognized prospective application
of a new rule of law, the plurality incorrectly interpreted Chevron
Oil when the plurality determined that the new rule in Scheiner
would be applied prospectively. 14 5 Justice Stevens distinguished
Chevron Oil and other cases in which the Court applied the Chevron
Oil test on the ground that those cases dealt with remedial issues,
not choice of law issues. 146 He characterized the statute of limitations issue in Chevron Oil as remedial because of the equitable discretion traditionally exercised by courts over statutes of limitation
issues. 14 7 Justice Stevens contrasted this situation to cases in
which the federal courts had no equitable discretion and thus "no
t4 8
authority to refuse to apply a law retroactively."'
144. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens' opinion, two
issues were before the Court: whether the HUE tax was unconstitutional and, if
so, whether the state was obligated to grant a refund. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens thought that determining the appropriate relief if the tax
was unconstitutional was a mixed question of federal and state law to be determined in the first instance by the state court. Id. at 205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Concerning the issue of whether the HUE tax was unconstitutional, Justice
Stevens believed that it was a matter of pure federal law, whose determination
"should be applied uniformly throughout the Nation." Id. at 205 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens thought the Arkansas HUE tax was unconstitutional in light of Scheiner. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He concluded that Scheiner should have been applied retroactively to all litigants, including those in Smith, based on "[fOundamental notions
of fairness and legal process." Id. at 212 (Stevens,J., dissenting). There is some
evidence that Justice Stevens intended to limit retroactivity to cases that involved constitutional issues. First, he relied on Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314 (1987), for the proposition that the same considerations in criminal law that
require retroactive application of a decision of law also apply to civil law. Smith,
496 U.S. at 213-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Griffith involved a constitutional issue (Equal Protection violation in use of preemptory challenges) and Smith also
involved a constitutional issue (Commerce Clause violation through taxation of
interstate commerce). According to Justice Stevens, the Constitution may therefore require that cases be decided on the court's current understanding of the
law and that all similarly situated litigants should be treated equally. Id. at 214
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Smith, 496 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This equitable discretion manifested itself in the development of the doctrines of tolling, laches and waiver. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). It should be noted that these equitable doctrines have
not been applied to substantive statutes of repose once the absolute limit in
which to bring suit has expired. If the federal courts do not have equitable discretion in the execution of statutes of repose, then the reasoning adopted by
Justice Stevens would indicate that a federal court would be required to apply a
statute of repose retroactively.
148. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens' opinion, the
Court had not previously been required to distinguish between the remedial determination and the choice of law determination because the prior cases were
federal cases that required the application of federal law and federal remedies.
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The plurality disagreed with Justice Stevens' characterization
of the Court's civil retroactivity doctrine as limited to remedial
issues., 49 Instead, the plurality perceived the Court's Chevron Oil
test as the means to decide whether any new rule would be given
retroactive or prospective application. 5 0 The schism in the
Court on choice of law issues set the stage for the Beam case.
B.

The Beam Decision

The Supreme Court revisited the issue of selective prospectivity inJames B. Beam DistillingCo. v. Georgia,' 5 1 which was decided
on the same day as Lampf. The issue in Beam was whether the
Court's earlier decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias 15 2 applied
retroactively and permitted the petitioner to claim a refund for
taxes imposed before the Bacchus decision. 53 In Bacchus, the
Court considered a Hawaiian tax that levied a higher tax on imported alcohol products than on domestic alcohol products and
54
found the tax unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.'
In Beam, the plaintiff sought a refund of taxes levied under a
Georgia statute that was virtually identical to the Hawaiian statute
in Bacchus.' 5 5 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision that the Georgia tax violated the Commerce
Clause because, like the tax in Bacchus, the Georgia tax discrimiId. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Smith, however, Justice Stevens noted that the
remedial issue needed to be separated from the substantive law issue because
the remedial issue required an initial state court determination. Id. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 188-89, 195-96.
150. Id. at 196. In support of this proposition,Justice O'Connor noted that
in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18
(1990), the Court held that due process required that some minimal relief be
given to a litigant who paid taxes under an unconstitutional tax scheme. Smith,
496 U.S. at 181; see also McKesson, 496 U.S. at 36-43. According to Justice
O'Connor, if Chevron Oil was characterized as remedial, then Chevron Oil would
essentially be useless because after McKesson, due process, not equitable considerations, would normally dictate the relief to which a party is entitled. Smith, 496
U.S. at 194.
The plurality also rejected the contention that the Court's criminal retroactivity doctrine applied with equal force to civil law. Id. at 197-99. Finally, the
plurality did not think that Article III compelled retroactive application of a judicially announced new rule of law. Id. at 200.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2445.
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 273.
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2442.
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nated between imported and domestic spirits.1 5 6 Nonetheless,
the Georgia court held that the Bacchus ruling would be given prospective application under the Chevron Oil test, and therefore the
Court denied Beam's request for a refund of the taxes paid before
57
Bacchus. 1
Although the Beam case generated five separate opinions, a
majority of the Court held that when a court announces a new
federal rule of law and applies it to the litigants in the case, the
court must also apply this rule retroactively to all litigants whose
claims arose from facts predating the pronouncement of the new
rule.' 58 The majority also agreed that the case-by-case approach
of Chevron Oil could no longer be tolerated, and rejected selective
prospectivity. 59 The majority, however, could not agree on the
reasoning for the judgment, and three Justices dissented.
Justice Souter, along withJustice Stevens, delivered the judgment of the Court. 160 Justice Souter assumed that the Court followed the normal procedure and retroactively applied the new
rule announced in Bacchus to the litigants in Bacchus. 16 1 According to Justice Souter, because the new rule of law had been applied to the litigants in Bacchus, principles of equality and stare
decisis required that the rule of law also apply retroactively to all
similarly situated litigants whose claims were not procedurally
barred or precluded by resjudicata. 62 Thus, the Bacchus rule had
to apply retroactively to all claims pending at the time of the
Bacchus decision, or arising from facts predating Bacchus, including the tax imposed by Georgia in Beam.' 6 3 According to Justice
Souter, if a new rule is applied to the litigants in the case in which
it is originally announced, the new rule must be applied retroactively even though this application might upset the expectations
156. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 382 S.E.2d 95, 96 (Ga. 1989),
rev'd, I IIS. Ct. 2439 (1991).
157. Id. at 96-97. Applying the Chevron Oil test, the Georgia Supreme Court
found that: (1) the state relied on state court findings and on its ability to collect
taxes under the tax statute, therefore the decision at issue could be considered a
new rule of law; (2) the second Chevron Oil element was not applicable because
the statute at issue was repealed; and (3) under a balance of the equities, any
refund of prior years' taxes could be an economic windfall to the corporate taxpayers and a severe financial burden on Georgia. Id.
158. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446, 2448, 2450.
159. Id. at 2444-45.
160. Id. at 2441.
161. Id. at 2445.
162. Id. at 2445-48.
163. Id. at 2448.
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of parties who had relied on the old rule. 1 64 In such cases, the
Chevron Oil analysis was no longer available to apply a new rule
prospectively to protect litigants who had relied on the previously
existing law.16 5 To this extent, Justice'Souter's decision implicitly
overruled Chevron Oil.
Justice Souter's opinion, however, did not explicitly overrule
Chevron Oil. Justice Souter emphasized that the rule he announced in Beam was narrow and dealt only with choice of law
issues. 1 66 He contrasted choice of law issues with remedial issues. 167 According to Justice Souter, after a court determines
164. Id. at 2446-47.
165. Id. at 2447. The Court stated:
Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive
application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to
others, the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case. Once retroactive application
is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who
might seek its prospective application. The applicability of rules of law
are not to be switched on and off according to individual hardship; allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would only compound the
challenge to the stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very development of "new" rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the
equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly situated.
Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual
equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.
Id. at 2447-48 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 2448.
167. Id. at 2443. A careful reading of Beam reveals that the roles of retroactivity and prospectivity in the context of remedial issues were left unresolved:
The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are confined
entirely to an issue of choice of law .... We do not speculate as to the
bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may be appropriate in
this case; remedial issues were neither considered below nor argued to
this Court .... Nothing we say here deprives respondent of his opportunity to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the
nature of the remedy that must be provided ....
Id. at 2448. Specifically, Beam indicated that even after a determination was
made as to the retroactive or prospective effect of a ruling, a remedial issue
involving additional constitutional, equitable or state law considerations may
persist. Id.
The Court had previously provided guidance regarding these considerations for courts confronted with retroactivity questions involving remedial issues. For example, in McKesson, the Court held that compliance with
constitutional due process required Florida to provide a clear and certain remedy of post-payment refund of taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional and
discriminatory liquor tax scheme. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 40 (1990). In McKesson, two distinct equitable
considerations were raised by the Florida Supreme Court in determining the
appropriate remedy. First, the court observed that the preferential tax scheme
was implemented in good faith in reliance on a presumptively valid statute. Id.
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whether the changed law applies retroactively (the choice of law
determination), a court then decides which remedial principles
will control. 168 The choice of law is a federal question when the
at 44. Thus, imposing the obligation to refund taxes collected pursuant to what
was later adjudicated to be an unconstitutional tax would "undermine the
State's ability to engage in sound fiscal planning." Id. Second, the court suggested that, if given a refund, the petitioner would receive an unfair windfall
because the cost of the tax most likely was passed on to customers and suppliers,
and was not borne by petitioner. Id. at 46. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that neither equitable consideration was sufficient to
justify the refusal to provide retroactive relief. Id. at 47-49.
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias provides an example of a case in which state law
considerations influenced the available remedies. In Bacchus, the Court stated:
"These refund issues, which are essentially issues of remedy for the imposition
of a tax that unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce, were
not addressed by the state courts. Also, the federal constitutional issues involved may well be intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of
state law." Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 277 (1984).
In Beam, the Court stated:
Once a rule is found to apply [retroactively], there may then be a further issue of remedies ....
whether the party prevailing under a new
rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the
rule had been an old one. Subject to constitutional thresholds, the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case
originates in state court.
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443 (citations omitted). The Beam Court also noted that
"any consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential
question [of retroactive application] has been settled to the effect that the rule of
law will apply to the parties before the Court." Id. at 2445.
Justice Souter intimated in his opinion that Chevron Oil is best understood as
a decision involving remedial, not choice of law concerns. See id. at 2443-44
(noting that Court had applied decisions purely prospectively in Chevron Oil and
other cases but that "it has never been required to distinguish the remedial from
the choice-of-law aspect of its decision"). Moreover, Justice Souter stated that
"[b]oth parties have assumed the applicability of the Chevron Oil test, under
which the Court has accepted prospectivity (whether in the choice-of-law or remedial sense, it is not clear)." Id. at 2445. However, Justice Souter went on to
state that "our decision [in Beam] does limit the possible applications of the Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may otherwise be to this case."
Id. at 2447. Justice Souter's observations are consistent with the views expressed by Justice Stevens in Smith; that Chevron Oil is best seen as a case dealing
with a remedial statute of limitations issue. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 219-20 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Justice Stevens' views in Smith, see supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
If the Lampf limitations period is characterized as procedural or remedial,
then the treatment of the limitations issue would be made part of the remedial
inquiry, distinct from an initial determination of retroactivity or prospectivity.
Consequently, if the uniform federal limitations period enunciated in Lampf can
be characterized as remedial, then Beam may not mandate the retroactive application of that limitations period. No court has yet faced or acknowledged this
possibility. Rather, all courts have uniformly held that Beam is applicable to
Lampf. If limitations periods are remedial and Beam does not apply, then § 27A,
which was intended to undo the retroactive application of the Lampf limitations
period, would be rendered unnecessary.
168. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

41

1254

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 37: p. 1213

rule in question "derives from federal law."' 16 9 InJustice Souter's
view, once the determination of retroactivity or prospectivity is
made in the case in which the rule is promulgated, later courts
may not perform a Chevron Oil analysis to determine if the law
applies retroactively or prospectively, regardless of the equities of
that particular action. 170
Although Justice Souter declined to
speculate on the "propriety of pure prospectivity," it would seem
that after Beam, the only time a Chevron Oil analysis is relevant is
either when the court confronts remedial issues or in the case in
which the court adopts the new rule of law. 17 1 Although Justice
Souter's opinion is unclear, his reliance on the principles of
equality and stare decisis seems predicated on jurisprudential
principles and not constitutional mandates. 72
Justice White concurred in the judgment and agreed with
Justice Souter that Bacchus should apply to the litigants in Beam
because the changed law had been applied to the litigants in
Bacchus. He observed that there is "no precedent in civil cases
[for] applying a new rule to the parties in the case in which the
rule is first announced but not to others similarly situated."' 73
Justice White noted that Griffith v. Kentucky 174 prohibited the use
of selective prospectivity in criminal cases.' 7 5 Even though he
dissented in Griffith1 76 and might be inclined to decide Beam differently, Justice White believed he was bound by Griffith on stare
77
decisis grounds. 1
Justice Blackmun concurred, in an opinion joined by Justices
Scalia and Marshall, because he thought that both pure and selec169. Id.
170. Id. at 2447-48. Justice Souter stated that "[o]nce retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who might
seek its prospective application." Id.
171. Id. at 2443-45; see also The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105
HARV. L. REV. 177, 344 (1991) (observing that "[t]he choice between retroactivity and prospectivity in a particular case depends on how the rule in question
was applied when first announced or, in the case announcing the rule, on consideration of the Chevron Oil factors").
172. For a discussion of whether Beam is a constitutionally based decision,
see infra notes 394-404 and accompanying text.
173. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (White, J., concurring).
174. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
175. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448-49 (White, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring); see also Griffith, 479 U.S. at 329
(White, J., dissenting).
177. Beam, 11l S. Ct. at 2449 (White, J., concurring). Justice White wrote
separately to rebutJustice Souter's implication that the issue of pure prospectivity was an open one. Justice White emphasized that Supreme Court precedent
supported the propriety of pure prospectivity. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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ive prospectivity exceeded the judiciary's constitutional
power.' 78 Justice Blackmun adopted the Court's reasoning in
Griffith and rejected the use of selective or pure prospectivity in
civil actions for three reasons.' 79 First, prospective decisionmaking violates the case or controversy requirement of Article III of
the Constitution.18 0 Second, prospective application of judicial
decisions "violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same."''8 According to Justice Blackmun, this principle "derives from the integrity ofjudicial review, which does not
justify applying principles determined to be wrong to litigants
who are in or may still come to court."' 8 2 Third, retroactivity and
stare decisis have a salutary effect on judicially declared changes
in the law because the effect of the two doctrines "forces us to
consider the disruption that our new decisional rules cause ....
prevent[ing] us from altering the law each time the opportunity
presents itself."' 8 3 Justice Blackmun concluded that prospective
application of new rules "breaches our obligation to discharge
our constitutional function." 8 4 Thus, Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia believed that retroactive application of new judicial rules was constitutionally mandated.
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, which was joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. This concurrence offered another reason why prospective rulings exceed the constitutional
power of the judiciary.18 5 Although Justice Scalia recognized that
judges "make" law, he noted that "they make it as judges make it,
which is to say as though they were 'finding' it-discerning what
the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or
what it will tomorrow be."' 8 6 According to Justice Scalia, when
178. Id. at 2449-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. Id. The reasons given by Justice Blackmun correspond, by and large,
to the reasons which he expressed in Griffith in which the Court held that new
rules in criminal cases would be applied retroactively to all pending or nonfinal
cases. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 320-28.
180. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Griffith, 479
U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal
cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.").
181. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Griffith, 479 U.S.
at 323-24.
182. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
183. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
184. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
185. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 2451 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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the law is "found" it must be the same law for all cases coming
before and after it unless a different law is subsequently "found."
Justice O'Connor, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, dissented.' 8 7 The dissent performed a Chevron Oil
analysis of Bacchus and concluded that Bacchus was improperly applied to the litigants in that case.' 88 Although the dissent conceded that nothing could be done about Bacchus, they thought
there was no reason to compound the error by applying the
89
changed law retroactively to all other cases.'
Beam constituted a sharp break from the Court's past practice
under Chevron Oil which permitted courts to consider the parties'
reliance interests when deciding whether to apply a new law prospectively. By changing the law concerning the choice of law approach for new judicial rules, Beam created a new issue in lOb-5
litigation: whether Beam required courts to apply Lampf to all
pending cases.
C.

Impact of Lampf and Beam on Section 10(b) Litigation

Following the Lampf and Beam decisions, the lower federal
courts had to decide whether Beam required retroactive application of the Lampf limitations period to pending section 10(b)
cases, because the Lampf court had announced a new rule of law
and applied it to the litigants in Lampf. If the courts applied Lampf
retroactively, many of the pending lOb-5 cases would be subject
to dismissal as barred under the Lampf rule even though they
were timely when filed.
The three circuits that had adopted the uniform limitations
period prior to Lampf had initially left unresolved the question of
retroactive application of the new law announced by those circuits
to pending cases.190 In decisions following the adoption of the
187. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2453-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2456 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[w]e leave for the future
all questions concerning retroactive application of this decision. Retroactivity
has not been briefed, and the retroactive application of decisions affecting periods of limitations is a question of some subtlety." Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg.
Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389-90 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991);
accord Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that retroactivity issue did not arise because limitations period applied was same
period that would have been applied under prior precedent); In re Data Access
Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1550-51 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (refusing to address
issue of prospective application of rule announced because question certified
from district court did not include issue of prospective application), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 849 (1988).
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uniform limitations period but prior to Lampf and Beam, the three
circuits acknowledged that the general rule was to apply judicial
decisions retroactively' 9 ' but also noted that a new rule could be
applied prospectively under Chevron Oil.192 Although the circuits
generally agreed that the Chevron Oil analysis should be performed on a case-by-case basis, 193 they diverged on their application of the Chevron Oil factors to the new Rule lOb-5 limitations
94
period that they had chosen.
191. See, e.g., Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.) (recognizing that general rule was to apply judicial decisions retroactively but granting
exception under Chevron Oil analysis), vacated and superseded, 946 F.2d 185 (2d
Cir. 1991) (vacated because impact of Lampf and Beam required court to apply
new rule retroactively without exception); Polansky v. Painewebber Inc., 762 F.
Supp. 768, 770 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("There is a presumption favoring retroactive
treatment." (citing EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1988))).
192. For a discussion of the Chevron Oil test, see supra notes 125-30 and
accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Welch, 923 F.2d at 993; Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d
960, 965 (3d Cir. 1990); Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1288
(7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
194. The Second Circuit was relatively settled with respect to the application of Ceres, determining that the first, but not all three, of the Chevron Oil factors must be met before prospective application of a new rule occurred. See
Welch, 923 F.2d at 994. With respect to the first Chevron Oil factor, the Second
Circuit stated that it was unnecessary for the parties in each case to prove actual
reliance on the former rule of law. Id. at 993 n.5. The court noted: "It is worth
emphasizing that the first prong of the Chevron test requires only a prior rule on
which plaintiffs 'may' have relied, and does not create a test of actual reliance."
Id. Additionally, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the Supreme
Court decisions in DelCostello, Wilson and Agency Holding, which eroded the local
borrowing practices, signaled the demise of the local borrowing rule in the Second Circuit. Therefore, litigants were not prevented from claiming reliance on
the old borrowing rule. Id. at 994. For a discussion of the DelCostello, Wilson and
Agency Holding cases, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. The Second
Circuit held that the second Chevron Oil factor suggested prospective application
of the Ceres rule. See, e.g., Welch, 923 F.2d at 994-95 (stating that primary purpose
of statute of repose was to give plaintiffs notice of time in which action must be
brought and defendants notice of time in which they were subject to suit, and
concluding that purpose of limitations period was not furthered by applying new
limitations period to litigants in previously instituted actions). With respect to
the third Chevron Oil factor, there was some divergence in the Second Circuit.
The third factor allowed the court to weigh the equities in each case. In the
majority of cases, Second Circuit courts held it inequitable to apply the Ceres rule
to the litigants before the court. See, e.g.,
id. at 995 (concluding that concealment
of fraud by defendant, not lassitude of plaintiff, was cause of delay in filing action); Gutman v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 769 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (indicating that retroactive application "could constitute an unjust penalty
for rightful reliance on existing law"); Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp.
69, 73-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that retroactive application of Ceres would be
inequitable); Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., 759 F. Supp. 992, 997
(W.D.N.Y.) (observing that equities favored prospective application), rev'd on
other grounds, 947 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1991). But cf.Varnberg v. Minnick, 760 F.
Supp. 315, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (choosing retroactive application of new limitations period after finding that equities weighed in favor of defendant because
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After the Supreme Court's decisions in Lampf and Beam, the
plaintiff inexcusably waited more than three years to bring suit and defendant
demonstrated hardship as result of delay).
In the Seventh Circuit, the law concerning retroactive application of the uniform limitations period was also well settled. Unlike the Second Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit generally applied the Short one-and-three-year period of repose
retroactively. See Polansky, 762 F. Supp. at 772 (concluding that because plaintiff
could not establish any Chevron Oil element, Short would be applied retroactively); Wentzka v. Gellman, 759 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (requiring
retroactive application of Short due to failure to fulfill all three Chevron Oil factors); accord Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 785 (N.D. Ill.
1991); In re VMS Sec. Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (N.D. Ill. 1990). But see
Reshal Assocs. v. Long Grove Trading Co., 754 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (requiring prospective application of Short because all three Chevron Oil
factors were satisfied). In the Seventh Circuit, prospective application of the
new limitations period occurred only if all three Chevron Oil factors were met. See
Wentzka, 759 F. Supp. at 487. The courts also placed heavy emphasis on the
litigants' ability to prove reliance on the prior limitations period. If the litigant
could not establish reliance on the old statute of limitations, the new limitations
period was applied. Only in Reshal did a Seventh Circuit court find adequate
reliance on prior precedent. Reshal, 754 F. Supp. at 1241 & n.13 (applying new
rule prospectively because plaintiffs established that they had justifiably delayed
suit for one year in attempt to reach settlement and conduct factual investigations and therefore had relied on prior limitations period).
Unlike the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Third Circuit did not take a
consistent approach to the retroactive application of the new limitations period
announced in Data Access. The majority of Third Circuit cases held that Chevron
Oil dictated retroactive application of DataAccess. See, e.g., McCarter v. Mitcham,
883 F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that unless all three Chevron Oil criteria
were met, Data Access must be applied retroactively); accord Gatto v. Meridian
Medical Assocs., 882 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080
(1990); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691, 696-97 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); Halperin v.Jasper, 723 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Bloch v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 707 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (W.D. Pa.
1989); Prospect Purchasing Co. v. Weber, Lipshie & Co., 694 F. Supp. 1149,
1156 (D.N.J. 1988). Some courts, however, applied Data Access prospectively.
See, e.g., Gruber, 911 F.2d at 965-69 (holding that because all three Chevron Oil
factors were met, Data Access was prospectively applied); Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F.
Supp. 358, 364-67 (D.N.J. 1991) (indicating that although two Chevron Oil factors
were not met, it would be inequitable to apply new rule retroactively because
plaintiff had spent over four years in costly litigation and discovery); accord In re
National Smelting, Inc. Bondholders' Litig., 722 F. Supp. 152, 160 (D.NJ.
1989); ITG, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 867, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1988); cf
Newfield v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 699 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(holding it would be unfair to apply new rule retroactively but not applying Chevron Oil).
In Hill, the leading case in the Third Circuit, the court determined that in
order to establish the first prong of Chevron Oil there must have been clear precedent on which the litigant relied. Hill, 851 F.2d at 696. The courts were split
over whether clear precedent existed prior to Data Access. Id. at 697-98. The
problem was exacerbated because the prior precedent was characterized as factbased. Id. Therefore, whether clear precedent existed depended on whether
the facts in the case before the court were analogous to the facts in a prior decision. For example, in McCarter, the Third Circuit found that the determinative
issue was whether the factual situation before the court was similar enough to
the facts of any prior holdings on which the plaintiffs could have relied. McCarter, 883 F.2d at 203. If the facts were analogous, then the court found clear
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lower courts began to receive and grant motions to dismiss lOb-5
actions on the basis of the new Lampf rule.19 5 Although the Court
applied the new Lampf rule to the litigants in Lampf, the Court
96
never expressly held that Lampf must be applied retroactively.1
The district courts, followed by the circuit courts, however, found
that because the Court applied the new rule in Lampf to the litigants in that case, Beam required applying the Lampf rule to all
pending cases whether those cases were filed before or after the

Lampf decision.197

precedent. See Gruber, 911 F.2d at 967 (finding that factual situation in case
before court was sufficiently similar to prior precedent such that plaintiffs could
have reasonably relied). If the facts were not analogous, then the court determined that the law in the Third Circuit was too unsettled for a litigant to have
justifiably relied. See, e.g., McCarter, 883 F.2d at 204 (finding that no case provided precedent for case before court).
195. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497, 498 (8th
Cir. 1991) (finding that court was compelled to apply Lampf rule retroactively to
pending cases); Koulouris v. Chalmers, 779 F. Supp. 99, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(holding that because plaintiff did not bring § 10(b) claim within three-year repose period, Lampf and Beam required dismissal of cause of action); Wegbreit v.
Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 957, 959 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (agreeing with
other courts which stated that Lampf rule must be applied retroactively under
Beam decision and therefore dismissing plaintiffs' § 10(b) claims), motion to reinstate granted, 793 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (reinstated following passage of
§ 27A); Held v. Davis, 778 F. Supp. 527, 530 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (dismissing plaintiff's claims as time-barred because of holdings in Lampf and Beam).
196. Justice O'Connor dissented precisely because she was concerned that
the combined effect of Lampf and Beam would result in the application of the new
rule to all pending cases. To prevent such retroactive application, the Court
could perhaps rule that because the Lampf rule concerned a limitations period, it
should be treated as a remedial situation by analogy to Justice Souter's comments in Beam and Justice Stevens' comments in Smith. If the Lampf rule is
treated as remedial, then the automatic retroactivity rule of Beam may not apply.
Given the failure of the Lampf majority to address the issue in the face ofJustice
O'Connor's dissent on that specific point, it is likely that a majority of the Court
would rule that Beam mandates the retroactive application of the Lampf rule. But
see Anthony M. Sabino, A Statutory Beacon or a Relighted Lampf? The Constitutional
Crisis of the New Limitay Periodfor Federal Securities Law Actions, 28 TULSA LJ. 23,
61-65 (1992) (arguing that it is unlikely that Court would hold that Lampf must
be applied retroactively).
197. See, e.g., Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating
prior decision that allowed prospective application of Ceres and concluding that
Lampf and Beam required retroactive application of Ceres to all pending cases);
Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 778 F. Supp. 141, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that Supreme Court's remand of Welch, which had
prospectively applied Lampf rule, was "clear indication that [Beam] was meant to
apply to cases involving retroactively reduced statutes of limitations"), modified
on other grounds, 788 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp.,
776 F. Supp. 504, 508 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (concluding that because Supreme Court
applied Lampf rule to litigants in Lampf, Lampf rule must be retroactively applied
to all pending cases); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 770
F. Supp. 595, 596 (D. Colo. 1991) (stating that court was required to dismiss
§ 10(b) claims because of Lampf and circuit precedent).
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CONGRESS REACTS TO LAMPF AND BEAM IN SECTION

27A

Congress reacted quickly to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lampf and Beam and the problems posed by the retroactive application of Lampf to pending lOb-5 actions by enacting section 27A
of the Exchange Act.' 98 Section 27A provides:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section [10(b)] of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the
limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such
laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section
[10(b)] of this title that was commenced on or before
June 19, 1991(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under
the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed onJune 19, 1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later
than 60 days after Dec. 19, 1991.199
Section 27A applies only to cases asserting claims based
upon implied rights of action arising under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act that were commenced on or before June 19, 1991,
the day before the Lampf and Beam decisions. The statute has
198. Steven B. Rosenfeld & Barbara A. Mehlman, The Constitutional Controversy Over the Limitations Period in Securities Fraud Cases, 25 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.

99, 99 (May 6, 1992) ("[S]eldom has Congress enacted-either with

due deliberation or, as in this case, in great haste-a statute that immediately

revives hundreds of time-barred claims in high stakes damage suits pending
nearly everywhere."). Because of the haste in which § 27A was enacted and the
fact that the provision was only a very small appendage to the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, none of the relevant congressional reports provides information about the goals or congressional intent with respect to § 27A. See Sabino,

supra note 196, at 29-30 ("[T]he individual legislative history of section 27A is
quite remarkable, primarily because of its absence. . . . In sum, section 27A
offers nothing in the way of true legislative history ....
Rather, one must look
to the Congressional Record and other public statements of lawmakers to deter-

mine its origins.").
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. III 1991).
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three components. First, it provides that the limitations period
that was in effect onJune 19, 1991 in the jurisdiction in which the
case was filed will govern pending cases. 20 0 Second, the controlling principles of retroactivity are those that were in effect in the
forum jurisdiction on the day before the Beam decision. 20 ' Thus,
Beam's rule of retroactivity does not automatically apply to all actions brought under Rule lOb-5. Normally, the lower courts will
apply the Chevron Oil test when determining whether to apply a
new rule retroactively or prospectively. Third, upon timely motion, plaintiffs may obtain reinstatement of lOb-5 private civil actions that were dismissed as time-barred after the Lampf and Beam
decisions, if the actions would have been timely under the limitations period and retroactivity principles in effect in the forum jurisdiction on June 19, 1991.202

In order to obtain reinstatement of a case dismissed as timebarred under Lampf, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff
commenced the case on or before June 19, 1991; (2) the action
was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds; (3) the action
would have been timely under the laws of the forum jurisdiction,
including principles of retroactivity, as they existed on June 19,
1991; and (4) the motion for reinstatement was made within sixty
20 3
days after the enactment of section 27A.

A.

Legislative History of Section 27A

Section 27A evolved from two separate bills, each containing
a specific limitations period for implied causes of action arising
under section 10(b). 20 4 The first bill was introduced on July 23,
1991, less than five weeks after the Court's decisions in Lampf and
200. See id. § 78aa- 1 (a).
201. Id. § 78aa-l(b)(2).
202. See id. § 78aa-l(b)(1).
203. Id. § 78aa-1; see also Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533,
1543 n.l (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); Treiber v. Katz,
796 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (E.D. Mich. 1992); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.
Supp. 587, 590 (E.D. La. 1992).
204. One of the bills was introduced in the Senate on July 23, 1991, and
one was introduced in the House of Representatives on August 1, 1991. See S.
1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3185, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The original bills contained specific limitations periods for § 10(b) actions: a
two-and-five year statute of limitations and repose in the Senate bill and a threeand-five year version in the House bill. See id. The Senate bill was originally
introduced purportedly as a compromise, because Senator Bryan (the bill's original sponsor) would have preferred "to enact a simple 2 or 3 year after discovery
rule, with no overall repose period." 137 CONG. REC. S10,691 (daily ed. July 23,
1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

49

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 1

1262

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1213

Beam. 20 5 The final version of section 27A was substantially different from the original proposals.2 0 6 The final version of the statute was the product of legislative compromise; its omission of a
specific limitations period occurred because the House and Sen20 7
ate could not agree on a uniform limitations period.
The record of the section 27A floor debate reveals two important aspects about the legislation. First, the provision was
designed to overturn Lampf in order to prevent "the dismissal of
a great number of legitimate cases currently under litigation." 20 8
205. S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
206. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa1 (Supp. III 1991)). The final version was enacted on December 6, 1992. 137
CONG. REC. S18,808 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1991). President Bush signed the bill
containing § 27A into law on December 19, 1991. 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1873 (Dec. 23, 1991).
207. The separate bills eventually were dropped and integrated as Amendment No. 1369 (§ 1126), of S.543, the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991. See 137 CONG. REC. S17,315 (daily
ed. Nov. 21, 1991). Section 1126 was amended to its present form as a result of
a compromise worked out by Senators Bryan (of Nevada) and Domenici (of New
Mexico). 137 CONG. REC. S17,307 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991). After conference,
§ 1126, along with the rest of S.543, was enacted as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-246, 105 Stat.
2236 (1991). Section 476 of that Act was codified as § 27A of the Exchange Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l.
Apparently, the two-and-five-year limitations period was ultimately rejected
in favor of the version finally enacted because the administration and Senate
Republicans did not want to extend the statute of limitations in Rule lOb-5 actions without introducing a number of reforms into § 10(b) litigation to prevent
unmeritorious claims. 137 CONG. REC. S16,901 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 137 CONG. REC. S17,356-60 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991)
(statements of Sens. Domenici and McConnell); 137 CONG. REC. S 17,725 (daily
ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. McCain). The suggested changes included shifting discovery costs, court costs and attorney's fees to plaintiffs who
file frivolous claims. See 137 CONG. REC. S16,901 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Domenici); 137 CONG. REC. S17,001 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Domenici). The proposals also included provisions for: (1)
limiting contingency fees to 20% of the total award (tracking the Federal Tort
Claims Act); (2) requiring § 10(b) plaintiffs' attorneys to give potential clients
up-front cost estimates, disclose hourly rates and give clients a choice of billing
method (contingency v. hourly); (3) providing plaintiffs with a private right of
action against attorneys who fail to comply with these requirements; and (4) borrowing principles from tort reform legislation, such as abolishing joint liability
in favor of comparative fault. 137 CONG. REC. S17,358-59 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1991) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
208. 137 CONG. REC. S10,691 (daily ed. July 23, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Bryan). Congress was especially concerned about the "[t]wenty-three thousand
victims of the Charles Keating securities actions [who] are at risk in [sic] having
their cases dismissed ...[and] tens of thousands of others who are victims of the
fraud perpetrated by the Michael Milken's, the Ivan Boesky's, and the Fred
Carr's, [who] also will lose their day in court." 137 CONG. REC. S17,036 (daily
ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan); see also 137 CONG. REC. S 17,356
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Congress viewed the retroactive application of Lampf to cases
pending prior to Lampf as fundamentally unfair because: it
changed the rules in effect when the alleged violations occurred;
caused billions of dollars in losses to private investors; and
granted unwarranted legal protection to high-profile perpetrators. 20 9 Second, section 27A was intended to mitigate the costs of

the savings & loan bailout by extending the time for the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to file suit based upon its
right of subrogation. 210 Notwithstanding the limitations expressed in the statute, at least some members of Congress were

apparently under the impression that section 27A would permit
reinstatement of all cases that were filed before the Lampf decision
and subsequently dismissed on the basis of Lampf.2 11
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("Cases against Michael
Milken, Charles Keating, and other famous rogues have been, or might be dismissed unless Congress acts .... Congress has to reverse the retroactivity [of
Lampf]."); 137 CONG. REC. S 17,725 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (observing that Milken, Carr and Keating "have moved to have their
cases dismissed under the Lampf decision. It's simply not fair that fraud cases of
such magnitude be dismissed by an arbitrary, legal technicality."); accord 137
CONG. REC. HI 1,811-12 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dingell);
137 CONG. REC. H 11,812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey);
Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 100 ("Among the many cases which
were thus threatened with dismissal were huge class and FDIC actions pending
against well known financial figures .... Speeches on the Senate floor blasted
the Lampf-Beam combination as a 'legal escape hatch for perpetrators of some of
the worst securities fraud in history' and bemoaned the imminent dismissal of
such cases." (footnote omitted) (quoting 137 CONG. REC. S17,725 (daily ed.
Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. McCain))).
209. As Senator Bryan noted: "Lampf changed the rules in the middle of the
game for thousands of fraud victims who already had suits pending-applying a
shorter statute of limitations than when they brought their suits." 137 CONG.
REC. S18,624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan). Senator
Riegle's statement that Congress "must take steps to protect those investors
who had cases pending prior to" the Lampf decision further indicates congressional concern for investors. 137 CONG. REC. S17,315 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Riegle). As one court noted: "The legislative history resonates with a single refrain: Congress was concerned that unless section 27A(a)
was enacted, 'over $4 billion of fraud claims... [were] threatened with pending
dismissal motions solely as a result of Lampf,' " In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F.
Supp. 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting 137 CONG. REC. H 11,812 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey)).
210. 137 CONG. REC. S17,036 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Bryan) ("[F]requently the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is subrogated
to the rights of the victims of ... securities frauds and unless this decision is
modified the FDIC will be unable to recover the damages as a consequence of
the fraud perpetrated against those from whom their rights are inherited.").
211. See Henley v. Slone, 961 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Congressman
EdwardJ. Markey contended that the provision 'permits the reinstatement of any
suit which may have been dismissed post-Lampf as a result of the Lampf decision.'
Moreover, the only specific explanation we have located of the reference to retroactivity in section 27A indicates that the proponents of the amendment ex-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

51

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 1

1264

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 37: p. 1213

Application of Section 27A

Although the operation and scope of the statute may present
a few interpretive problems, the statute's basic operation is clear.
An example of the proper application of the statute is the Seventh
Circuit's decision in McCool v. Strata Oil Co. 21 2 In McCool, the
plaintiffs commenced their action in 1989, alleging violations of
certain securities laws, including Rule lOb-5. 21 3 On a partial sum-

mary judgment motion brought by the defendants, the district
court employed the traditional borrowing rule 214 and determined
that a three-year Illinois statute of limitations applied to the plaintiffs' lOb-5 claim and barred it.215 The plaintiffs appealed.
After the district court dismissed the case but before the appeal was decided, three developments occurred. First, the Seventh Circuit adopted the one-and-three-year uniform federal
limitations period in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co.216 In

Short, the Seventh Circuit left open the question whether that decision would be applied retroactively. 2 7 Second, the Supreme
Court decided the Lampf and Beam cases, which required the retroactive application of Lampf to the McCool case. 218 Finally, Congress enacted section 27A, which required the court to apply the
legal rules in effect before the Lampf and Beam decisions. 21 9 The
pected the retroactivity clause always to benefit '34 Act claimants.") (citations
omitted) (quoting 137 CONG. REc. H 11,761, H 1,813 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991)
(statements of Rep. Markey)).
212. 972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992).
213. Id. at 1457. Defendants formed Strata Oil Co. in the early 1980s. Id.
at 1455. In 1983, Strata entered into a joint venture to acquire and develop
mineral leases on specific properties. Id. The plaintiffs were investors who
claimed the defendants misrepresented the nature of the property and the value
of the investment. Id.
214. For a discussion of traditional borrowing practices, see supra notes 2649 and accompanying text.
215. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1457. Subsequent to the original investment
agreement, the parties had entered into another agreement in which Strata
agreed to toll any statute of limitations until March 31, 1989, in the event of a
lawsuit by the plaintiffs. Id. The district court applied federal tolling principles
to the Rule lOb-5 claim and held that there was no active concealment of the
fraud. Id. Because the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to discover the fraud
through due diligence, the court held that the statute of limitations commenced
when the investment agreements were signed, and expired three years later. Id.
216. 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887
(1991).
217. Id. at 1389-90. For a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit dealt with
the retroactivity issue following the adoption of the uniform limitations period,
see supra note 194.
218. See McCool, 972 F.2d at 1458.
219. Id.
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McCool court had to decide "what to do with this tangled web." '220
The McCool court found that section 27A required the court
to apply the statute of limitations in effect on the day before
Lampf.2 2' The statute of limitations in effect in the Seventh Circuit on that day was the uniform period enunciated in Short, which
would have barred the plaintiffs' claims. 22 2 Instead of applying
the Short rule, the court properly determined that section 27A
also required the court to apply the principles of retroactivity in
2 23
effect in the jurisdiction on the day before the Beam decision.
Before Beam was decided, the Seventh Circuit had not determined
whether Short applied retroactively. The court decided that the
controlling precedent on retroactivity prior to Beam was Chevron
Oil and proceeded to perform a Chevron Oil analysis. 2 24 After finding that the plaintiffs had relied on the limitations period in effect
before Short, the court determined that Short should be given pro2 25
spective effect, at least with respect to the McCool plaintiffs.
Because the Lampf rule did not apply and Short was given prospective effect, the court applied the limitations period in effect
22 6
prior to Short, which was the traditional state borrowing rule.
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the original district
court ruling, which applied the borrowing rule, notwithstanding
the intervening changes in the law made by Short, Lampf and
Beam.

22 7

220. Id. at 1455. The McCool court indicated that if Beam had been a constitutional decision, the court would have needed to decide whether it was required to obey the congressional mandate in § 27A. Id. at 1458 n.3. For a
discussion of whether Beam is a constitutionally based decision, see infra notes
394-404 and accompanying text.
221. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1458.
222. The period in Short was the federal statute of limitations under § 13 of
the Exchange Act. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991). For a discussion of the uniform
limitations period adopted in Short, see supra notes 50-68 and accompanying
text.
223. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1458.
224. Id. at 1458-59. For a discussion of Chevron Oil, see supra notes 125-30
and accompanying text.
225. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1459.
226. Id. The applicable Illinois statute of limitations was three years from
the time the plaintiffs knew, or should have known, about the fraud, but never
more than five years after the sale of the securities. Id. at 1459-60.
227. Id. at 1463.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 27A-VESTED RIGHTS
CHALLENGE

A.

Introduction to the Vested Rights Doctrine

After Congress enacted section 27A, plaintiffs relied on the
statute to defend against motions to dismiss cases on the ground
that the cases were untimely under Lampf. Plaintiffs also invoked
section 27A(b) to support their motions to reinstate cases previously dismissed on the basis of Lampf and Beam. 22 8 In response,
defendants attacked the constitutionality of section 27A on two
primary grounds. First, defendants claimed that section 27A deprived them of vested property rights in contravention of the
Fifth Amendment. Second, defendants asserted that section 27A
violated the separation of powers doctrine. This part of the Article explores whether section 27A divests defendants of vested
rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Part VI then considers the separation of powers issue.
Defendants have had mixed success in their attacks on the
constitutionality of section 27A on the ground that it divests them
of vested rights. A few courts have ruled that section 27A deprives defendants of vested rights by unconstitutionally divesting
the litigants of their property interests in final judgments. 2 29
Other courts, however, have sustained the constitutionality of section 27A against due process challenges even when the defendants had received final judgments of dismissal in their favor. 230
228. See Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 100 ("It did not take anything like the allotted 60 days before a raft of reinstatement motions seeking to
restore already-dismissed claims were filed, together with scores of supplemental briefs relying on section 27A to oppose pending dismissal motions.").
229. See, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding § 27A unconstitutional to extent that it allows reinstatement of claims
already subject to final adjudication); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 231, 234 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (concluding that once final judgment entered,
rights of parties are fixed and legislative modification is unconstitutional taking);
In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding
§ 27A(b) unconstitutional because change in law may not reverse final judgments); Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (D. Colo. 1992)
(same).
Of the cases finding § 27A unconstitutional on these grounds, three have
involved a final dismissal of the claim against the defendant. Treiber, 796 F.
Supp. at 1062; Plaut, 789 F. Supp. at 235;Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1099.
230. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546-47 (10th
Cir. 1992) (holding § 27A constitutional because lifting of statute of limitations
bar divests no property rights in final adjudication), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841
(1993); accord Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Axel
Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 482-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); In re Melridge, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 87-1426-JU, 1992 WL 58265, at *2 (D.
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Although the term "vested right" is not found in the Constitution, the basic notion is that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
federal government from taking vested property rights away from
individuals without due process of law. 2 3' In section 27A cases, a
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment could arise
from either: (1) the running of the Lampf limitations period itself;
or (2) a final judgment of dismissal based upon the Lampf limitations period. 2 32 In both cases, a defendant would claim that the
Or. Mar. 20, 1992); Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574,
576 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Ayers v. Sutiffe, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,552, at 92,537-38 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 1992).
231. The vested rights doctrine has two components: a due process component and a separation of powers component. As to the due process component,
see Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11 th
Cir. 1988) ("[R]ights fixed by judgment are ... a form of property over which
legislatures have no greater power than any other."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090
(1989); Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1060 ("The vested rights doctrine has a due
process component premised upon the fact that once rights are fixed by judgment, they are a form of property over which the legislature has no greater
power than it has over any other form of property."); Plaut, 789 F. Supp. at 234
("[W]hen final judgment has been entered, the rights of the parties have been
fixed, and legislative modification amounts to an unlawful taking.").
As to the separation of powers component, see Georgia Ass'n, 855 F.2d at
810 (stating that vested rights doctrine "protects judicial action from superior
legislative review"); Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1060 ("The doctrine also has a separation of powers component derived from the constitutional limitation on legislative review ofjudicial action, 'aregime ... subversive of the judicial branch.' "
(quoting Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1974))); Plaut, 789 F. Supp. at 235 ("A judgment of a court as it affects the
parties before the court cannot be disturbed by the legislature without subverting the constitutional independence of the judiciary." (citing Daylo, 501 F.2d
at 816)).
Another potential separation of powers problem is that retroactive annulment of a prior final judgment transmutes that judgment into an advisory opinion. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1107 ("[A] judicial declaration subject to
discretionary suspension by another branch of government may easily be characterized as an advisory opinion.") (quoting 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529.1 (1978)).

232. There is a third possible source. In theory, a vested right could arise
from a nonfinal judgment based upon the Lampf limitations rule. The courts,
however, have consistently held that parties acquire no protectable property interests in nonfinaljudgments. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
310 (1945) (holding that statute did not deprive defendant of property without
due process of law, as defendant's immunity from suit was not finally adjudicated); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 201 (1921) (stating that plaintiff had no vested right in law upon which
district court's judgment was based while case was on appeal); Rafferty v. Smith,
Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226, 232 (1921) (concluding that respondents had no
greater rights in appealable judgment than party whose action was barred by
legislation enacted after action was instituted); Grimsey v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738,
744 (9th Cir. 1989) (indicating that no property right vests in any cause of action
until final unreviewable judgment is rendered), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1620
(1991); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing
Supreme Court opinions to support conclusion that person has no vested right
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existence of the vested right results in immunity from suit.
In order for a defendant to claim successfully that a vested
right arises from the mere expiration of the Lampf limitations period, the defendant must overcome two obstacles. First, the defendant must show the continued viability of the Supreme Court
cases indicating that a vested right arises after the running of a
substantive limitations period. Second, the defendant must show
that the Lampf limitations period is substantive. These issues are
explored in the next section, which concludes that: (1) the Lampf
limitations period is substantive; and (2) although not free from
doubt, the Court probably still adheres to the view that a vested
right arises upon the expiration of a substantive limitations
period.
If a case has actually been dismissed as untimely based upon
the expiration of the Lampf limitations period and that judgment
has become final, the defendant may also contend that the final
judgment itself constitutes a vested right. As the final section of
this part discusses, the issue confronting the defendant making
such a claim is which of two lines of cases applies. The first line of
cases holds that vested rights generally do not arise upon the expiration of a limitations period. However, none of these cases involve final judgments. The second line of cases supports the
proposition that vested rights arise from final judgments. None
of these cases involve a final judgment based upon the expiration
of a limitations period. The issue thus becomes which line of
cases provides the closer analogy to a case in which the defendant
obtains a final judgment based on a limitations period. This part
concludes that the courts should find that the second line of cases
provides the better analogy and should hold that vested rights
arise when defendants obtain final judgments based on the running of the Lampf limitations period.
in rule of law until final unreviewable judgment is rendered); De Dampitan v.
Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 516 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (observing
that because judgments at issue were appealable, they were not final and could
be vacated by court); De Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1253 (D.C.
Cir.) (stating that nonfinal judgments did not create vested rights and therefore
could be altered by legislature), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). Put another
way, courts are obligated to apply all constitutional changes in the law applicable
to the case if such change occurs at any time during the pendency of the case,
including the appeal process.
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Vested Rights Arising From the Running of the
Lampf Limitations Period

1. Supreme Court Cases Regarding Vested Rights and Statutes of
Limitation
Although defendants have argued primarily that vested rights
arise from final judgments, a defendant could claim a vested
property right by virtue of the expiration of the Lampf limitations
period alone, regardless of whether the defendant had obtained a
final judgment in reliance on that rule at the time section 27A
became effective. Under this theory, if a plaintiff's claim was untimely by virtue of the application of Lampf and Beam, Congress
could not enact legislation that had the effect of retroactively removing the bar. The vested property interest would be the
"right" to be immune from suit by virtue of the running of the
one-and-three-year rule enunciated in Lampf. Although Supreme
Court precedent exists that could support such a claim, a defendant would have to establish a number of difficult propositions in
order to successfully make this argument.
Campbell v. Holt 23 3 is the earliest important case discussing
whether a person has a protectable property interest in being immune from suit once a limitations period expires. In Campbell, a
state constitutional amendment retroactively reinstated a tolling
provision. The provision had the effect of removing the bar on
the plaintiff's claim even though the applicable limitations period
had run. 234 The defendant contended that the retroactive appli233. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
234. At the start of the Civil War, Texas passed a law that tolled all statutes
of limitations. Id. at 621. Prior to this legislation, the defendant in Campbell sold
land and acquired the services of slaves legally owned by his minor daughter
through an inheritance from her mother. Id. at 620. The statute of limitations
pertinent to the claim in Campbell required suit to be brought within two years of
the actual conversion of the plaintiff's property. The limitations period was
tolled while the plaintiff was still a minor. Id. at 621. After the war, the Texas
legislature repealed the suspension of the limitations statutes. At that point the
plaintiff was no longer a minor and the limitations period on her claim for conversion against her father commenced. Id.
After the applicable limitations period had run (barring the daughter's
claim against her father), Texas amended its state constitution to include a provision that reinstated the tolling of limitations statutes, retroactive to the start of
the Civil War, until Texas was readmitted into the Union. The amendment
stated that "[t]he statutes of limitations of civil suits were suspended by the socalled act of secession of the 28th ofJanuary, 1861, and shall be considered as
suspended within this State, until the acceptance of this Constitution by the
United States Congress." Id. The daughter then sued, contending that this provision lifted the bar on her claim against her father because the effect of the
constitutional amendment was to toll the limitations period applicable to her
suit. Id. at 621-22.
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cation of the amendment to a claim that was already barred constituted a taking of his property in violation of the due process
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 5 Both the trial court
and the appellate court held that the constitutional amendment
lifted the statute of limitations bar even though the limitations
period had run prior to the amendment. 23 6 The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the retroactive tolling provision was
2 37
constitutional.
In allowing the retroactive tolling provision to lift the bar of
the statute of limitations, the Court distinguished between two
types of limitations statutes. The first type confers on the defendant a vested right in real property by prescription once the time
period expires. 23 8 The second type bars only the remedy otherwise available to the plaintiff, but confers no vested right in the
defendant to be free from suit. 23 9 In the former situation, the
running of the statute of limitations extinguishes the substantive
cause of action, while in the latter situation, the limitations period
does not affect the underlying substantive right of the plaintiff.
The Campbell Court found the limitations period at issue in that
case was of the second type, noting:
We certainly do not understand that a right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a vested
right, so as to be beyond legislative power in a proper
case. The statutes of limitation, as often asserted and especially by this court, are founded in public needs and
public policy-are arbitrary enactments by the law-making power. And other statutes, shortening the period or
235. The defendant's claims were based upon the proposition that "the bar
of the statute, being complete and perfect, could not.., be taken away by this
constitutional provision, and that, to do so, would violate . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . which declares that no State shall 'deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.' " Id. at 622 (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).

236. Id.

237. Id. at 630.
238. Id. at 623.
239. Id. at 623-24. The Campbell Court noted:
It may, therefore, very well be held that, in an action to recover
real or personal property, where the question is as to the removal of the
bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar
has become perfect, such act deprives the party of his property without
due process of law ....
But we are of the opinion that to remove the bar which the statute
of limitations enables a debtor to interpose to prevent the payment of
his debt stands on very different ground.
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making it longer, which is necessary to its operation,
have always been held to be within the legislative power
until the bar is complete. The right does not enter into
or become a part of the contract. No man promises to
pay money with any view to being released from that obligation by lapse of time. It violates no right of his,
therefore, when the legislature says, time shall be no bar,
though such was the law when the contract was made.
The authorities we have cited, especially in this court,
show that no right is destroyed when the law restores a
2 40
remedy which had been lost.
The Court went on to observe that no property right vests when a
claim is barred by the statute of limitations:
We are unable to see how a man can be said to have
property in the bar of the statute as a defence to his promise to pay. In the most liberal extension of the use of the
word property to choses in action, to incorporeal rights,
it is new to call the defence of lapse of time to the obligation to pay money, property. It is no natural right. It is
24 1
the creation of conventional law.
According to the principles set forth in Campbell, a statute of
limitations barring a claim with respect to the payment of a debt
does not vest any right in the debtor not to be sued; rather, the
statute merely withdraws the remedy otherwise available to the
creditor. Thus, a statutory extension of the time to sue after the
original time expires is permissible because it merely revives the
barred remedy; the underlying obligation (right) to pay was never
terminated.
The Court reaffirmed the Campbell holding in Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson.242 In Chase, a statutory amendment created a
240. Id. at 628 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 629.
242. 325 U.S. 304 (1945). The Chase Court noted:
The substantial federal questions which survive the state court decision are whether this case is governed by Campbell v. Holt and, if so,
whether that case should be reconsidered and overruled.
In Campbell v. Holt ....
this Court held that where a lapse of time
has not invested a party with title to real or personal property, a state
legislature, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal
or extend a statute of limitations, even after right of action is barred
thereby, restore to the plaintiff his remedy, and divest the defendant of
the statutory bar. This has long stood as a statement of the law of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and we agree with the court below that its
holding is applicable here ....
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specific limitations period for securities sale violations under a
state blue sky law. The issue was whether the statutory amendment could apply retroactively to reinstate claims barred by the
prior limitations period. 243 The trial court held that the amendment revived the plaintiff's previously dismissed securities fraud
claims. 24 4 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that
the amended law applied to the case and did not violate the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the amended law, which retroactively resurrected the
2 46
plaintiff's previously barred claim, was constitutional.
The Chase Court determined that the defendant had not obtained a final judgment in his favor before the change in the law
Id. at 311-12.
243. In Chase, the plaintiff sued to recover the purchase price of securities
sold in violation of Minnesota's blue sky law. Id. at 305-06. The defendant asserted that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's claim had run. Id. at 306.
The plaintiff countered that the statute was tolled when the defendant left the
state and did not run during its absence. Id. The blue sky law at the time of
filing did not specify a limitations period. Id. at 306-07. Rather, a general statute of limitations, requiring that the cause of action be brought within six years
after discovery, was applied to blue sky law violations. Id. The claim was
brought seven years after the sale. Id. at 305-06.
The trial court ruled that the statute was tolled during the defendant's absence from the state and the claim was therefore still viable. Id. at 306. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, finding that the limitations period had
run. Id. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the
defendant's absence because the defendant, pursuant to statute, had designated
agents to receive service of process after its departure. Id.
While the case was pending on remand on different grounds, the Minnesota legislature amended the blue sky law, adding a specific limitations period
for blue sky law violations. The statutory amendment extended the time available for the plaintiff to commence his cause of action. Id. at 306-07 n.3 (citing
MINN. STAT. § 3996-24 (Supp. 1941)). The revised statute required that suit be
brought within six years of delivery of the securities, rather than six years after
discovery of a blue sky law violation. Id. at 307. If delivery occurred more than
five years before the effective date of the revision, the suit could be brought
within one year of the statute's enactment. Id. at 308. For the full text of the
amendment, see id. at 306-07 n.3.
244. Id. at 308. The defendant moved to raise the issue of the constitutionality of reviving the previously barred action, but the court denied the motion.
Id. The defendant claimed that application of the amendment would deprive the
defendant of property without due process of law. Id.
245. Id. at 309. In finding that the application of the amended law to the
plaintiff's case was constitutional, the Supreme Court of Minnesota relied on
Campbell: "We do not find that Campbell v. Holt has been reversed or reconsidered, and we regard it as sound law; and, certainly, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, it is binding on this court until reversed by the Supreme
Court." Donaldson v. Chase Sec. Corp., 13 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1943), aff'd, 325
U.S. 304 (1945).
246. Chase, 325 U.S. at 315-16.
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took effect. 24 7 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Campbell but
adopted a slightly different rationale. The Chase Court stated:
This Court, in Campbell v. Holt, adopted as a working
hypothesis, as a matter of constitutional law, the view
that statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy, not to
destruction of fundamental rights. The abstract logic of the
distinction between substantive rights and remedial or procedural
rights may not be clear-cut, but it has beenfound a workable concept to point up the real and valid difference between rules in
which stability is of prime importanceand those in which flexibility is a more important value....
The essential holding in Campbell v. Holt, so far as it
applies to this case, is sound and should not be overruled. The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an
act of state legislation void merely because it has some
retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Some rules of law probably could not be changed retroactively without hardship and oppression, and this
whether wise or unwise in their origin. Assuming that
statutes of limitation, like other types of legislation,
could be so manipulated that their retroactive effects
would offend the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said
that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a
remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against
248
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Chase Court reaffirmed the principle that limitations statutes are merely legislative tools used to effectuate public policy
concerning the fair and efficient administration of claims. 2 49 Con247. See id. at 310 (holding that defendant's statutory immunity in state
courts was not final judgment, and therefore legislative action did not deprive
defendant of judgment in his favor).
248. Id. at 314-16 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court intimated that
the right/remedy distinction used in Campbell might be "unsound" but found
that it produced an acceptable result. Id. at 314. The Chase Court refused to
recognize that such a right/remedy distinction existed as a matter of constitutional law. Id. at 316.
249. In describing statutes of limitation, the Court stated:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims ....
They have come into the law not
through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a
public policy about the privilege to litigate.
Id. at 314 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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sequently, the Court declined to treat limitations periods as creating fundamental rights and noted that such periods were subject
250
to substantial legislative control.
Defendants arguing that the expiration of the Lampf limitations period creates vested property interests could distinguish
Campbell and Chase by relying on William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf &
Ship Island Railroad.2 5 1 In Danzer, a case decided after Campbell but
before Chase, the Court considered a statute of limitations that
specifically related to a cause of action and therefore affected the
right and not the remedy. The issue was whether the limitations
2 52
period could be extended after the limitations period had run.
The Danzer Court distinguished Campbell because Campbell involved a limitations period that affected only the remedy. 2 53 In
Danzer, the Court held that because the running of the limitations
period terminated the underlying right upon which the plaintiff
based his claim, any extension of the limitations period unconstitutionally divested the defendant of a property interest in contra250. Id. The Court noted that statutes of limitation had never been recognized as "fundamental" rights, and could be relied on only through "legislative
grace and . . .subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control." Id.
251. 268 U.S. 633 (1925). In Danzer, the defendant carrier misrouted a
shipment of lumber, causing damages to the plaintiff-purchaser. Id. at 634.
Subsequent to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, the plaintiff
filed a claim for reparation with the Interstate Commerce Commission under
§ 206(0 of the Interstate Commerce Act. Id. Section 206(0 provided that "[t]he
period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission
for causes of action arising prior to Federal control." Id. at 635. The plaintiff's
right to file his complaint expired prior to the passage of the Act, but if the
period of federal control was excluded, the complaint was timely. Id. at 636.
Under § 206(0, the Commission ordered the defendant to pay damages. Id.
at 634. The defendant contended that § 206(0 was unconstitutional because to
renew or revive the cause of action that had expired prior to the passage of the
Act was to take the defendant's property without due process of law. Id. at 635.
252. Danzer was not the first case in which the Court accepted the
right/remedy distinction. In 1886, the Supreme Court decided that a plaintiff
was time-barred from bringing a wrongful death action, stating:
The statute[] create[s] a new legal liability, with the right to [bring] a
suit for its enforcement, provided the suit is brought within twelve
months, and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be
brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not
of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at
all .... The liability and the remedy are created by the same statute,
and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right.
The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886).
253. Danzer, 268 U.S. at 636-37 ("[Ilt is plain that [Campbell] does not apply .... Th[at] decision rests on the conception that. . . the statute of limitations
related to the remedy only, and that the removal of the bar was not
unconstitutional.").
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vention of the Fifth Amendment.2 54
The Chase Court considered the right/remedy distinction relied on in Danzer. Although Chase appears to have minimized the
right/remedy distinction, the Court did not overrule Danzer. The
Chase Court did find that the facts of its case were distinguishable
from Danzer because the limitations period in Danzer affected the
right while the limitations period in Chase affected only the
25 5
remedy.
Both Campbell and Danzer relied to some extent on the traditional right/remedy distinction in deciding whether a limitations
period can be extended to revive a barred claim or remedy.
Under these decisions, if the limitations period is remedial or procedural, the defendant has no vested right in the running of the
limitations period and a statute extending the time period can revive an action previously barred. If, on the other hand, the limitations period is substantive and affects the right, a subsequent
enactment impinges on the defendant's vested right if the enactment attempts to extend the time to bring suit when the action
was barred under a prior limitations period. Thus, the defendant
relying on Danzer will need to show that the Lampf limitations period is substantive and that Danzer and the right/remedy distinction recognized in Danzer is still viable.
2.

The Lampf Rule As a Substantive Limitations PeriodAffecting the
Right

None of the courts considering the constitutionality of section 27A has characterized the limitations period established by
Lampf as substantive. If the right/remedy distinction articulated
254. Id. at 637.
255. In Chase, the Court distinguished Danzer:
In the Danzer case it was held that where a statute in creating a liability
also put a period to its existence, a retroactive extension of the period
after its expiration amounted to a taking of property without due process of law ....
[T]he result may be the same if the period of limitation
is prescribed by a different statute if it "was directed to the newly created liability so specifically so as to warrant saying that it qualified the
right." [A] situation [where this does not occur] plainly does not parallel that in the Danzer case ....
[In Chase, the state court, whose opinion
the Supreme Court affirmed] considered that the effect of the legislation was merely to reinstate a lapsed remedy, that appellant had acquired no vested right to immunity from a remedy for its wrong.., and
that reinstatement of the remedy by the state legislature did not infringe any federal right under the Fourteenth Amendment, as expounded by this Court in Campbell v. Holt.
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 312 n.8 (1945) (quoting Davis v.
Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904)).
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in Danzer remains viable, however, the Lampf three-year statute of
repose appears to be substantive. If so, then under Danzer, the
Lampf limitations period extinguishes the right when the period
runs. Congress then could not extend the period to sue if suit
was previously barred by Lampf. Thus, if the Lampf limitations period is substantive and Danzer is still good law, resurrecting claims
barred under Lampf and Beam would unconstitutionally divest defendants of property interests.

a. The Lampf Limitations Period As a Substantive Statute of
Repose
The Lampf limitations period can be viewed as substantive.
Section 13 of the Exchange Act, one of the express limitations
periods to which the Lampf Court looked when adopting the oneand-three-year limitations period, has been characterized as "a
statute of limitations framed by a statute of repose." 256 The oneand-three-year structure includes both a statute of limitations
component in the one-year discovery period and a statute of repose component in the three-year termination period. The Tenth
Circuit has held that the three-year statute of repose in section 13
is substantive three-year and its running extinguishes the underlying liability. 257 Because the Lampf rule is itself a hybrid, the oneyear discovery component of the Lampf limitations period may affect only the remedy while the substantive three-year statute of
repose affects the right.
Courts have interpreted section 13 as creating a substantive
right of immunity from suit when the three-year period expires
and have refused to apply equitable tolling principles to extend
that period. 258 Similarly, in adopting the one-and-three-year
256. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1434 (10th Cir.
1991), vacated sub nom. Dennler v. Trippet, 112 S. Ct. 1658 (vacated for reconsideration in light of § 27A, not because of issues regarding § 13 portion of opinion), and remanded, Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir.
1992). Section 13 provides:
No action shall be maintained ... unless brought within one year
after the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such
action be brought to enforce a liability ... more than three years after
the security was bona fide offered to the public, or ...more than three
years after the sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
257. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]hat is critical to understanding Section 13 as a statute of repose ... is the recognition that, as such, not only is the
remedy barred, but, also, the liability itself is extinguished." Anixter, 939 F.2d at
1434.
258. See Mekhjian v. Wollin, 782 F. Supp. 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing
Anixter and Short to support ruling that three-year period of repose was absolute
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structure in Lampf and rejecting equitable tolling of the three-year
prong, the Court in Lampf made it clear that the three-year prong
was a statute of repose imposing an unconditional outside temporal limitation on a plaintiff's ability to bring suit under Rule
lOb-5. 2 59 Several courts have echoed the Supreme Court's proclamation that "it is evident that the equitable tolling doctrine is
fundamentally inconsistent" 2 60 with the three-year repose period
in section 13 and Lampf.2 6 1 These rulings support the claim that
the Lampf rule is substantive.
b.

Substance/Procedure Dichotomy in an Implied Private
Right of Action

Under traditional conflicts analysis, the issue becomes
whether courts should characterize the one-and-three-year limitations period created by Lampf as procedural or substantive. On
the one hand, the Lampf limitations period might be viewed as
procedural or remedial because it applies to causes of action that
are judicially implied rather than legislatively created. 26 2 Under
the traditional tests used to characterize the nature of a statute of
limitations, the Lampf limitations period arguably cannot qualify
as substantive because both the built-in and the specificity tests
are based upon the fact that the legislature created the limitations
period as part of the cause of action. 26 3 The Lampf limitations
bar to § 10(b) claim); Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc.,
778 F. Supp. 695, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Anixter and Short in concluding
that use of doctrine of equitable estoppel was inconsistent with Lampf and that
three-year period was absolute bar to plaintiff's claim); see also Anixter, 939 F.2d
at 1436; Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991).
259. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773, 2782 (1991). The Court stated:
The 3-year limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling. One
commentator explains: "[T]he inclusion of the three-year period can
have no significance in this context other than to impose an outside
limit." Because the purpose of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve
as a cutoff, we hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bloomenthal, supra note 34, at 288).
260. Id. (quoting Short, 908 F.2d at 1391).
261. See, e.g., Borden, 778 F. Supp. at 698-99 (discussing Anixter and Short);
Covell v.Photo Images, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.Kan. 1991) (citing
Anixter and Lampf inrejecting equitable tolling in 1Ob-5 claim).
262. Stewart, Note, supra note 27, at 533-34. For a discussion of how the
limitations issue if it is procedural, might be treated under Beam, see supra note
167.
263. For a discussion of the built-in and specificity tests, see supra notes 21 23 and accompanying text. Recently, a district court was faced with an argument
that § 27A was properly characterized as substantive and should therefore be
analyzed under the Danzer holding. Barr v. McGraw-Hill, No. 87 CIV. 6259
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period is neither built-in to the statute creating the cause of action (section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5), nor is it specifically directed
to any statutorily-created liability, because courts have implied
the liability created under section 10(b). The courts could find
that a substantive limitations period can only be created by the
legislature and any limitations period created by the judiciary is
necessarily procedural.
On the other hand, because courts created the Rule lOb-5
right of action by implication, it would seem that courts could
make the limitations period a substantive element of the right to
sue. Because the limitations period created in Lampf relates specifically to the implied private right of action, the limitations period can be viewed as substantive by analogy to the built-in or
specificity tests. Furthermore, the statute of repose component of
the rule would probably be treated as substantive under the traditional view. No definitive case law directly supports or rebuts the
proposition that an implied limitations period can be characterized as substantive.
3.

Continued Viability of Danzer and of the Right/Remedy Distinction
in Limitations Periods
If the Lampf rule is substantive, then based upon traditional
conflicts distinctions and Danzer, the running of the Lampf limitations period would affect the right and terminate the obligation.
Under Danzer, once the repose period has run, a defendant has a
vested right in not being sued that cannot be divested by a subsequent statute reviving the obligation or extending the time to sue
on the obligation. This conclusion depends on the continued viability of the right/remedy distinction in limitations periods and
the continued viability of Danzer.
a.

Continued Viability of the Right/Remedy Distinction in
Limitations Periods
The continued viability of the right/remedy distinction was

(KC), 1992 WL 196754, at *8 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). The court rejected
the argument, stating:
In Chase... the Supreme Court observed that Danzer's holding against
retroactive change of a statute of limitations as to already accrued
causes of action was confined to cases in which the statute creating liability either put a limitations period into existence or in which the limitations period was specifically directed to by a different statute ....
[W]e note that section 10(b) does not include a reference to a limitations period, nor did it do so prior to the passage of section 27A.
Neither does section 27A or any other provision in the Securities Act of
1934 confer a definite limitations period on section 10(b).
Id. (citation omitted).
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rejected by the D.C. Circuit in a different context in Wesley Theological Seminary v. United States Gypsum Co. 2 64 In Wesley, a District of
Columbia statute revived an earlier time-barred action against
manufacturers of building materials. 26 5 The manufacturer argued that the earlier limitations period was a substantive statute
of repose that had run, giving the defendant a vested right not to
be sued. 26 6 The manufacturer argued "that Chase and Campbell
[acknowledge] a simple dichotomy between procedure and substance, under which changes in purely procedural provisions may
2 67
be retroactive while changes in substantive ones may not."The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Chase and
Campbell did not support the procedural/substantive dichotomy
suggested by the manufacturer.2 68 Although the Wesley court recognized that there were differences between statutes of limitation
and statutes of repose, the court was unwilling to embrace the
right/remedy distinction, finding it "somewhat metaphysical.- 269
The court focused on the language in Chase that distinguished between "rules for which 'stability' is important and ones for which
'flexibility' is critical." '2 70 The Wesley court concluded that "any
substance/procedure dichotomy suggested by Chase is either completely defunct or, at the very most, establishes procedural rules
as a safe harbor within which a legislature may freely make retro27
active changes." '
The Wesley court found that the procedural/substantive distinction was also undermined by a line of cases exemplified by
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. ,272 in which the Court held that
Congress may enact legislation that disturbs otherwise settled expectations of private parties if the legislation meets the rational
basis test. 27 3 In Usey, coal mine operators challenged the consti264. 876 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
265. Id. at 120.
266. Id. at 121.
267. Id.
268. Id. The manufacturer also relied on the holding of International
Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) to
support its argument. Wesley, 876 F.2d at 121. For a discussion of International
Union, see infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text. The court also rejected
the use of International Union to support the manufacturer's contention, stating
that International Union did not mention the substantive/procedural distinction
advanced in Wesley. Wesley, 876 F.2d at 121.
269. Wesley, 876 F.2d at 122.
270. Id. at 121.
271. Id. at 122.

272. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
273. Wesley, 876 F.2d at 122.
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tutionality of a federal statute that required them to pay benefits
to former employees who had died or become disabled as a result
of contracting black lung disease.2 7 4 In upholding the retroactive
effect of the statute against a due process challenge, the Court
declared that the statute was a rational measure within Congress'
power and therefore constitutionally permissible even though the
statute upset settled expectations.2 75 The Usery rational basis test
was subsequently refined by the Court in Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,276 in which the Court held that a court
must determine whether the statute in question "is supported by
2 77
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means."
274. Usery, 428 U.S. at 5. The statute required the operators to compensate
even former employees who were not employed at the time the legislation was
passed. Id. at 12.
275. Id. at 18-19. The Court noted:
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a
due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an
arbitrary and irrational way....
...[O]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose
a new duty or liability based on past acts.
It does not follow, however, that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retroactive aspects of
legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the
former.
Id. at 15-17 (citations omitted).
276. 467 U.S. 717 (1984). In Pension Benefit, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that retroactively imposed a penalty on employees who
withdrew funds from a multi-employer pension plan, even though withdrawals
from the plan had been permitted without penalty when they occurred. Id. at
734. The Court stated that such retroactive legislation met due process requirements if it was supported by a rational legislative purpose. Id. at 729.
277. Id.; see also United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64 (1989) (upholding statute requiring retroactive payment of user fee for parties litigating
claims before Iran-United States Claims Tribunal against due process challenge). Both Pension Benefit and Usery cite Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107
(1947), in which the Supreme Court held that parties do not gain immunity from
federal regulation of future acts by virtue of rights previously acquired through
final judgments. See Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 729; Usery, 428 U.S. at 15.
In the cases challenging the constitutionality of § 27A, the courts deciding
the issue have held that § 27A meets the due process rational basis test because
the statute is rationally related to the furtherance of legitimate governmental
interests. E.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,414, at 96,262, 96,265-66 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993) (finding
that § 27A passes due process and equal protection rational basis scrutiny);
Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11 th Cir. 1992) (stating that § 27A is rational means of preserving lawsuits filed prior to Lampf and
satisfies due process test); Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Litig., 800 F. Supp.
1478, 1483-84 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (protecting integrity of securities and banking
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Using the Usery test, the Wesley court stated that it was not
irrational to place the burden for losses due to defective materials
on the manufacturer, particularly because the manufacturers had
not made sales in reliance on the running of the limitations period. 2 78

The defendant attempted to distinguish Usery and its

progeny by arguing that those cases dealt solely with situations in
which Congress had created a new liability where none had previously existed as compared with situations where litigants used a
statutory provision in an attempt to revive a barred cause of action. The court rejected this argument because it was unable "to
perceive a distinction of constitutional magnitude between an expectation of nonliability that arises from legislative silence and
common law nonliability, and one that arises from the type of affirmative legislative action present in this case."

279

If Chase, Campbell and the Usety line of cases are the relevant
authority, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Wesley is persuasive. Significantly, the Wesley court did not mention Danzer, which held that
the expiration of a substantive statute of repose created a protectable property interest in the defendant to be immune from
suit.

b.

28 0

Continued Viability of Danzer

Although the Wesley court did not discuss Danzer, the court
rejected the substance/procedure distinction urged by the defendant. In rejecting the defense argument, the court cited International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. ,281 a case
laws, and giving securities plaintiffs their day in court by negating Lampf are
legitimate congressional purposes); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1058
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (noting that § 27A satisfies due process rational basis test);
First v. Prudential Bache, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,622, at 92,919 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1992) (indicating that Congress acted
rationally in enacting § 27A); Ayers v. Sutliffe, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,552, at 92,537-38 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 1992) (allowing claimants to pursue timely filed claims is legitimate legislative purpose
that satisfies rational basis test). For a discussion of how § 27A rationally relates
to legitimate government purposes under an equal protection analysis, see infra
note 377.
278. Wesley Theological Seminary v. United States Gypsum Co., 876 F.2d
119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
279. Id. at 123.
280. For a discussion of Danzer, see supra notes 251-54 and accompanying
text.
281. 429 U.S. 229 (1976). In International Union, the defendant fired an employee for allegedly failing to comply with procedures contained in a collecive
bargaining agreement. Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 525 F.2d 124, 126 (6th
International Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins &
Cir. 1975), rev'd sub noma.
Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976). The plaintiff filed an internal grievance under
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that raises serious questions about the continued vitality of Danzer. 28 2 In International Union, the defendant, relying on Danzer, argued that Congress could not constitutionally revive an action
previously barred by the running of the established limitations
period. 2 83 The Supreme Court, however, relying on Chase, held
that Congress did not violate the defendant's due process rights
when it enacted a law that retroactively extended the time in
which the plaintiff could file an EEOC claim.2 8 4 The Supreme
Court found Chase applicable and read Chase as eviscerating
28 5
Danzer.
The International Union Court seems to have misinterpreted
Chase because Chase did not limit Danzer to the extent suggested in
InternationalUnion. The Chase Court found that Danzer was not applicable because the limitations period at issue in Chase affected
only the remedy and not the right. 28 6 The Chase Court found that
Campbell controlled because the limitations period in Campbell affected only the remedy. 2 8 7 The Danzer Court had based its decision on the fact that the limitations period at issue affected the
the collective bargaining agreement but her grievance was rejected. Id. The
plaintiff then filed a charge with the EEOC, but not until 108 days after her date
of discharge. Id. The EEOC granted a right to sue letter and the plaintiff then
filed a cause of action. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of Title
VII which, at that time, required the plaintiff to file her charge with the EEOC
within 90 days of discharge. Id. at 125.
282. Wesley, 876 F.2d at 121.
283. International Union, 429 U.S. at 243.
284. Id. at 243-44. The Sixth Circuit had affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff-employee's action, holding that the running of the Title VII 90-day limitations period in effect at the time terminated the plaintiff's right to file a charge
with the EEOC.
285. Id. International Union may have sounded the death knell for Danzer.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Guy relied on and accepted the right/remedy distinction accepted by the Court in Danzer. See Guy, 525 F.2d at 127-28. The Sixth
Circuit stated:
The limitation in Title VII is more than a mere statute of limitations. The Act creates a right and liability which did not exist at common law and prescribes the remedy. The remedy is an integral part of
the right and its requirements must be strictly followed. If they are not,
the right ends.
... The subsequent increase of time to file the charge enacted by
Congress could not revive plaintiff's claim which had been previously
barred and extinguished.

Id.
286. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 312 n.8 (1945). For a
discussion of Chase, see supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
287. Chase, 325 U.S. at 312.
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right.2 8 8 Thus, it appears that the Court in InternationalUnion improperly held that Chase was the controlling precedent. Nonetheless, if the Court persists in its erroneous reading of Chase and
Danzer, the Court will likely continue to reject the principles set
forth in Danzer.
4.

Conclusions on Vested Rights Arising from the Running of the
Lampf Limitations Period

Even assuming that Danzer is still good law, Usery apparently
would permit Congress to enact a new statute that retroactively
imposes liability on Rule lOb-5 defendants for actions in which
they no longer have lOb-5 liability because the Lampf limitations
period has run. Creating a new liability and removing a limitations impediment to an existing cause of action will have the same
effect: in each case the defendants will be liable for their actions.
In the situation in which Congress creates a new statutory liability
settled expectations may be disturbed, but no property interest of
the defendant is divested by virtue of the statute alone.
It is uncertain whether the running of the Lampf limitations
period itself creates a vested right in defendants to be free from
suit for lOb-5 violations. Although Supreme Court cases discuss
the ability of Congress to revive a previously barred claim by retroactively extending the applicable limitations period, they provide uncertain guidance. Danzer has never been overruled. If
Danzer is still good law and the Lampf limitations period is substantive, so that it extinguishes the right to sue, then a defendant
appears to have a vested right in the immunity from suit arising
from the running of the Lampf limitations period. On the other
hand, International Union virtually eviscerates Danzer by misapplying Chase. If the Court persists in misreading Chase, decides to
overrule Danzer or decides that the Lampf limitations period is not
substantive because it was judicially created or otherwise, then
the courts would reject defendants' claims that they acquired
vested rights solely upon the expiration of the Lampf limitations
period.
Courts should find that the three-year repose period in Lampf
is substantive. The viability of the right/remedy distinction and
of Danzer present difficult issues. The Court would probably take
the position, at least in the context of the constitutionality of section 27A, that a vested right arises from the expiration of a sub288. For a discussion of Danzer, see supra notes 251-54 and accompanying
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stantive limitations period. This conclusion is buttressed by the
Court's rejection of equitable tolling in Lampf. The thrust of that
determination is arguably that once the repose period runs, the
underlying right ceases to exist.
C.

Vested Rights Arisingfrom FinalJudgments

Defendants who have obtained final, nonappealable dismissals of the actions against them based upon the one-and-threeyear limitations period in Lampf also attack the constitutionality of
section 27A(b), which requires reinstatement of many of those
dismissed cases, by arguing that retroactive legislation that reopens finally-adjudicated actions violates the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 2 89 These defendants claim that their final judgments constitute vested property rights protected by the
Fifth Amendment.2 90 The courts have split on whether section
27A divests defendants of vested rights arising from final judgments. The disparate holdings stem from a fundamental disagreement over the proper interpretation of the relevant
precedent. This part of the Article concludes that once a defendant obtains a final judgment of dismissal based upon the Lampf
rule, Congress may not reopen that case by creating a longer limitations period or by extending that period through other means.
Accordingly, section 27A(b) is unconstitutional to the extent that
it permits reinstatement of cases in which defendants had already
obtained final judgments dismissing the claims against them.
Some courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statute
against due process challenges by treating the one-and-three-year
limitations period in Lampf as remedial or "technical" in nature. 29 ' These courts conclude that the final dismissal of a lawsuit
289. For the text of § 27A(b), see supra note 9. It is important to note that
the term "final judgment" used in this Article refers to a judgment that is final in
the sense that it is no longer subject to appeal.
290. See, e.g., Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is extended to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, suits that originate in state
courts and raise the due process constitutionality issue do so under the Fourteenth Amendment. At least one commentator has taken the position that
§ 27A(b) divests defendants of vested rights in their final judgments. See Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 104-05 (Section 27A(b) "transgresses the
rule first established in McCullough v. Virginia, that final judgments of the courts
may not be overturned by legislation ....
A contrary rule would violate the
separation of powers doctrine by subjecting all judicial action to superior legislative review.").
291. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th
Cir. 1992) (indicating that statutes of limitations represent public policy regarding privilege to litigate and their protection is not regarded as fundamental right
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based upon the expiration of the Lampf limitations period does
not confer a vested property interest as does a final judgment
based upon substantive merits.2 9 2 Therefore, these courts hold
that the retroactive application of section 27A to dismissed final
actions does not divest defendants of constitutionally protected
property interests.

Some district courts have held section 27A unconstitutional
on the ground that any final judgment is a property right that can(citing Chase, 325 U.S. at 314)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); AxelJohnson,
Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 482-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding finality argument weak in light of short period in which case was final, dismissal on technical rule not decision on merits, and unfair nature of contrary
result to plaintiffs). The court in AxelJohnson stated:
[T]he artificiality and technicality of the sole reason for dismissal of the
initial case, which has nothing to do with its merits-that is, the new
limitations period established by Lampf-militates in favor of allowing
relief. While a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds technically is
a final adjudication on the merits, the Supreme Court has noted that
the timeliness defense is not a " 'fundamental' right ... of the individual," and that "the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good
only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of
legislative control."
Id. (quoting Chase, 325 U.S. at 314).
292. For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York declared:
While it is true that "[iut is not within the power of the legislature
to take away rights which have been once vested by judgment," this
rule does not apply where the judgment was not based upon the merits
of the claim, but instead was the result of the application of the defense
of statute of limitations, a mere technical rule. Federal courts have long
held that unless the passage of the statute of limitations creates a prescriptive property right, such as title in adverse possession, Congress is
free to revive a cause of action after the limitations period has expired.
Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (citation omitted) (quoting McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123 (1898)); see
also Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (noting that "statutes of limitations traditionally
reside in the legislative branch" and do not create vested rights); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (finding that "[d]efendants'
argument that Section 27A unconstitutionally divests [them of a right] is equally
flawed"); AxelJohnson, 790 F. Supp. at 482 (rejecting applicability of vested rights
doctrine to § 27A).
In Rabin, the district court also held that § 27A was constitutional, but for a
different reason. Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at 1055-56. In Rabin, a final judgment was
not entered until after the passage of § 27A. "Thus, at the time of enactment no
rights were vested." Id. at 1056. Therefore, as applied to the particular case
before the court, § 27A was constitutional because no vested right could be disturbed. Further, the judge stated that § 27A was facially constitutional because
it did not direct courts to reinstate finally-adjudicated cases. Id. at 1055.
"Although § 27A(b) directs courts to reinstate cases dismissed as time barred
subsequent to June 19, 1991 if they would have been timely under the law existing on that date it does not speak specifically to cases in which final judgment
has been entered and the time for appeal has expired." Id.
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not be divested by subsequent legislation. 29 3 This position does
not conflict with the Supreme Court's holdings in Campbell, Danzer
and Chase because none of the defendants in any of those cases

had obtained final judgments of dismissal based upon the expiration of a limitations period. 294 Although the cases provide guidance as to whether a vested right arises solely because of the
expiration of a limitations period, they do not address the arguably different problem of whether Congress can constitutionally
resurrect a time-barred claim that has been dismissed in a final

judgment.
Several cases support the proposition that individuals have
293. See, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding § 27A unconstitutional because although defendants do not have
vested rights in particular statute of limitations, defendants do have vested
rights in court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's § 10(b) claims, which § 27A
seeks to reinstate); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D.
Ky. 1992) (noting that although Supreme Court has yet to decide whether dismissal on limitations ground gives rise to vested right, it has determined that
final judgment gives rise to vested right); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp.
1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding that § 27A is unconstitutional because
it directs courts to reverse final judgments).
294. No final judgment had been rendered in Campbell because the state
constitutional amendment extending the limitations period was enacted before
suit was brought. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 621 (1885). For a discussion
of Campbell, see supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text. The same is true in
Danzer. William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633, 634
(1925). For a discussion of Danzer, see supra notes 251-54 and accompanying
text. Although the action had been commenced in Chase when the statute extending the time period was enacted, the case was still pending on remand and
the Court assumed that no final judgment had been rendered. Chase Sec. Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 305-08 (1945). For a discussion of Chase, see supra
notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
The Chase Court specifically addressed the argument that a final judgment
had been entered by stating:
Appellant, however, insists that it was sued upon two separate and
independent causes of action, one being "upon a liability created by
statute," and that its immunity from suit on that cause of action had
been finally adjudicated. The argument is not consistent with the holdings of the state court ....
The state court did not dispose of the liability for statutory violation as a separate cause of action by dismissal or
otherwise. We cannot say that it was finally or separately adjudicated.
Id. at 3 10-11. In fact, the Court addressed the status of the adjudication in great
length to emphasize that the plaintiff's claim was never dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds. Id. at 305-11.
One commentator analyzed Chase as permitting retroactive application of
newly-enacted legislation to cases on appeal, but thought that applying such a
statute to finally-adjudicated cases would be improper. Charles B. Hochman,
The Supreme Court and The Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV.
692, 718 (1960) ("The Supreme Court held that this new statutory provision
could constitutionally be applied to the case since there had been no final disposition of the litigation. Similarly, it has been held that a statute enacted after
judgment may be retroactively applied on appeal.").
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vested property interests in final judgments. 295 The Supreme
Court has stated that "[i]t is not within the power of a legislature
to take away rights.., vested by a judgment. Legislation may act
on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when
those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legisla29 6
ture to disturb [those] rights . . . ceases."
None of the Supreme Court cases recognizing vested rights
in final judgments involved judgments of dismissal based upon
the expiration of a limitations period. Consequently, final judgment cases do not expressly prohibit resuscitating a previously
final judgment by extending a previously expired limitations bar.
Based upon this distinction, courts finding section 27A(b) constitutional have eschewed these cases and have instead relied on the
Campbell line of cases to support the conclusion that the Constitution permits legislative revival of cases dismissed on the basis of a
technical defense such as the expiration of a statute of
29 7
limitations.
295. See, e.g., Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923) ("[T]he private
rights of parties which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be
taken away by subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by the
court regardless of such legislation."); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102,
123-24 (1898) (concluding that once judgment creates vested right it cannot be
legislatively removed); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421, 431-32 (1855) (noting that private rights determined by final
judgment cannot be annulled by subsequent legislation, although same does not
apply to public rights); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855
F.2d 805, 810 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("The constitutional dimension of this principle,
sometimes labelled the 'vested rights' doctrine ... recognizes that rightsfixed by
judgment are, in essence, a form of property over which legislatures have no
greater power than any other."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989); Tonya K. v.
Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The 'vested rights' doctrine starts from the proposition that a judgment, like a deed, is (or identifies) a
species of property.... Once the court has fixed property rights by judgment,
the legislature has no greater power over this form of property than over any
other."); Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 818 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (denying retroactive application of newly-enacted statute because "to
hold that Congress could annul [the] judgment would be to enlarge substantially
the exception carved by applicable precedent in the general, constitutional rule
that rights vested in final judgments, no longer subject to appeal, are immune
from legislative alteration").
296. McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24.
297. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 233-50 and accompanying text. It is always important to remember, however, that some statutes of
limitation have been held to establish substantive rights. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935) (holding that suits to recover real or personal
property that are barred by statute of limitations cannot be revived by subsequent legislation). The Stewart Court found that such legislation would constitute a deprivation of property without due process because the person
benefitting from the bar had legal vested title in the property once the limitations period expired. Id. at 417; see also Danzer, 268 U.S. at 637 ("[S]uch [limita-
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In validating section 27A(b), courts must determine that final
judgments based upon technical defenses do not rise to the level
of protected property rights. This conclusion is problematic for
many reasons. First, although the Supreme Court has not decided a case in which the issue was the reopening of a prior final
decision rendered between private parties on the basis of a limitations period, the Court has ruled that a final judgment between
private litigants could be reopened by a retroactive statute only in
very specific and limited circumstances. To date the Court has
narrowly confined Congress' ability to disturb a final judgment to
cases involving actions against the government and to cases involving the power of the court to maintain equitable jurisdiction
in matters involving public rights. 2 98 Second, in many jurisdictions, a dismissal based upon statute of limitations grounds operates as a full adjudication on the merits unless otherwise
stated. 29 9 Third, although courts upholding the constitutionality
of section 27A in cases involving final judgments rely on the language in Chase and Campbell that limitations periods are "technitions] provisions sometimes constitute a part of the definition of a cause of
action created by the same or another provision, and operate as a limitation
upon liability. Such, for example, are statutory causes of action for death by
wrongful act."). For a discussion of Danzer, see supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
In addition, courts that hold § 27A constitutional also distinguish the cases
which held that a final judgment on the merits establishes a vested property
interest because again, such cases involve substantive rather than remedial
rights. For example, one court stated:
[D]efendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced. Rather than involving the modification of a technical defense, the cases cited . . . specifically involved divestiture of a substantive right ....
While it is true that "[i]t is not within the power of a legislature to
take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment," this does
not apply where the judgement was not based on the substantive merit
of the claim, but instead was the result of the application of the defense
of statute of limitations, a mere technical rule.
Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123) (citation omitted); see also Sabino, supra note 196, at
50-52 (commenting, without discussing Danzer, that Chase controls and establishes constitutionality of § 27A).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)
(concluding that government could choose to waive its res judicata defense and
pay judgment); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 421 (1855) (allowing relitigation of final judgment in case involving adjudication of public, not private, right). Courts have acknowledged that the
Supreme Court has limited the reopening of final judgments to these types of
cases. See Daylo, 501 F.2d at 816-18; Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 231, 234 n.3 (E.D. Ky. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098,
1106 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
299. Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061-62 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (citing
Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978)).
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cal" and do not rise to the level of fundamental rights, the
Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that final judgments as such do confer protected rights, subject to the very limited exceptions mentioned above. 30 0 Furthermore, as noted
above, the Campbell line of cases is not controlling because it does
not involve final judgments. 30 1 Despite these problems, no clear
Supreme Court precedent controls. Although the Court has
ruled that the running of a statute of limitations does not create a
vested property interest, 30 2 the Court has not determined
whether a final judgment of dismissal, based upon statute of limitations grounds, is a vested property interest protected from ret30 3
roactive legislation by the Fifth Amendment.
Although a few courts have been presented with the issue of
whether retroactive legislation can affect a final judgment in other
contexts, these courts have avoided directly ruling on the issue.
For instance, in two cases involving final judgments, the courts
avoided the constitutional issue by finding no clear congressional
intent to retroactively apply the statute to final judgments. 30 4 In
two other cases, the courts avoided the constitutional question by
300. For examples of cases standing for this general proposition, see supra
notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g.,
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 305, 310, 316
(1945) (indicating that Court considered it important that case involved pending
litigation at time of legislative action, not final adjudication). For a discussion of
these cases, see supra notes 233-50 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976) (holding that congressional extension of limitations period applied to cases pending appeal at time extension made); see also
Chase, 325 U.S. at 315 (lifting bar of statute of limitations to restore remedy does
not violate due process); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628 (1885) (running of
statute of limitations does not affect underlying substantive right); Berstein v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395, 1400-03 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that legislature may
revive claim barred by statute of limitations through extension of limitations
period).
303. "The United States, in its Statement of Interest .... acknowledges that
the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a dismissal on statute of limitation
grounds gives rise to vested rights .... ." Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1061. In
Treiber, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' § 10(b) claims as time-barred
and the plaintiffs did not appeal. Id. at 1056. The district court, in rejecting
reinstatement of the claim, considered the prior dismissal and failure to appeal
as a final judgment. Id. at 1062.
304. See Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810
(11 th Cir. 1988) ("In light of the fact that Congress did not clearly express [an
intent to apply the statute retroactively to final judgments] the constitutional
difficulty associated with this interpretation require[s] the Act to be construed
otherwise."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989); Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("In view of the serious constitutional problems that [retroactive application of the statute to final judgments]
would raise, we are unwilling to impute [such an intent] to Congress ....").
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deciding that the judgments at issue were not final judgments. 30 5
The line of cases represented by Usery and its progeny may
provide insight into how the Court would rule if faced with this
issue. Usery held that Congress can change the law in ways that
disturb otherwise settled expectations of private parties by retroactively making activities that happened in the past actionable
even though those activities were lawful at the time they took
place. Moreover, the Supreme Court decisions indicate that final
judgments are not always sacrosanct. 306 A logical extension of
Usery and the cases that permit the reopening of final judgments
in certain situations could lead to the conclusion that Congress
has the power to undo previously granted protections from suit
so long as it does so rationally. Under this view, intangible property rights would never be vested. Arguably, interfering with the
right not to be sued for a past obligation "terminated" by a statute of repose seems to present no greater impediment to retroactive legislation than an act creating a new liability for past actions
in which no prior liability existed.
Nonetheless, given the Court's apparent inclination to protect rights arising from final judgments and the Court's recognition of the strong societal interest in finality, the Court probably
would adopt the position that defendants who obtained final
judgments of dismissal based upon the Lampf rule acquired vested
rights that cannot be divested by retroactive legislation.30 7 Thus,
305. Tonya K. v. Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that prior suit dismissed without prejudice provided no basis for asserting
vested right in that judgment); Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La
Plata, 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that retroactive statute that
affected pending case violated no vested right).
Nevertheless, these courts in strong dicta indicated that reversing the result
of an otherwise final judgment on the basis of retroactive legislation would present serious due process problems. See Tonya K., 847 F.2d at 1248; Animas-La
Plata, 739 F.2d at 1477.
306. For a discussion of cases that support this view, see supra note 298 and
accompanying text.
307. For example, in Beam, Justice Souter emphasized the importance of
finality and how it acts as a barrier to reopening cases because of new law when
he said:
[R]etroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for finality;
once suit is barred by res judicata . . .a new rule cannot reopen the
door already closed .... Insofar as equality drives us, it might be argued that the new rule should be applied to those who had toiled and
failed, but whose claims are now precluded by res judicata ....
.. .While those whose claims have been adjudicated may seek
equality, a second chance for them could only be purchased at the expense of another principle. " 'Public policy dictates that there be an
end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound
by the result of that contest, and that matters once tried shall be consid-
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section 27A(b) would be unconstitutional at least in those cases in
which plaintiffs sought reinstatement of dismissed claims when a
final judgment was involved.
VI.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGE TO SECTION

A.

27A

Introduction

In most of the section 10(b) cases preserved or revived under
section 27A, defendants have argued that section 27A violates the
constitutional separation of powers doctrine by impermissibly invading the domain of the judiciary. The doctrine's source is Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the
United States "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
30 8
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
The primary rationale for preventing the legislature from exercising or infringing upon the powers of the judiciary is to prevent
the popular will (through the legislature) from depriving unpopu309
lar figures and causes of their rights under the law.
An underlying premise of the separation of powers doctrine
is that each branch has its own sphere of influence upon which the
other branches may not encroach.3 10 The border between Conered forever settled as between the parties.' " Finality must thus delimit equality in a temporal sense ....
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2446-47 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401
(1981) (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525
(1931))); see also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1983) (reaffirming principle that public policy requires that final judgments bring end to litigated issues); United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that new judicial civil rules should not be
applied to transaction in which rights of parties are fixed by final judgment and
that "any uncertainty engendered by this approach should.., be deemed part of
the risks of life").
308. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the doctrine, courts have held it to be implicit in the reservation of powers among the branches. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (James
Madison) (discussing separation of powers generally); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7883 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the judiciary). The separation of powers
among different governmental arms has been traced to Montesquieu's Spirit of
the Laws and as far back as Aristotle's Politics. Edward S. Corwin, Introduction to
the 1953 Edition, to THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION at XVII (Johnny H. Killian ed., 1987) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION].

309. See, e.g., Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 371, 374-75 (1976) ("The supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities. The
legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money schemes [and] suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts.").
310. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) ("It
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gress and the judiciary is, in reality, far from impregnable. Several constitutional provisions mandate checks and balances
among the branches. 3 1 The general development of the separation of powers doctrine indicates that the separation is not a hermetic seal of one branch from the others.3 12 Early on, the
judiciary blurred the border between the judicial and legislative
provinces by upholding retroactive legislation and applying judicially promulgated legal principles in a prospective fashion.313
is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government-the Legislative, the Executive, and theJudicial-shall
be, in its sphere, independent of the others.").
311. The Court has "recognized Madison's teaching that the greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branchlies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted
system of checked and balanced power with each Branch." Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). For example, to provide legislative control
over the courts, the Constitution expressly gives Congress control over the creation of all courts inferior to the Supreme Court and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court itself. U.S. CONST. art.
III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 2. To provide judicial control over the legislature, the Constitution expressly insulates judges from removal or reduction in compensation during their good behavior while in office. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
312. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)); see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

3-7

(Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., Supp. 1990) (discussing Supreme
Court's use of formalist and functionalist approaches in deciding recent separation of powers questions); THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (strongly
supporting permissibility of invasion of each branch upon others).
313. The earliest United States case in which retroactive legislation was
given effect seems to be Calder v. Bull, in which the Court allowed application of
a state statute to reverse the probate decree of a state court notwithstanding the
ex post facto clause in Article 9, § 1 of the Constitution. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Call.) 386 (1798). The decision to apply the legislation retroactively was somewhat surprising given the general consensus at the time that the constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto laws applied equally to all types of statutes. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 308, at 381-82; see also 3 JoSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1339 (1833) (defining term "ex post facto laws" to "embrace all retrospective
laws, or laws governing, or controlling past transactions, whether they are of a
civil, or a criminal nature"). The Calder opinion limited the scope of the ex post
facto prohibition to penal statutes. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
Because the function of the legislature is to "make" law, statutes should
ideally apply prospectively, i.e., only to events that occur after their enactment.
See United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1877) (noting that statute should
never be construed as applying retroactively if it can be avoided); see also Robert
von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409, 427
(1924) ("It is the function of legislatures to make written laws to govern future
situations ...."). Because a statute is "made" rather than "found," parties
cannot obtain notice (constructive or actual) prior to its existence and thus cannot be expected to guide their actions by it. Refusing to apply a statute retroactively protects the interests of parties who may have relied on the state of the law
before the statute and promotes respect for the rule of law. Arguably, people
are more likely to disregard the present state of the law if, because of retroactiv-
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Defendants challenging section 27A on separation of powers
grounds have raised three distinct arguments. First, section 27A
violates the separation of powers doctrine by prescribing a rule of
decision to the judiciary without changing the underlying law, in
violation of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Klein3 1 4 and its progeny. Second, because section
27A requires prospective application of Lampf, the statute invades
the judiciary's domain by interfering with the Court's constitutionally based decision in Beam, which requires retroactive application of Lampf.3 15 Third, section 27A(b) divests defendants of
vested rights in final judgments in contravention of the separation
ity principles, they have reason to suspect that it will not be controlling. Ideally,
the law governing a given transaction or occurrence should be "fixed" at the
time of the transaction or occurrence, regardless of whether the legislature
makes subsequent enactments to the contrary. It is at the time of the transaction
or occurrence that all of the evidence is fixed and the parties have done and
made all of the legally relevant actions and decisions.
Conversely, the decisions of appellate courts in interpreting the law are ideally mere "discovery" of what the existing law is. See James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991); Moschzisker, supra, at 427
("[C]ourts exist to determine what the law,-written and unwritten,-was at the
time of the particular transactions involved in controversies which come before
them for adjudication, and to apply that law to those facts."). Whether a decision is based on statutory or common law, all parties whose transactions or occurrences are governed by that law must be governed by that decision, even
parties who have relied on some contrary interpretation of the law, insofar as
they have received adequate notice (actual or constructive) of the decision. This
protects the justified reliance interests of parties who have expended sufficient
effort to understand the law correctly so as to rely upon it, and promotes respect
for the rule of law, because parties are likely to make a greater effort to properly
understand the law as it presently stands.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has permitted retroactive application of
statutes since Calder and the purely prospective application of court decisions
since Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-06 (1863). The
ability to apply a decision purely prospectively, while giving a court some quasilegislative power, also gives a court the opportunity to bridge a gap that may
arise from the legislature's inability to foresee all possible implications of a given
law, whether because of political motivations, poor draftsmanship or the inability to anticipate all cases. Whenever a court attempts to apply a law purely prospectively, however, it is arguably invading the province of the legislature and
violating the separation of powers doctrine by legislating from the bench.
On the other hand, giving a legislature some degree of quasi-judicial power,
through the ability to make and apply law retroactively, is meritorious as a check
on the judiciary, because if the judiciary becomes too activist, making law under
the color of interpreting it, the legislature can act to restore the status quo. Yet
even retroactive legislative changes are, at least arguably, invading the province
of the judiciary and violating the separation of powers doctrine.
314. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
315. See Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 101. For a discussion of
whether the rule in Beam is constitutionally mandated and if so whether § 27A
violates the separation of powers doctrine, see infra notes 394- 404 and accompanying text.
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of powers component of the vested rights doctrine.3 16 After a
brief discussion of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, this
part of the Article explores the first two arguments.
This part concludes that section 27A does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine. Section 27A does not prescribe a
rule of decision in contravention of Klein because section 27A
changes the law from the automatic application of Lampf to all
pending cases to the application of the limitations period and
principles of retroactivity in effect in the jurisdiction before Lampf
and Beam were decided.
Furthermore, section 27A does not unconstitutionally encroach upon the Beam decision for three reasons. First, Beam is
based on jurisprudential principles, not constitutional requirements. Second, section 27A does not result in selective prospectivity in contravention of Beam. Third, Beam does not prevent
Congress from engaging in selective prospectivity.
B.

Supreme Court Precedent Concerning Congress'Ability to Enact
Retroactive Legislation Affecting Pending and
FinalJudicial Decisions

Since the 1801 Supreme Court decision in United States v. The
Schooner Peggy, 3 1 7 courts have consistently held that retroactive
legislation does not per se violate the separation of powers doctrine.3 1 8 In Schooner Peggy, Chief Justice John Marshall sustained
the constitutionality of retroactive legislation holding that "if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate
court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed." 3 1 9 Although the Court cautioned
316. For a discussion of this argument, see supra notes 289-307 and accompanying text.
317. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
318. Schooner Peggy involved a dispute regarding actions that occurred
under the provisions of a treaty between the United States and France. Id. at
107. One provision of the treaty called for the return of certain property captured as "prize" by the privateers of each nation. Id. Prior to ratification of the
treaty by the Senate, the French owners of the Peggy petitioned in the United
States district court for the return of their ship and cargo, arguing that the Peggy
had not been a lawful subject of the statute authorizing such capture in the first
place. Id. at 103-04 & n.l. The district judge decided in the French owners'
favor, but the circuit court reversed, condemning the vessel and its contents for
sale. Id. at 104-07. While the case was still pending on appeal, the treaty was
ratified. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court reversed because of the ratification. Id.
at 110.
319. Id. This holding reflects the judicial standard that the judiciary ought
to apply the law based upon the best current understanding of what the law is at
the time of the decision, not what the law was at the time of the events upon
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against retroactive construction that would divest private parties
of vested rights, the Court acknowledged that legislation would
be given retroactive effect if that was Congress' clearly expressed
3 20
intent.
The Supreme Court established some constitutional limits to
retroactive legislation in United States v. Klein.3 2 1 Klein was the administrator of the estate of Victor Wilson.3 22 The government
confiscated cotton owned by Wilson, sold it as captured and abandoned property, and deposited the proceeds of the sale in the
United States Treasury.3 2 3 The cotton was confiscated pursuant
to the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863,
(Abandoned Property Act).3 2 4 Under the Abandoned Property

Act, an owner could recover the proceeds from the sale of captured or abandoned property if the owner could prove that "he
ha[d] never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion." 3 25
which the lawsuit is based. Id. at 108-09; see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987) ("[F]ederal cases should be decided in accordance with
the law existing at the time of decision."); accord Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608 (1987); Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639
(1985); United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982); Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77
(1975); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 369 n.4 (3d ed. 1988) ("[Clourts are obligated to apply law
(otherwise valid) as they find it at the time of their decision, including when a
case is on review, the time of the appellate judgment."); cf. Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) ("[T]he law announced in the Court's decision controls the case at bar."). But see Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-37 (1990) ("[A]n
amendment to the law while a case was pending should be applied by the appellate court only if, 'by its terms,' the law was to be applied to pending cases.");
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1982) ("The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, and it
ought never to receive such a construction if it is susceptible of any other."
(quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers
Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908))).
320. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110.
Schooner Peggy established the legitimacy of retroactive legislation in the civil
arena. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), did so for criminal matters. The statute at issue in McCardle repealed a statute that granted the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over applications for writs of habeas
corpus that had reached the circuit courts. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 508.
Notably, the ChiefJustice commented in McCardle that the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court technically flows from the Constitution, not from Congress. Id. at 512-13. However, Congress has the constitutional power to restrict
that jurisdiction by creating exceptions to that jurisdiction. Id. at 513.
321. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
322. Id. at 132.
323. Id. at 138.
324. Ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (1863).
325. Id. § 3.
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After Wilson received a presidential pardon in return for taking
an oath of loyalty to the Union, Klein, his administrator, brought
suit in the Court of Claims to recover the proceeds from the sale
3 26
of his cotton. The Court of Claims found in favor of Klein.

After the Court of Claims decision, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Padelford,3 2 7 a case factually similar to Klein.
In Padelford, the Court affirmed a Court of Claims judgment in
favor of Padelford holding that if a claimant had received a presidential pardon, the pardon alone sufficed to meet the Abandoned
Property Act's requirement that the claimant show that he had
28
given no aid or comfort to the Confederacy.3
Shortly after Padelford, and while Klein was pending on appeal, Congress amended the Abandoned Property Act by adding
a proviso. The proviso denied jurisdiction and directed courts to
dismiss any claim against the United States (whether at trial in the
Court of Claims or on appeal) in which the claimant had accepted
a presidential pardon but had not explicitly disclaimed participation in aid of the Confederacy. 329
The Klein Court decided that the proviso contravened the
separation of powers doctrine in two ways. First, the proviso improperly impaired the effect of a presidential pardon and thus infringed upon the constitutional powers of the executive
branch. 330 Second, and of direct relevance to the constitutional326. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132.
327. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
328. Id. at 543.
329. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133-34. If upheld, the proviso required the
court to dismiss Klein's case because Wilson had not made the required disclaimer when he received the presidential pardon. Id. at 146. In a later case the
Court summarized the intended impact of the proviso:
The proviso had three effects: First, no Presidential pardon or amnesty
was to be admissible in evidence on behalf of a claimant in the Court of
Claims as the proof of loyalty required by the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. Second, the Supreme Court was to dismiss, for
want ofjurisdiction, any appeal from ajudgment of the Court of Claims
in favor of a claimant who had established his loyalty through a pardon.
Third, the Court of Claims henceforth was to treat a claimant's receipt
of a Presidential pardon, without protest, as conclusive evidence that he
had given aid and comfort to the rebellion, and to dismiss any lawsuit
on his behalf for want ofjurisdiction.
United States v.Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 403 (1980). The Klein
court concluded: "The substance of this enactment is that an acceptance of a
pardon, without disclaimer, shall be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned,
but shall be null and void as evidence of the rights conferred by it, both in the
Court of Claims and in this court on appeal." Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144.
330. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. The Klein Court stated:
Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a
pardon any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this is at-
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ity of section 27A, the Klein Court found the proviso constitutionally infirm because it attempted to prescribe a rule of decision in
the government's favor in a pending case without changing the
underlying circumstances, that is, without changing the law governing the case. 3 3' In its ruling, the Court made a number of
comments concerning why it found the statute repugnant to the
3 32
constitutional separation of powers doctrine.
tempted by the provision under consideration. The court is required to
receive special pardons as evidence of guilt and to treat them as null
and void. It is required to disregard pardons granted by proclamation
on condition, though the condition has been fulfilled, and to deny them
their legal effect. This certainly impairs the executive authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.
Id. at 148.
331. Id. at 145-47. This holding continues to be the major lesson of Klein.
As one commentator recently noted:
Consistent with constitutional limitations, Congress clearly has authority to fix the rules of procedure, including rules of evidence, which
article III courts must apply. Again consistent with constitutional limitations, Congress also has authority to define by statute the substantive
law which such courts are to enforce. Nonetheless, the separation of
powers does limit congressional regulation of the decision-making
processes of article III courts at least this much: if Congress does not
purport to alter the governing procedural and substantive law, Congress cannot force its interpretation of that law upon the federal courts
in particular cases.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-5, at 50 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnotes omitted).
332. The Klein Court commented:
[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great
and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President
the effect which this court had adjudged them to have. The proviso
declares that pardons shall not be considered by this court on appeal.
We have already decided that it was our duty to consider them and give
effect, in cases like the present, as equivalent to proof of loyalty....
It is evident from this statement that the denial of jurisdiction to
this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the
application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress. The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but
when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is
to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want ofjurisdiction.
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the
appellate power.
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased by dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of
a cause in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of Claims
has rendered judgment for the claimant and an appeal has been taken
to this court. We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the
judgment must be affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants. Can we do so without allowing one party to the
controversy to decide in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing
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In invalidating the proviso at issue in Klein, the Court distinguished Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., a decision
that determined whether the parties could relitigate issues concerning a public infrastructure after Congress had recharacterized
the bridge as a post-road. 33 3 The Wheeling Bridge Court had determined that Congress had the power to change the substantive law
and courts had the power to re-open a final decision and allow the
parties to relitigate the case based upon the change of law.3 34 In
distinguishing Wheeling Bridge from Klein, the Klein Court stated:
No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in [Wheeling
Bridge], . . . the court was left to apply its ordinary rules
to the new circumstances created by the act. In the case
before us no new circumstances have been created by
legislation. But the court is forbidden to give the effect
to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence
should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely
3 35
contrary.
The relationship between retroactive legislation and the separation of powers doctrine again was the central focus of the
Supreme Court's disposition of United States v. Sioux Nation of lndithat the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it?
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power.
...Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal.
Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to
itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government
and favorable to the suitor? This question seems to us to answer itself.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145-47.
The Klein opinion provides no guidance as to whether the Court considered
any one of the foregoing to be necessary or sufficient conditions to overturn the
legislation or whether the Court relied on a combination of infirmities in rendering its decision.
333. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421 (1855). In Wheeling Bridge, Congress passed legislation that defined a particular bridge to be a post-road. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had
found the bridge to be a nuisance to river navigators. Id. at 426-27, 429. After
Congress redefined the bridge as a post-road, the parties relitigated the question of nuisance. Id. at 426-27. In Wheeling Bridge, the Supreme Court held that
the redefinition and relitigation were constitutional. Id. at 436.
334. Id. at 431.
335. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47.
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ans.3 6 The Sioux had filed a petition in the Court of Claims, alleging that certain government actions constituted an unlawful
taking of Indian lands in the Black Hills in contravention of the
Fifth Amendment. 33 7 In 1942, the Court of Claims dismissed the
suit on the ground that the statute conferring jurisdiction did not
include the power to question the adequacy of the compensation
paid by Congress.3 3 8 Eight years later, the Sioux resubmitted
their claim to the newly-created Indian Claims Commission,
which concluded that the claim was valid and the Sioux were entitled to compensation for the taking. 339 When the government appealed, the Court of Claims reversed the Commission and ruled
that the Court of Claims' 1942 decision had res judicata effect
that precluded the Commission's contrary decision.3 40 In dicta,
the Court of Claims indicated that the Commission's findings
were otherwise correct and that Congress could remedy the
34 1
problem.
Congress took the hint and passed a statute that directed the
Court of Claims to review the Commission's judgment de novo
on the merits, to take new evidence and to disregard the defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 34 2 The Court of Claims
promptly affirmed the Commission's finding of a taking, 3 43 and
the government successfully petitioned for certiorari.3 4 4 Writing
for the majority, Justice Blackmun held the statute constitutional,
at least in part because the act at issue waived the government's
defense of res judicata and allowed adjudication on the merits. 34 5
336. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).

337. Id. at 384. The Fort Laramie Treaty provided that "the Great Sioux
Reservation including the Black Hills, would be 'set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named.' " Id. at 374
(quoting Fort Laramie Treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (1868) (repealed
1877)). In 1877, Congress passed an act which abrogated the Fort Laramie
Treaty and implemented terms of another agreement less favorable to the
Sioux. Id. at 382-83; see also Act of Feb. 28, 1877, 19 Stat. 254 (1877).
338. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 384. A special congressional act gave the

Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear claims specifically related to disputes between the Sioux tribe and the United States. Id. at 384; see also Act of June 3,

1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738 (1920).
339. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 385-86.
340. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 F.2d 1298, 1305-06 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975).
341. Id. at 1302-03.

342. Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70s(b) (Supp. III 1979)
(omitted from Code when Commission terminated Sept. 30, 1978).
343. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1172 (Ct. Cl.
1979), afftd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
344. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1980).

345. Id. at 405.
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In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that Klein prohibited Congress from forcing the relitigation of an issue once decided because such congressional power would infringe upon the finality
3 46
of the judiciary's decisions.
In Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court interpreted Klein to have
found two distinct separation of powers problems with the proviso. First, the proviso enacted by Congress in Klein prescribed a
rule of decision in a pending case in such a way as to force courts
to decide the controversies in the government's favor. Second,
the proviso impaired the effect of a presidential pardon, thus "infringing the constitutional power of the Executive." 34 7 The Sioux
Nation Court distinguished Klein and rejected the separation of
powers challenge to the statute at issue for two reasons. First, the
Court observed that "[t]he amendment at issue in the present
case ... waived the defense of res judicata so that a legal claim could
be resolved on the merits." 34 8 Second, the Court indicated that "Congress made no effort ... to control the Court of Claims' ultimate
'34 9
decision of that claim."
The Supreme Court recently again explored the separation
of powers limits to legislation affecting pending cases in Robertson
v. Seattle Audubon Society. 3 50 Robertson arose from the battle between environmental groups and the timber industry over the status of the northern spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest. 3 5 ' The
environmental groups filed several suits against the United States
Department of the Interior in an attempt to prevent the cutting,
for sale, of timber on public land. 3 52 While the suits were pending, Congress passed legislation that prohibited the sale of timber
from certain areas and also provided that compliance with that
prohibition was sufficient to meet the requirements of the environmental statutes upon which the environmental groups based
346. Id. at 428-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority saw it differently. In upholding the statute, the Court emphasized that the statute "neither
brought into question the finality of [the Court of Claims'] earlier judgments,
nor interfered with that court's judicial function in deciding the merits of the
claim." Id. at 406.
347. Id. at 404-05 (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
146 (1872)).

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
Id. at 1410.
Id. The opposition between the two factions was summarized as fol-

lows: "Harvesting the forests, say environmentalists, would kill the owls. Restrictions on harvesting, respond local timber industries, would devastate the
region's economy." Id.
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their suits 5 3s The legislation cited those actions by case name
and docket number.3 54 The government moved for dismissal of
the actions in light of the government's compliance with the prohibition created by the legislation.35 5 The environmental groups
opposed the motion, arguing that the legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine by prescribing a rule of decision in a
3 56

pending case.

The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss. 35 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that the legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Ninth
Circuit found that Klein prohibited Congress from directing a decision in pending cases without changing the underlying substantive law. 3 58 The Supreme Court reversed. 3 59 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Thomas stated that, even assuming that
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Klein was correct, the new
statutory provision changed the prior environmental statutes by
providing another method of compliance. 360 Unfortunately, how353. Id. The legislation passed by Congress in response to the ongoing
litigation was the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 745 (1989) (Northwest
Timber Compromise). The Northwest Timber Compromise "established a
comprehensive set of rules to govern harvesting within a geographically and
temporally limited domain." Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1410. Subsections (a)(l)
and (a)(2) mandated the sale of certain quantities of timber from government
lands for the fiscal year. Northwest Timber Compromise, § 318(a), 103 Stat. at
745. Subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) forbade all cutting on specified parcels. Id.
§ 318(b), 103 Stat. at 746-47. Subsection (b)(6)(A) provided that agency compliance with the prohibitions expressed in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) was "adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that
are the basis for the consolidated cases" that the environmental groups had filed
in Robertson and other pending cases. Id. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747. As a
result, agency compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) constituted exceptions to the previously existing environmental statutes under which the environmental groups sued.
354. Northwest Timber Compromise, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
355. Robertson, 112 S.Ct. at 1411-12.
356. Id. at 1412. The plaintiffs claimed that the Act "purported to direct
the results in two pending cases [and, therefore] violated Article III."Id.
357. Id. Upholding the constitutionality of the provision, the district court
in Robertson concluded that "subsection (b)(6)(A) 'can and must be read as a
temporary modification of the environmental laws.' " Id. (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. 89-160 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 1989)).
358. Id. The circuit court construed Klein as prohibiting Congress from
"direct[ing] a particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending the
law underlying the litigation." Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d
1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
359. Robertson, 112 S.Ct. at 1415.
360. Id. at 1413-14. The Court found that "subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced
the legal standards underlying the two original challenges [brought by the respondents/plaintiffs] with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), with-
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ever, the Court did not decide whether the appellate court's construction of Klein was correct or give any indication as to the
36 1
Court's present view of Klein.
C.

The Constitutionality of Section 27A Under Klein

The basis for the decision in Klein is difficult to identify because of the various justifications advanced by the Klein Court for
its decision. 36 2 The Supreme Court, most lower courts and many
commentators usually view Klein as forbidding congressional acts
that prescribe rules of decision in pending cases without changing
the underlying law. 36 3 Some of the courts addressing the consti-

tutionality of section 27A under the separation of powers docout directing particular applications under either the old or the new standards."
Id. at 1413. The Court concluded that Congress had changed the law but had
not directed a rule of decision in a pending case, noting that "[b]efore subsection (b)(6)(A) was enacted, the original claims would fail only if the challenged
harvesting violated none of [the] old provisions. Under subsection (b)(6)(A), by
contrast, those same claims would fail if the harvesting [did not violate either
(b)(3) or (b)(5)]." Id.
361. The Robertson Court commented: "The Court of Appeals held that
subsection (b)(6)(A) was unconstitutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any law. Because we conclude that
subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need not consider whether
this reading of Klein is correct." Id. at 1414.

362. See

BATOR ET AL.,

supra note 319, at 369 ("The [Klein] opinion ...is not

a model of clarity."); Gordon G. Young, CongressionalRegulation of Federal Courts'
Jurisdictionand Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1189,
1195 ("[T]he Klein opinion combines the clear with the Delphic. Chief Justice
Chase's excessively broad and ambiguous statements for the majority provide
the Delphic elements in Klein. His statements have permitted Klein to be viewed
as nearly all things to all men."). For the text of the Klein decision containing
the various reasons given by the Court to support its holding, see supra note 332.
363. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980)
(noting that "the proviso at issue in Klein had attempted 'to prescribe a rule for
the decision of a cause in a particular way' " (quoting United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872))); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)
(observing that Klein condemned statute because it prescribed rule of decision);
Austin v. United States, 155 U.S. 417, 424 (1894) (declaring that, among other
things, statute invalidated in Klein violated Constitution because statute denied
jurisdiction to Court through legislative prescription of rule of decision); Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
under Klein, Congress cannot affect pending case without changing underlying
law), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992); BATOR ET AL., supra note 319, at 369 & n.4
(suggesting that Klein prohibits Congress from requiring courts to reverse decision previously rendered pursuant to independently unconstitutional legal rule);
Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate theJurisdiction of the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 87 (1981) (commenting that Klein stands for proposition that "Congress cannot give the federal
courts jurisdiction to adjudicate cases while directing them to reach a particular
result"); cf Young, supra note 362, at 1196-97 (stating that Klein really involved
narrow limitation on power of Congress to control jurisdiction of courts and
Congress' power to invoke sovereign immunity).
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trine have based their decisions on other interpretations of
Klein.3 64 This section discusses the constitutionality of section
27A cases under the various interpretations utilized and concludes that section 27A is constitutional under all reasonable interpretations of Klein.
1. Section 27A As Prescribinga Rule of Decision Without Changing
the Underlying Law
Virtually all of the courts that have discussed whether section
364. For a discussion of the various interpretations of the Klein holding as
they relate to § 27A challenges, see infra notes 365-89 and accompanying text.
As stated, the most common interpretation is that Klein forbids congressional acts that prescribe a rule of decision without changing the underlying law.
Another interpretation of Klein permits Congress to amend the law as it sees fit
and to apply those amendments retroactively so long as the amendment itself
does not otherwise violate the Constitution. This view of Klein suggests that
there is nothing wrong per se with changing the legal implications of granting a
pardon and applying that change to pending cases; the error is that it "impairs
the effect of a pardon, and thus infringes the constitutional power of the Executive." United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872). Klein has also
been cited in support of the proposition that "congressional control of the appropriations power does not allow Congress to deny or to direct the President in
exercising the power to pardon." See Marshall Silverberg, The Separation of Powers
and Control of the CIA's Covert Operations, 68 TEX. L. REV. 575, 621 (1990). Commentators have also noted that the political question doctrine did not bar the
adjudication of the dispute between Congress and the Executive in Klein. See,
e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597, 624 &
n.76 (1976).
Others have expressed that "[p]erhaps the safest reading of Klein is that it
precludes Congress from impairing the Executive's power to pardon." Theodore Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower Federal CourtJurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498, 526-27 (1974); see also Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in
Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1379 n. 116 (1980) (stating that Congress cannot pass laws impairing President's pardoning power);Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40
STAN. L. REV. 203, 224 n.108 (1987) (stating that "no legislation can constitutionally direct courts to ignore the effect of a presidential pardon"); accord Kate
Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1351 n.32 (1988); Roger W.
Kirst,Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV. 549, 576-77 (1980). This understanding of Klein
views Congress' law-making and law-applying power as absolute, except in situations in which it infringes on the constitutional prerogatives of another branch,
the states or individuals.
In Robertson, the Ninth Circuit also interpreted Klein as prohibiting legislation that instructs the court how to decide an issue of fact or requires the court
to decide a case based on a rule of law that is otherwise unconstitutional on
other grounds. Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1315-16. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs argued, "Klein and Wheeling Bridge thus stand for the
straightforward proposition that Congress cannot direct the outcome of a particular pending case by instructing the courts how to interpret and apply the existing law to the specific pending claims." Brief of Respondents Seattle
Audubon Society et al. at 28-29, Robertson, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992) (No. 90-1596).
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27A violates the separation of powers doctrine have based their
decision on the most common interpretation of Klein under which
the primary focus is whether section 27A prescribes a rule of decision without changing the underlying law. 365 Most courts applying this test conclude that section 27A is constitutional because it
does not prescribe a rule of decision and because it does change
the underlying law. 36 6 Generally, these courts find that section
365. See, e.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,414, at 96,262 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993) (indicating that
Congress violates separation of powers if it either (1) directs findings in pending
cases without changing underlying law or (2) enacts statute that is unconstitutional on other grounds); Berning v. Edwards & Sons, Inc., [1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97, 389, at 96,099 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993)
(discussing defendants' claim that Klein was contravened by § 27A because "section 27A does not change existing law or create new law, but rather commands
the courts to decide pending cases in a particular manner"); Anixter v. HomeStake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992) (indicating that defendants contended that § 27A "does not change existing law or create new law but
specifically commands the courts to decide, pending cases in a particular manner"), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); Barr v. McGraw-Hill, No. 87 CIV. 6259
(KC), 1992 WL 196754, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992) (stating that "question
before the Court is whether, without changing the underlying law, Congress impermissibly enacted a 'rule of decision' with respect to a pending action when it
passed section 27A"); Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1052
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (framing defendant's argument as being "that § 27A does not
change § 10(b) but rather directs the application of a rule of decision in a particular class of cases, which constitutes an act of adjudication by the legislature");
Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (same); Adler v.
Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); First v.
Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,622, at 92,919 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1992) (same; applying Klein test as
refined by Robertson); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992) (same); TBG Inc. v. Bendis, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,623, at 92,923 (D. Kan. Mar. 5,
1992) (same); Ayers v. Sutliffe, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,552, at 92,537 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 1992) (same); cf. Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("Taken
together, the Klein and Robertson decisions establish a rule of law that permits
Congress to amend or repeal existing law provided Congress does not direct
courts to make specific factual findings . . . or particular applications of law to
fact." (citation omitted)); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1102
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that issues were whether § 27A prescribed rule of decision without changing underlying law and whether § 27A directed reversal of
final judgments).
366. See, e.g., Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,262-63 (holding that § 27A changed underlying law by providing new statute
of limitations for all cases filed before Lampf thereby eliminating retroactive effect of Lamp]); Berning, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,099 (holding that § 27A changed limitations period for all cases filed before
Lamp); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11 th Cir.
1992) (holding that § 27A "does implement a change in the law; it amends the
Securities Exchange Act to provide the statute of limitations for private causes of
action under section 10(b) that were filed by June 19, 1991" and that § 27A
"does not require courts to make any particular findings of fact or applications
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27A allows courts to apply their own rules to determine whether
they will decide the merits of a section 10(b) claim by removing
3 67
the preexisting time bar.
The courts upholding section 27A have found that it effected
a change in the preexisting law in two ways. 368 First, the statute
changes the applicable limitations period from the Lampf oneand-three-year rule to the limitations period in the forum jurisdiction before Lampf was decided. Second, section 27A changes the
law by preventing the automatic application of Lampf to pending
cases, in that section 27A requires courts to apply the principles
of retroactivity recognized in the forum jurisdiction prior to
of law to fact"); accord Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1545; Arioli, 800 F. Supp. at 1482-83;
Cannistraci v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Mass.
1992); Barr, 1992 WL 196754, at *6; Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,936, at 93,965 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
1992); Kalmanson v. McLaughlin, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,915, at 93,795-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1992); Fry v. UAL Corp., No 90
C 0999, 1992 WL 177086, at *13 (N.D. Ill.July 23, 1992); Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at
1054; Lundy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
Maio v. Advanced Filtration Sys. Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954, 961 (E.D. La. 1992);
Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1242-43; Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307,
1313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 476, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Fred Hindler, Inc. v. Telequest, Inc., [19911992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,634, at 92,990, (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 1992); First, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
92,919; Bendis, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,923;
Ayers, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,537.
367. See, e.g., Barr, 1992 WL 196754, at *6. The Barr court stated:
Congress changed the underlying limitations law with no guaranteed
result. Congress repealed the one-year/three-year rule for cases pending as of the date of Lampf and referred courts to the pre-Lampf limitations periods in the relevant jurisdiction. Both of these acts constitute
the establishment of new law for the courts to apply.
Id.
368. E.g., Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,26263 (holding that § 27A changed underlying law by establishing new limitations
periods for all pre-Lampf § 10(b) claims); Berning, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,099 (same); Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (finding that
§ 27A does not intrude upon separation of powers because it limited Lampf to
prospective application, thereby changing existing law); Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at
1053-54 (establishing different limitations period changed governing law); Adler,
790 F. Supp. at 1243 ("Section 27A changed the law by limiting the [Lampf] rule
to prospective application only and by subjecting Section 10(b) claims filed prior
to June 19, 1991 to the limitations period determined to be applicable by the
court in which the action was filed."); AxelJohnson, 790 F. Supp. at 479 (noting
that although courts and commentators dispute Klein's holding, "even under
[the defendant's] broad reading, Klein is not applicable where the legislation
under review establishes a new and generally applicable rule"); First, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,919 (changing retroactive effect
of Lampf constitutes change in applicable law); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.
Supp. 587, 592 (E.D. La. 1992) (same); Bendis, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,923 (same).
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Beam. 3 69 Because of section 27A, the lower courts will normally
apply the Chevron Oil framework to determine the retroactivity of
the applicable limitations period, an approach that Beam appar3 70
ently precludes.
The courts upholding the constitutionality of section 27A acknowledge that Congress did not expressly provide a single, express statute of limitations for all section 10(b) actions.
Nevertheless, these courts conclude that section 27A changes the
law for all cases filed before Lampf and Beam by incorporating by
reference the jurisdictions' pre-Lampf limitations law and pre3 71
Beam retroactivity law.
In contrast, some courts have ruled that section 27A violates
the separation of powers doctrine because the statute prescribes a
rule of decision. According to these courts, section 27A requires
the judiciary to ignore Lampf and Beam without any change in the
underlying law. 3 72 As one district court concluded:
369. The effect of the statute may not, in fact, change the result in certain
cases where the jurisdiction's pre-Lampf rule was the one-and-three-year limitations period and application of the jurisdiction's pre-Beam retroactivity test gives
that rule retroactive effect.
370. For a discussion of Beam's impact on the retroactive application of
Lampf, see supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
371. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("The fact that Congress chose to incorporate
the statute of limitations existing in the applicable jurisdiction, rather than prescribe a specific statute of limitations for Section 10(b), has no bearing on
whether a change has occurred in the law."); Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at 1054 (rejecting defendant's argument that § 27A failed to change existing law because it
did not contain uniform limitations period to be applied in all jurisdictions);
Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243 (stating that § 27A changes law through its impact on
retroactive application of Lampf rule); Bendis, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,923 n.8 (concluding that § 27A changed existing law);
Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89 C 8571, 1992 WL 3694,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1992) ("Congress has changed the law. It might seem
otherwise only because instead of delineating fully the change of law, Congress
has made the change by reference, incorporating the prevailing law in the applicable jurisdiction.").
372. See, e.g., In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (concluding that § 27A violates separation of powers because it improperly prescribes rule of decision in pending cases, reverses final judgments and
attempts to change constitutionally mandated rule in Beam); Bank of Denver v.
Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992)
(holding § 27A unconstitutional because it prescribes rule of decision without
concomitant change in law);Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 110102 (D. Colo. 1992) (concluding that § 27A was unconstitutional because it directs "a result under the unchanged provisions of § 10(b)-namely, it directs
federal courts in a discrete body of pending cases to ignore the Supreme Court's
binding interpretation of § 10(b) and to reinstate actions that were dismissed
under the Court's interpretation"); Mancino v. International Technology Corp.,
[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,614, at 92,892 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 10, 1992) (same). Rosenfeld & Mehlman stated:
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This case is directly analogous to Klein-in both
cases, Congress sought to displace the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a statute without changing the underlying law. Just as in Klein, the "great and controlling purpose" of § [27A] is to deny the interpretation of § 10(b)
"which this court had adjudged [it] to have." If Congress' purpose was to change the law, it could have enacted a retroactive express statute of limitations or made
§ [27A] applicable to all cases regardless of whether they
were filed on or beforeJune 19, 1991. Instead, by selecting a discrete body of pending actions for special treatment under § [27A], Congress demonstrated that its
sole purpose was to nullify the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 10(b) without amending § 10(b) itself. In
so doing, Congress usurped the power set aside to the
3 73
judiciary by the Constitution.
Interestingly, the courts that invalidate section 27A on the basis
of Klein acknowledge that Congress probably had the power to
pass a retroactive statute that contained a specific, single limita3 74
tions period for all cases.
What Klein stands for, we submit, is that while Congress may legislate
applicable rules of law, where, as here, it is unable or unwilling to do
so, it may not tell the lower courts how to perform their judicial function of providing judge-made rules to determine particular issues
before them in pending cases. In particular, it may not tell judges to
ignore Supreme Court decisions and to revert to earlier conflicting
rules of decision.
Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 107.
A few courts reject the separation of powers challenge on Klein grounds but
find § 27A unconstitutional on other grounds. E.g., Pacific Mut., 806 F. Supp. at
112 (holding that § 27A does not violate separation of powers doctrine under
Klein, but violates separation of powers doctrine by legislatively overruling constitutionally based decision in Beam and violates vested rights doctrine); In re
Prudential-Bache Energy Income Partnerships Sec. Litig., CIV. A. MDL No. 888,
1992 WL 142575, at *3 (E.D. La. June 9, 1992) (finding § 27A violative of separation of powers doctrine and unconstitutional because it mandates selective
rospectivity in contravention of Beam's constitutional holding); Treiber v. Katz,
96 F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (stating that § 27A does not violate
Klein but does violate separation of powers component of vested rights doctrine); Simmons, 786 F. Supp. at 592 (holding statute unconstitutional because,
although it changed law in compliance with Klein, it contravened Beam's constitutional requirement of retroactivity).
373. Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097.
374. The Bank of Denver court admitted that "Congress could have written
an express statute of limitation and repose into § 10(b) and applied the amendment retroactively." Id. at 1098. The district judge in Brichard also opined that
Congress would have the power to adopt a retroactive statute of limitations for
lob-5 actions. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104 n.5.
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Section 27A is constitutional because it did change the underlying law, and does not prescribe a rule of decision for pending cases. 375 Before section 27A, Lampf and Beam required a
court to apply the one-and-three-year limitations period to all
nonfinal claims arising before those decisions. After section 27A,
Lampf and Beam no longer automatically apply. Instead, a court
must look to the law applicable in its own jurisdiction prior to the
date Lampf and Beam were decided. Admittedly, Congress' purpose in changing the law was to rectify the perceived injustice that
Congress saw in the retroactive application of the Lampf rule to
litigants who had filed suit believing that their suits were timely
under the limitations periods in effect at the time of filing. 3 76
375. For a discussion of how § 27A changed the underlying law, see supra
notes 365-71 and accompanying text. Rosenfeld and Mehiman argue that § 27A
did not change the underlying law, stating:
Congress did not, as it did in Seattle Audubon, change the governing
rules and then direct courts to apply those changed rules to determine
specific pending cases. Here, all Congress did was to direct courts to
abandon their usual law-interpreting function, ignore a recent Supreme
Court precedent, and instead revert to earlier, conflicting "rules of decision," whatever they might have been. And it also told the district
courts in the three circuits that had adopted the Lampf formula prior to
Lampf (but had not made it fully retroactive) that they were not to follow
the dictates of Beam by now applying those circuit court decisions retroactively. Because both of those directives prescribe "rules of decision,"
rather than new tenets of substantive law, both of them violate the Klein
doctrine.
Rosenfeld & Mehiman, supra note 198, at 103.
376. One interpretation of Klein turns on the legislative purposes behind a
retroactive statute. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.,
673 F. Supp. 411,416 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (citing wide range of cases to support
statement that "[i]mproper legislative motive has been held repeatedly by the
United States Supreme Court to be a valid basis for finding a statute to be constitutionally infirm"), vacated, 1988 WL 158948 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 1988) (vacating ruling as to constitutionality of state statutory version of § 10(b) by
finding use of separation of powers doctrine to resolve state governmental actions improper); Eisenberg, supra note 364, at 519, 525-27 (commenting that
proviso in Klein was struck down due to political motives); Richard H. Fallon,Jr.,
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1222 & n.368 (1988)
(reading Klein as holding that "jurisdictional legislation may not be used as
means to achieve an unconstitutional purpose"). But see Samuel Estreicher, CongressionalPower and ConstitutionalRights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 343 n.20 (1982) (criticizing construction of Klein as
turning on inquiry into legislative motive). If the infirmity of the proviso in Klein
lay in improper congressional motives that resulted in discriminatory treatment
to pardoned Southerners, then Klein is distinguishable from McCardle because in
the latter case Congress less clearly directed the statute to any particular litigants. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 507 (1868). Schooner Peggy
would likewise be distinguishable, because the treaty in that case was not ratified
for the purpose of depriving the privateers of their prizes. See The Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 106-07 (1801). For a discussion of the McCardle
and Schooner Peggy decisions, see supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
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Although Congress was moved to enact legislation because of the
high profile figures and cases affected by the Beam and Lampfdecisions, 37 7 the legislation affects all cases brought before those de377. The leading § 27A case that construes Klein as forbidding the direction ofjudgments based upon improper motivation is In re Brichard Securities
Litigation, 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In reviewing the legislative history of § 27A, the court observed that "[tihe possible dismissal of actions against
Messrs. Milken and Keating [was] a constant theme" in Congress' consideration
of the bill. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1105. Because "Congress was aware that,
by enacting section 27A, it was tacitly directing a result in the cases of those
individuals whom Congress held in low esteem, without changing the Lampf
rule," the court found § 27A to be "little less than a judgment rendered directly
by Congress," and accordingly held § 27A to be an unconstitutional violation of
the separation of powers. Id. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 398 (1980) (quoting Nock v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451,
457 (1867))). On the other hand, the Southern District of New York rejected the
same argument, emphasizing the objective generality of the statute and the reality that § 27A did not preclude a court from carrying out its judicial functions.
Axel Johnson v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The defendants had alleged "that although the statute does not specify particular cases at which it is aimed, it in fact was intended by Congress to pinpoint a
few high-profile securities fraud defendants whom it perceived to receive a windfall under Lampf." Id.
Four general difficulties occur with any approach that focuses on "targeting" as the basis of separation of powers problems. First, "as a general rule,
courts decline to inquire into Congressional intent in adopting any facially valid
legislation." Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). Because legislatures have priority over courts in determining what the law should
be, courts are generally reluctant to inquire into the wisdom or propriety of
statutes, restricting themselves to ascertaining their meaning. Indeed, in McCardie, Chief Justice Chase said the Supreme Court was "not at liberty to inquire
into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under
the Constitution." McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514. Second, "ascertaining the
motive and purpose of a legislative body" is difficult "based upon the statements
of only some of its members." Washington Pub. Power Supply, 673 F. Supp. at 417.
Third, inquiring into the legislative purpose is potentially futile "if the legislature re-enacts the flawed statute and thwarts the purpose examination by articulating a non-objectionable purpose." Id.
A final potential difficulty with this reading of Klein lies in two decisions
following Klein: Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886), and Austin v. United
States, 155 U.S. 417 (1894). Like Klein, Hart and Austin were claimants under
authorizing statutes that expressly precluded pardonees from establishing their
loyalty via their pardons. Austin, 155 U.S. at 419-21; Hart, 118 U.S. at 62-64.
Unlike Klein, however, they were unsuccessful in their claims. Austin, 155 U.S. at
443; Hart, 118 U.S. at 66. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of their recovery. Therefore, it seems that excluding former rebels from recovery under the
Abandoned Property Act was not an improper congressional purpose. Thus,
although improper purposes may indeed be objectionable, perhaps even constitutionally so, Klein cannot be cited as support for such a proposition. Indeed,
Klein itself does not emphasize "targeting" of any particular group as the reason
behind its decision. To the extent that improper classification is a problem, an
equal protection analysis seems much more appropriate than a forced Klein
interpretation.
The only two circuits to evaluate an equal protection challenge have held
that § 27A is valid under both the due process and equal protection tests. Gray
v. First Winthrop Corp., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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cisions and returns the state of the law to the status quo before
3 78
those decisions.
Unlike the proviso at issue in Klein, section 27A effects a
97,414, at 96,265 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
971 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (1lth Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit refused to consider
an equal protection challenge to § 27A. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977
F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993). The Gray
and Henderson courts found that § 27A did not involve a suspect class or fundamental right and therefore should be scrutinized under the rational basis test.
Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,265; Henderson, 971
F.2d at 1574. The Gray and Henderson courts held that § 27A furthers the government's legitimate interest in protecting litigants from unanticipated changes
in the law and that the classifications created by the statute are rationally related
to achieving that legitimate purpose. Gray [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH), at 96,265; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574. The court found that the
temporal distinctions made in the statute protect the people who relied on the
limitations period existing at the time of suit and who expended time and money
bringing their actions. Id. In addition, the court concluded that the jurisdictional distinction created by the statute also protects the reliance interest because the litigants bringing suit prior to Lampf and Beam anticipated that the law
in the jurisdiction in which they brought suit would apply to their claims. Id.
The district courts facing the issue have also rejected equal protection challenges to § 27A. E.g., Duke v. Touche Ross, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,936, at 93,965-66 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992) (stating that § 27A
is rationally related to protecting reliance of litigants who filed before Lampf);
Cortes v. Gratkowski, 795 F. Supp. 248, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (observing that
§ 27A is rationally related to purpose of limiting retroactive application of Lampf
to pending cases); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 970
(E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that § 27A reasonably protects reliance interest of
litigants on claims filed before Lampf); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp.
1307, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that § 27A furthers legitimate government
interest of protecting reasonable expectations of those litigants who filed before
Lampf); First v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,622, at 92,919 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1992) (upholding
§ 27A because its purpose of negating retroactive effects of Lampf is rationally
achieved by its classification scheme); Ayers v. Sutliffe, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,552, at 92,537-38 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11,
1992) (noting that § 27A rationally achieves legitimate legislative purpose of
permitting litigants to pursue claims that were timely when originally filed);
Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89 C 8571, 1992 WL 3694,
at *6 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 6, 1992) (indicating that § 27A classifications are rational
because Lampf rule will apply only to litigants with notice of that rule).
378. In upholding § 27A, the Southern District of Ohio stated: "Congress
has simply eliminated a defense available to defendants in an unidentified number of
cases based on the date on which the cases were filed." Ayers, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,537 (emphasis added). The Southern
District of New York similarly rejected the characterization of § 27A as applying
to "a limited set of previously-existing cases without enacting a generally applicable or prospective change in law," finding it to be applicable "to a generally
identified set of cases" based on the commencement date of the action. Axel
Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 479-80. The AxelJohnson court stated:
Congress did not single out and reverse decided cases contrary to its
predilections. Rather, it provided relief for a broadly defined class of
claimants from what it deemed to be an unfair rule, and it did so without regard to whether or not those claimants' cases had yet been adjudicated pursuant to the new rule of Lampf. Such evenhanded treatment
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change in the law and permits, rather than precludes, the possibility of ajudgment on the merits. In contrast to the proviso at issue
in Klein, section 27A requires that a court utilize its own rules on
limitations periods and retroactivity, not an arbitrary rule of decision foisted on it by Congress. Thus, section 27A is constitutional under the interpretation of Klein accepted by the vast
majority of courts because section 27A does not prescribe a rule
of decision and did change the underlying law governing section
10(b) actions.
2.

Section 2 7A As Mandating Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law

Some courts have applied alternative interpretations of Klein
to determine whether section 27A contravenes the separation of
powers doctrine. For example, observing that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is," 3 79 some courts have suggested that Klein also prohibits Congress from passing legislation that decides issues of fact or
questions of law in pending cases. 380 Under this view, most
is less threatening to the judiciary's independence than would be Congressional action to reverse particular adjudications.
Id. at 483.
379. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
380. This reading is supported by language in Klein that seems to indicate
that Congress may not redefine the legal incidents of a presidential pardon so as
to give it an effect opposite from its normal operation. United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872). Thus, "[i]f one takes this view, the [Klein Court]
recognized a constitutional right of a successful litigant to retain the judgment of
a federal constitutional court as long as that judgment was not erroneous when
entered." Young, supra note 362, at 1239.
In Grimsey v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1620 (1991), and In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988), the
Ninth Circuit held that Congress violates the separation of powers if it dictates
how a court is to decide questions of fact or requires a court to decide a case in
accordance with an unconstitutional law. Similarly, as Judge Stewart noted in
his concurrence in In re National Store Fixture Co.:
[T]he legislative branch of government, for all its power to dictate substantive and procedural law to the Article III judiciary, cannot dictate
how a court should determine genuine issues of material fact .... [F]or
Congress to enact a statute compelling courts of the United States to
draw factual inferences which could be justified neither by common
reason and experience nor by the surrounding facts and circumstances
was an unwarranted encroachment on the independence of the judiciary ....
In re National Store Fixture Co., 37 B.R. 481, 491 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit rejected the contention that the Speedy Trial
Act violated Klein, stating that "the better reading of Klein is quite narrow and
construes the case as holding only that Congress violates the separation of powers when it presumes to dictate 'how the Court should decide an issue of fact
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courts have found that section 27A does not unconstitutionally
dictate that a court make any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law, but only specifies the legal rule for a court to apply.3 1' A few courts have invalidated section 27A on this ground

by erroneously substituting "rule of law" for the phrase "rule of
decision" in Klein.3 8 2 Such a construction is unjustified because,
(under threat of loss of jurisdiction).' " United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691,
695 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting BATOR ET AL., supra note 319, at 316.).
This interpretation of Klein raises difficulties because distinctions between
questions of fact and questions of law are not particularly clear. In § 27A cases,
for example, essentially no difference exists between defining the statute of limitations for cases pending on June 19, 1991 as the statute that was in effect in the
jurisdiction at the time (Congress "changing the law") and deeming cases pending on June 19, 1991 as filed within the statute of limitations (Congress "directing findings of fact"). Construing Klein as prohibiting only statutes which
direct findings of fact potentially allows the legislature to swallow up the judiciary by artful scrivening. One commentator indicates that the second problem
with this interpretation of Klein is that the language suggesting this interpretation is almost certainly dicta.
This is true because none of the crucial facts was disputed in Klein and,
as a consequence, the conclusive presumption did not operate to establish any fact in that case. This is true because it was stipulated in Klein
that Wilson[, the original Rebel owner of the property at issue,] had
served as a surety for rebel officers and was thus, disloyal. . . . The
finding of Wilson's disloyalty, made by the Court of Claims in Klein, was
not ... based upon Wilson's receipt of a pardon but rather upon the
facts to which Klein stipulated.
Young, supra note 362, at 1236.
381. See, e.g., Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,263 (finding that § 27A did not prescribe findings or results under previously
existing law but rather created change in applicable law); Henderson, 971 F.2d at
1573 ("The Act does not require courts to make any particular findings of fact or
applications of law to fact. Any effect on pending cases is solely a result of a
change in the underlying law."); Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1545 ("Section 27A does
not direct courts to make specific factual findings or mandate a result in a particular case."); Duke, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,965
("In enacting Section 27A, Congress did not prescribe the outcome of any case
or direct any particular finding. . . . Section 27A does not dictate a decision
under old law, but rather compels a change in existing law." (citations omitted));
accord Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Treiber
v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); AxelJohnson, 790 F. Supp. at
479; First, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,919; Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992);
Bankard, 1992 WL 3694, at *6.
382. See, e.g., In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (stating that § 27A "is analogous to the enactment at issue in Klein. It
directs a rule of decision by intruding on the adjudicative process ....
[L]ike
Klein, section 27A(a) attempts to control one part of the adjudicative process
without making a change in the underlying law.").
The phrase "rule of decision" should not be equated to mean "rule of law."
Every law is by definition ultimately a rule of decision, and thus whenever a legislature enacts, repeals or amends a statute, it is in a sense prescribing a rule of
decision. When it does so and purports to apply the law retroactively, then it is
prescribing a rule of decision to a court in a pending case. Presuming that retro-
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since the Schooner Peggy decision, it has been settled that Congress
can pass a law that affects the parties in a pending case.
Another related interpretation adopted by some courts is
that Klein permits Congress to decide questions of law in pending
cases but prohibits Congress from interfering with the courts in
383
the performance of their fact-finding and evidentiary functions.
The statute in Klein directed the court to find the acceptance of a
pardon as conclusive evidence that the claimant participated in
the Confederacy (a direction of a finding of fact), rather than as
changing the legal incidents of a pardon. Under this interpretation, the proviso in Klein created a conclusive presumption of disloyalty from the unreserved acceptance of a pardon. In so doing,
Congress interfered with the evidentiary and fact-finding power
of the courts. As the Klein Court noted: "[T]he court [is] forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment,
such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect pre3 84
cisely contrary."
Courts testing the constitutional validity of section 27A
against this interpretation of Klein have upheld the statute, finding
that section 27A does not direct any factual finding or prohibit
the use of any evidence in deciding the case on the merits. 3 5 Secactive application does not violate any other constitutional provisions, such as
the clauses against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, deprivation of property
without due process of law, unequal protection of the laws, etc., then such prescription is constitutionally permissible. Indeed, to say that Congress could not
decide questions of law and apply those decisions retroactively is to say that
Congress cannot apply any law retroactively. The cases do not support this conclusion. For example, in Schooner Peggy, McCardle and Wheeling Bridge, Congress
redefined something-the rights of the privateers, the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, and the status of the bridge, respectively-and the Supreme
Court held the redefinition constitutional. Klein does not seem to be different in
this regard.
383. One commentator believes that Klein turns, at least in part, on an "unconstitutional encroachment on judicial power to weigh and give proper effect
to evidence." Parnell, supra note 364, at 1379 n. 116. It is possible that the question in Klein was purely an evidentiary one, such that the decision therefore only
regulates Congress' power in prescribing rules of evidence. So viewed, the
question in Klein would be whether Congress can constitutionally create a conclusive presumption that unreserved receipt of a presidential pardon is evidence of
disloyalty. If this is the ground of decision, Congress could have conditioned
the right of recovery on proof of loyalty in fact, created a rebuttable presumption
of disloyalty as an incident of unreserved acceptance of a pardon or required
affirmative proof of loyalty. Thus, the impropriety in Klein was arguably the conclusiveness of the presumption.
384. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
385. E.g., Duke, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,965
(stating that § 27A does not prescribe any specific factual findings); AxelJohnson,
790 F. Supp. at 479 ("Notably absent from § 27A, unlike the statute held unconstitutional in Klein, Js a specific directive as to what evidence a court may con-
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tion 27A poses no separation of powers problems under this alternative interpretation of Klein because section 27A does not
address any factual or evidentiary matters.
3.

Section 2 7A As Requiring a ParticularDecision on the Merits or
Foreclosinga Decision on the Merits

Some courts have analyzed the constitutionality of section
27A under yet another interpretation of Klein. This alternative
interpretation is that Klein prohibits Congress from enacting a retroactive statute that forecloses a decision on the merits in a pending case. These courts have upheld the validity of section 27A
under this interpretation of Klein .3a 6 This reading of Klein stems

from the argument that the proviso in Klein violated the separation of powers doctrine because the proviso forced the Court to
decide the case in favor of one party even though the Court
would have decided the case on the merits in favor of the other
party. 3 7 If this is a proper interpretation of Klein, section 27A is
sider in determining the timeliness of the suit's filing or the case's merit.");
accord In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954,959 (E.D. La. 1992)
(same); Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243 (same).
386. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573
(1 th Cir. 1992) (concluding that § 27A did make change in law and did not
interfere with judicial process); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d
1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that Congress prescribed new statute of
limitations in § 27A that courts are free to apply without further legislative constraint), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054,
1058 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (observing that even though § 27A may change result in
some pending cases it does not proscribe adjudication on merits); Taxable Mun.
Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. at 961 (concluding that § 27A is constitutional because "Congress simply modified a defense that is involved in this controversy
but that defense does not affect the merits of the claim"); First v. Prudential
Bache Sec., Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,622, at 92,919 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1992) (commenting that § 27A does not
focus on facts relating to merits in order to determine timeliness of claims); accord Barr v. McGraw-Hill, No. 87 CIV. 6259 (KC), 1992 WL 196754, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992); Duke, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
at 93,965; Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp.
1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992); Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F.
Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Bankard v. First Carolina Communications,
Inc., No. 89 C 8571, 1992 WL 3694, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 6, 1992).
387. Although the statute in Klein purported to relate to the jurisdiction of
the court, a procedural matter, it required that "the court ... deny to itself...
jurisdiction ... because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled
law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor." Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. Rosenfeld and Mehlman reach an rroneous opposite
conclusion:
Although the Court in Sioux Nation also considered it important
that Congress had not attempted "to control the Court of Claims' ultimate decision" in the pending case as it had in Klein, that should not be
read as limiting the Klein doctrine only to statutes that dictate which
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constitutional, because it does not direct a court to decide in favor
of one party or lose its jurisdiction to decide the case at all.
Rather, section 27A merely requires that the class of cases covered by the statute be adjudicated on the merits if that adjudication is not foreclosed by the limitations periods and choice of law
rules existing before Lampf and Beam.
A variation of the preceding interpretation is that Klein
merely prohibits the legislature from changing the law to the government's advantage when the government is a party in the litigation.3 88 No court has yet considered the constitutionality of
section 27A based on this interpretation of Klein. If this is the
party shall ultimately prevail in pending cases. To begin with, the statute in Klein did not dictate who would win any given case. Moreover,
were the Klein doctrine that narrow, there would have been no reason
for the Sioux Nation Court to have concentrated on Congress's ability to
waive the resjudicatadefense on behalf of the United States as a litigant.
Rather, the Court's rationale for upholding the statute at issue in Sioux
Nation illustrates why Congress does not pass constitutional muster
where it tells district courts how to decide specific issues in cases pending before them in which the United States is not a defendant.
Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 102.
388. Under this interpretation, the infirmity of the statute in Klein lay in
"allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor." Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. As Justice Chase observed in dicta in Calder v. Bull:
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority.... [A] law that makes a man a Judge in his
own cause . . . .is against all reason and justice ...."
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). One commentator noted:
This narrower view of Klein's possible prohibition is consistent with the
Wheeling Bridge case. In short, it allows the government to change the
law in a case where it is a party acting as regulator but not where it is a
party disputing property rights or money liability. In a rough sense,
one might say the issue is whether the government is a party in a purely
governmental capacity or in a proprietary capacity.
Young, supra note 362, at 1242-43; see also Eisenberg, supra note 364, at 526
("There is ...language in [Klein] suggesting that a crucial aspect of the case was
the fact that the United States was a party and that it is particularly offensive for
a litigant to prescribe a rule of decision for its own case."). This approach, however, is problematic. If Klein does prohibit Congress from changing the law to
the disadvantage of its opponents in pending litigation, then arguably the
Supreme Court should have decided Robertson differently. For a discussion of
Robertson, see supra notes 350-61 and accompanying text. As the Ninth Circuit
concluded in Gray:
Robertson indicates a high degree ofjudicial tolerance for an act of Congress that is intended to affect litigation so long as it changes the underlying substantive law in any detectable way. Because section 27A more
clearly and directly changes the underlying substantive law than the appropriation "rider" upheld in Robertston, section 27A amply passes
whatever is left of the Klein test.
Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,414, at 96,263 (9th
Cir. Apr. 7, 1993); see also Berning v. Edwards & Sons, Inc., [1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,389, at 96,099 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993)
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correct reading of Klein, the only defendants who would have
standing to successfully raise the constitutional argument would
be those defending actions brought by the United States on its
own behalf or as a subrogee.3 8 9 Either way, the principles in Klein
would not be violated because section 27A does not prescribe a
decision, regardless of the merits of the case, in the government's
favor.
Although there are many views concerning what Klein forbids, the core holding in Klein, accepted by the vast majority of
courts, is that Klein prevents Congress from prescribing a rule of
decision without changing the underlying law. As noted above,
section 27A does not prescribe a rule of decision and does change
the underlying law. Moreover, section 27A is constitutional
under the alternative interpretations of Klein because it does not
foist on the courts any findings of fact, conclusions of law, evidentiary conclusions or any particular decision on the merits of any
case. In short, section 27A passes constitutional muster under
any reasonable interpretation of Klein.
D.

Section 27A As UnconstitutionallyRequiring Selective Prospectivity
in Contravention of Beam

A few courts have held that section 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine because it nullifies the Supreme Court's
holding in Beam that prohibits selective prospectivity. 39 °
According to these courts, Beam's prohibition of selective prospectivity is constitutionally based. These courts conclude that
section 27A contravenes the separation of powers doctrine because section 27A requires courts to engage in selective prospec("If the statute in Robertson 'changed the underlying law' sufficiently to pass muster under Klein ....
then ... section 27A clearly does so.").
389. Reading Klein in this manner raises the further general retroactivity
question of which § 10(b) litigants can use Klein to evade § 27A: only those
against whom the government had assumed subrogation rights and/or filed
claims at the time § 27A was enacted, or also those who were defending against
private citizens at the time of the enactment of § 27A but against whom the
government later assumed the adversarial position?
390. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (concluding that reformulation of retroactive
application is within power of judiciary, not Congress); In re Prudential-Bache
Energy Income Partnerships Sec. Litig., CIV. A. MDL No. 888, 1992 WL
142575, at *3 (E.D. La. June 9, 1992) (asserting that § 27A unconstitutionally
forces courts to apply selective prospectivity despite Beam's prohibition against
such application of new rule of law); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp.
1098, 1108-09 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp.
587, 594 (E.D. La. 1992) (same). For a discussion of selective prospectivity, see
supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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tivity when applying the Lampf rule. To support this theory, these
courts must accept a number of questionable legal premises.
First, Beam must be constitutionally based. 3 9 1 Second, the application of section 27A must require selective prospectivity in contravention of the principles established in Beam. 3 9 2 Third, Beam
must be interpreted not only to prohibit judicial decisions that
permit selective prospectivity but also to prohibit retroactive legislation that results in selective prospectivity. 393 The following
sections test the validity of these legal premises.
1. Beam As a Constitutionally Based Decision
A number of courts, including the circuit courts that have decided the issue, reject the argument that section 27A violates the
separation of powers doctrine on the ground that it unconstitutionally overrules Beam. The courts who reach this conclusion
usually do so by holding that the rule in Beam is not constitutionally mandated.3 94 By parsing the various opinions in Beam, these
391. All the courts invalidating § 27A on the theory that it requires courts
to ignore Beam have found Beam to be constitutionally based. E.g., Pacific Mut.,
806 F. Supp. at 115 ("[T]he source of such a ruling can not be other than
the constitution."); Energy Income Partnerships, 1992 WL 142575, at *3 (same);
Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1109-10 (same); Simmons, 786 F. Supp. at 593-94
(same).
392. See Pacific Mut., 806 F. Supp. at 115 (holding that § 27A is unconstitutional because "it encroaches on the Supreme Court's provision for retroactive
application of the Lampf rule as a constitutional matter"); accord Energy Income
Partnerships, 1992 WL 142575, at *3; Brichard,788 F. Supp. at 1109; Simmons, 786
F. Supp. at 594.
393. See PacificMut., 806 F. Supp. at 115 (noting that rationale of Beam logically extends not only to judiciary but also to Congress); Energy Income Partnerships, 1992 WL 142575, at *3 (holding, without authority, that Beam restricts not
only judiciary but also Congress).
394. See, e.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,414, at 96,264-65 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993) (finding that
majority of Beam Court did not hold that selective prospectivity was constitutionally prohibited); Berning v. Edwards & Sons, Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,389, at 96,098 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993) (same); Anixter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Beam was carefully crafted to garner a plurality to agree . . . that retroactive application of a
rule of law announced in a case was a matter of a choice of law and not of constitutional import. Beam did not declare unconstitutional the practice of selective
prospectivity .... "), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); McCool v. Strata Oil Co.,
972 F.2d 1452, 1458 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992) ("IfJim Beam purported to be a constitutional decision, there would be a nice question whether we could obey the congressional mandate. But only three (or maybe four) Justices inJim Beam opined
that the practice of applying a new rule to some litigants and not to others is
unconstitutional."). The district court in Adler summarized the plurality opinion
in Beam as follows:
Only three Justices out of nine found a constitutional basis for the
Court's conclusion that selective prospectivity ofjudicial decisions was
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courts conclude that although three Justices (Blackmun, Marshall
and Scalia) held that the Beam rule was constitutionally based, the
other Justices joining in the judgment (Souter, Stevens and
White) based their decisions upon nonconstitutional jurisprudential concerns. 395 These courts acknowledge that Justice Souter's
opinion relies on Griffith v. Kentucky, 39 6 a decision in which the
Court focused primarily on the judicial function of the Court
under the Constitution. However, these courts point out thatJustice Souter's opinion relies on the jurisprudential principles of
stare decisis and equality that were also utilized by the Griffith
Court as additional nonconstitutional reasons for the rule an3 97
nounced in that case.
Disagreeing with this interpretation of Beam, a few courts
impermissible-Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia found that retroactive application ofjudicial decisions is required by Article III of the
Constitution. Justice Souter, writing for the Court and joined by Justice Stevens, stated that "selective prospectivity ... breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a
fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally."
Justice Souter viewed the retroactivity issue very narrowly, as "an issue
of choice of law" and refused to "speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity." Justice White, in his concurring opinion,
agreed with the "narrower ground employed by Justice Souter," rejecting the constitutionality argument made by Justice Scalia. The
three dissenting Justices totally rejected Justice Scalia's constitutional
interpretation of retroactivity in favor of utilizing the Chevron Oil analysis. Accordingly.... Beam did not declare unconstitutional the practice
of "selective prospectivity" ....
Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(citations and footnote omitted).
395. These courts believe that Justice Souter (joined by Justice Stevens)
predicated his opinion on a narrow, nonconstitutional choice of law issue. See,
e.g., Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,265 ("The
grounds for [the Supreme Court's] decision [in Beam] are narrow. They are confined entirely to an issue of choice of law .... " (quoting Beam, 111 S. Ct. at
2448)); accord Berning, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,098; Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1547 n. 10 (same). Justice White's opinion indicates
that he concurred "on the narrower ground employed by Justice Souter,"
namely the choice of law ground. See Gray, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 96,265; Berning, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
at 96, 098; Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243-44. The three dissenters who would have
opted for performing a Chevron Oil analysis clearly rejected the notion that Beam
was constitutionally compelled. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.
Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Chevron Oil analysis, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
396. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). Griffith held that "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 322.
397. See, e.g., Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1244 n.9 (stating that "Justice Souter in
Beam found Griffith to apply to civil cases on the principles of stare decisis and
equality, not on the basis of judicial integrity under Article III").
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have concluded that Beam's ruling on selective prospectivity is
constitutionally based.3 9 8 These courts find that section 27A unconstitutionally attempts to neutralize Beam's requirement that
the Lampf rule be applied retroactively by requiring that Beam apply only in cases not covered by section 27A. 39 9 Courts accepting
this theory find that Justice Souter's opinion is predicated on the
constitutional principles underlying the Court's decision in Griffith. These courts assert that a majority of the Beam Court embraced the notion that selective prospectivity was prohibited by
the Constitution.
The district court's opinion in In re Brichard Securities Litiga398. See, e.g., In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1109 (N.D. Cal.
1992) ("[T]his court believes that [the four separate opinions dealing with the
reasoning behind the final judgment in Beam] demonstrate that the Supreme
Court concurred that its decision was on constitutional grounds."); TGX Corp.
v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La. 1992). The court in Simmons noted:
The Court's rejection of selective prospectivity [in Beam] was
rooted in article III of the constitution. While Justice Souter did not
explicitly reference article III, his reliance on, and adoption of Griffith
confirm that his opinion was constitutionally based. Gritffih rested
squarely on constitutional grounds, holding that article III required full
retroactive application of the Court's decisions to pending criminal
cases....
The concurrences in Beam further confirm that the Court's rejecJustice
tion of selective prospectivity was constitutionally based ....
Souter's opinion for the Court, combined with the ... concurrences,
thus establish that the Court's rejection of selective prospectivity was
constitutionally based.
Beam thus reflects a judicial interpretation of the constitution, such
that congressional enactments inconsistent therewith must fall.
Id. at 593-94; Rosenfeld & Mehiman, supra note 198, at 104 ("lIt is fair to conclude . . . that each of the four opinions [in Beam] reveals solid constitutional
underpinnings.").
399. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1109 ("Section 27A replaces the Beam decision against selective prospectivity with a law of selective prospectivity in certain
cases. Permitting selective prospective application of statutes of limitations after
the Beam court constitutionally forbade selective prospective application of such
rules is an attempt to change Beam."); see also Simmons, 786 F. Supp. at 594
("[S]ection 27A . . . effect[s] the selective prospectivity constitutionally proscribed in Beam, such that section 27A is unconstitutional."). Other commentators have proffered the same type of argument:
[S]ection 27A directs district courts in the Second, Third, and Seventh
Circuits to ignore Beam in applying the pre-Lampf decisions in those
circuits that had already adopted the one-year/three-year limitations
period beforeJune 20, 1991, but had not accorded it full retroactivity.
Since it is clear from the Beam decision that the Supreme Court intended the "full retroactivity" principle there adopted to itself apply
retroactively, Congress could not tell the courts to ignore Beam and
deny these pre-Lampf precedents retroactive effect. But that is what
Congress did, and that renders section 27A unconstitutional-regardless of its effect on the outcome of the Lampf litigation.
Rosenfeld & Mehlman, supra note 198, at 104.
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illustrates the position that Beam rests on constitutional

grounds. The court observed that the issue in Beam was "judicial
responsibility" and the resolution of that issue required consideration of the source of judicial power emanating from Article
111.401 According to the court, although Justice Souter did not

explicitly discuss the constitutionality of selective prospectivity,
his opinion was rife with constitutional overtones because it discussed the nature of judicial power, necessarily implicating Article 111.402
Although arguably a close call, the reasoning behind Justice
40 3
Souter's loosely worded opinion is not constitutionally based.
400. 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
401. Id. at 1109-10.
402. Id. at 1110 ("[H]owever phrased, the judicial power is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and its meaning therefore remains a constitutional
question."). In reaching this conclusion, the Brichard court cited Marbury v.
Madison, in which the Supreme Court concluded that when a law contravenes the
Constitution the court must decide which of the incompatible rules govern. Id.
at 1111 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)). The
Brichard court likened that task to Justice Souter's "choice of law" decision in
Beam. Id. Such reasoning is specious. Justice Souter made it clear that what he
meant by "choice of law" was simply whether the new law would apply prospectively or retroactively. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439,
2443 (1991).
403. Justice Souter's intent in relying on Griffith is unclear. In Griffith, the
Supreme Court relinquished the notion that courts could apply new criminal
constitutional rules either retroactively or prospectively. Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (overruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)).
In 1961, the Court had held in Linkletter that " 'the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect' of a new constitutional rule, and that a determination of retroactivity must depend on 'weigh[ing] the merits and demerits
in each case.' " Griffith, 479 U.S. at 320 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629). In
Griffith, the majority of the Court instead adopted the view previously expressed
by Justice Harlan in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), and Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-701
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-23. The Griffith
Court noted that "[i]n Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a
newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 322.
The Griffith Court justified its opinion on two primary grounds. First, because Article III requires the Court to determine only cases and controversies,
"the integrity of judicial review requires that [the Court] apply that rule to all
similar cases pending on direct review." Id. at 323. The Court, quotingJustice
Harlan in Mackey, stated:
If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of
our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all .... In truth, the
Courts' assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating
cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate
review, is quite simply an assertion that our constitutionalfunctionis not one
of adjudication but in effect of legislation.
Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
The second basis upon which the Griffith Court relied was the concept that "se-
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In formulating the Beam rule Justice Souter never stated that the
rule was constitutionally based. Rather, he emphasized that he
lective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same." Id. at 323 (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist did not clearly state his conclusions with
respect to whether selective prospectivity was constitutionally based orjurisprudentially based. Justice Harlan embraced the "classical view of constitutional
adjudication" set forth in Marbury. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He noted that courts should treat similarly situated people the same unless
a principled reason existed for treating them differently. Id. (Harlan,J., dissenting). Justice Harlan called this principle a "basic judicial tradition," but implied
that it was not necessarily constitutionally based. Id. at 258-59 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
On the other hand, the Griffith Court also relied on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Mackey. In that case, Justice Harlan referred to the "awesome power of
judicial review" that carries with it "the responsibility of adjudicating cases or
controversies according to the law of the land." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 678
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan explained that his view was based on
Marbury, and he spoke of constitutional "duties" and "functions." Id. at 678-79
(Harlan,J., concurring). Consequently, it appears that Justice Harlan essentially
based his conclusions on constitutional grounds.
Because the Griffith decision is based so strongly upon Justice Harlan's
views, Griffith can similarly be considered as constitutionally compelled. Justice
Souter's opinion in Beam relies heavily on Griffith's reasoning, and therefore a
strong argument exists that under Justice Souter's opinion, selective prospectivity is constitutionally prohibited. On the other hand, because Justice Souter
never explicitly expressed whether the Beam ruling was constitutionally based, a
serious question exists as to his intent in relying on Griffith's principles of equality and stare decisis. The Griffith Court did not actually address stare decisis as
one of the operative reasons for its decision. In Mackey, Justice Harlan did discuss stare decisis, arguing that the ability to decide constitutional cases prospectively "tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing us to
restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and
thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis, a force which ought properly
to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem." Mackey, 401 U.S. at
680-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Although stare decisis plays
an important role in our jurisprudence, it has never risen to the level of a constitutional requirement.
Justice Souter's opinion in Beam excludes application of the ruling to cases
barred by res judicata and statutes of limitation on the ground that the finality
principle takes precedence over even equality and stare decisis concerns. Beam,
111 S. Ct. at 2446-47. In so ruling, it appears that Justice Souter's opinion
agrees with Justice Harlan's view with respect to finality. For example, in United
States v. Estate of Donnelly, Justice Harlan stated:
The critical factor in determining when a new decisional rule should be
applied to a transaction consummated prior to the decision's announcement is, in my view, the point at which the transaction has acquired such a degree of finality that the rights of the parties should be
considered frozen .... [I]n the civil area that moment should be when
the transaction is beyond challenge either because the statute of limitations has run or the rights of the parties have been fixed by litigation
and have become resjudicata. Any uncertainty engendered by this approach should, I think, be deemed part of the risks of life.
United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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was deciding only a narrow choice of law issue. Although he cited
Griffith, his opinion is predicated on the effect of selective prospectivity on stare decisis and equality, both of which can be
viewed as jurisprudential concerns. Thus, even though the issue
is not free from doubt, most courts have held that Beam is not
based upon constitutional principles. 40 4 If Beam is not constitutionally mandated, then section 27A cannot unconstitutionally
contravene the courts' power to declare what the law is.
2.

Section 27A As Requiring Selective Prospectivity

Even assuming that Beam is constitutionally based, section
27A does not unconstitutionally require selective prospectivity in
violation of the principles enunciated in Beam. The major premise underlying the Beam decision is that a court should apply the
same rule to all litigants whose claims are either pending or based
upon events occurring prior to the decision announcing the new
rule of law. According tojustice Souter's view, principles of stare
decisis and equality require that similarly situated litigants be
treated the same. The courts finding section 27A unconstitutional reason that the statute limits the Lampf rule to prospective
application thereby treating similarly situated litigants, those who
filed their cases before Lampf, differently than the litigants in
Lampf.
Section 27A, however, treats all similarly situated litigants
the same. For section 27A purposes, all similarly situated litigants are those litigants who, like the litigants in Lampf, filed section 10(b) actions before the Supreme Court's decisions in Lampf
and Beam. By its terms, section 27A applies its rule to all litigants,
including the litigants in Lampf itself. In fact, the Lampf plaintiffs
40 5
requested and were granted reinstatement under section 27A.
Because section 27A applies to all litigants whose cases were filed
prior to the decisions in Lampf and Beam, section 27A turns the
40 6
Lampf rule into one that applies on a purely prospective basis.
Nothing in Beam prohibits the application of a judicial rule purely
404. For a discussion of the opinions that state that Beam is not constitutionally based, see supra notes 398-402 and accompanying text. See also Sabino,
supra note 196, at 60 (concluding that Beam is nothing more than choice of law
decision).
405. See Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1107 n.9.
406. Id. at 1109 ("Section 27A's reversal of the Lampf decision as to the
Lampf litigants supports plaintiffs' argument that section 27A transformed Lampf
into a purely prospective rule."). Although it is true that applying § 27A may
lead to different results, Beam only requires that the same rule apply to all similarly situated litigants, not that their cases reach identical results.
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prospectively. Consequently, section 27A does not contravene
the Beam principle that all similarly situated litigants be treated

the same.
3.

Beam As ProhibitingLegislation That Requires Selective
Prospectivity

In Brichard,the district court invalidated section 27A on separation of powers grounds even though it acknowledged that section 27A requires a purely prospective application of the Lampf
rule and is not unconstitutional on that ground. 40 7 The court
found that section 27A was constitutionally infirm because it violated the Beam rule, which requires applying all new judicial rules
either purely prospectively or retroactively. 40 8 The district court
concluded that because the Supreme Court applied the new rule
in Beam to the litigants in Beam, the principles set forth in Beam
must apply to all cases pending or arising from events occurring
before Beam was decided, as well as all cases arising after Beam was
decided. Under this analysis, section 27A turns the legal clock
back to pre-Beam law and therefore unconstitutionally permits the
courts to ignore Beam and engage in selective prospectivity in
choosing the statute of limitations in lOb-5 actions. 40 9 Under this
theory, Congress may not pass a statute that requires or permits
anything other than pure prospectivity or pure retroactivity of judicially declared rules.
The Brichard court assumes that the application of section
407. Id.
408. Id. The Brichard court noted:
Beam dealt with two issues of retroactivity. Beam not only announced a rule of retroactivity, but Beam also applied its decision on retroactivity retroactively. In the context of securities law, Beam directed not
just the retroactivity of the statute of limitations announced in Lampf; it
also affected the retroactivity of any federal statute of limitations announced by a court prior to its decision in Beam. Therefore, Beam mandates that a judicially declared statute of limitations which operates on
the litigants in a case will also operate on similarly situated litigants in
cases announced both subsequent and prior to the Beam decision.
Section 27A contradicts that result and directs that, at least in
§ 10(b) cases, Beam will apply only to future cases. That conflicts with
the rule announced in Beam. Beam forbade the selective prospective ap-

plication of new judicially announced federal rules and required their
retroactive application. Section 27A replaces the Beam decision against
selective prospectivity with a law of selective prospectivity in certain
cases. Permitting selective prospective application of statutes of limitations after the Beam court constitutionally forbade selective prospective
application of such rules is an attempt to change Beam.
409. Id.
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27A permits the courts to apply their pre-Lampf decisions on a
selectively prospective basis. Section 27A, however, incorporates
each jurisdiction's pre-Lampf limitations period as the limitations
period chosen by Congress for section 10(b) actions. In other
words, the statute of limitations utilized by the court may have
been a new judicial rule at one time but, in essence, has been
"borrowed" by Congress as the applicable rule for section 10(b)
actions. Beam discussed the power of the judiciary to apply its
self-generated rules, not the power of Congress to have different
rules apply to different litigants. 41 0 It appears that Congress'
power in this regard may be limited by equal protection or due
process considerations but not by Beam. As noted above, section
27A passes both due process and equal protection scrutiny. 4 1'
The courts that have invalidated section 27A on the ground
that it unconstitutionally treads on Beam are implicitly ruling that
Congress cannot enact a retroactive statute that results in a rule
different from Lampf or Beam that applies to any litigants whose
claims were filed before Lampf or Beam. Given the Supreme
Court's consistent approval of retroactive legislation, this view extends Beam further than any Supreme Court opinion. Moreover,
under this theory if a court misinterprets congressional intent,
Congress could never correct the problem and all cases filed prior
to the erroneous decision would have to be decided under the
erroneous rule.
The Lampf case presents an interesting example. In Lampf,
the goal of the Court was to determine what statute of limitations
Congress desired for section 10(b) actions. Reference was made
to the best evidence of that intent, the statute of origin. Based
upon Congress' reaction in passing section 27A, it appears that
the Court misinterpreted modern congressional intent. At least
for those cases brought prior to the decisions in Lampf and Beam,
Congress did not want the one-and-three-year limitations period
410. E.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,414, at 96,265 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993) (observing that Beam
"speaks only to the power of the judiciary under Article III and says nothing
about legislative power under Article I"); Berning v. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,389, at 96,098 (7th Cir.
Mar. 23, 1993) ("Even those Justices [in Beam] who discerned a constitutional
bar to selective prospectivity were concerned solely with the limits of judicial
power under Article III, not with limits on the legislative power under Article
I.").
411. For a discussion of § 27A's validity under due process and equal protection, see supra notes 277 & 377 and accompanying text. See generally Sabino,
supra note 196, at 50-67 (concluding that § 27A is constitutional after considering constitutional challenges that have been raised).
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but rather wanted to maintain the rules of the jurisdiction in effect
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions. Thus, if section 27A is
unconstitutional because it nullifies Beam, Beam imposes limits not
only on the courts but also on Congress. 41 2 Absent more explicit
language in Beam expressing the intent that Beam affects the
power of Congress, the courts should eschew such an approach.
Section 27A does not violate separation of powers principles
by unconstitutionally nullifying the Supreme Court's decision in
Beam. Although the focus of Justice Souter's opinion in Beam is
not crystal clear, it appears that a majority of the Court did not
view the Beam rule as constitutionally mandated. Furthermore,
even assuming that the Beam rule is constitutionally based, section
27A does not require courts to contravene Beam but directs them
to apply the rules on limitation periods and retroactivity that were
in effect on the day before Lampf and Beam. Section 27A limits
Lampf to purely prospective application. Section 27A directs the
courts to apply legislatively declared law (albeit borrowed from
previously existing judicial law), not judicially created law, in determining the limitations period in section 10(b) actions. Consequently, Beam's restrictions on judicial power have no bearing on
whether section 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Lampf and Beam provided a one-two knockout punch for
many substantial lOb-5 actions pending at the time those cases
were decided. Before Lampf and Beam, plaintiffs thought that they
had timely filed their lOb-5 actions based upon the state of the
law as it existed in their jurisdictions when they filed suit. Then
Lampf and Beam magically combined in a "now you see it, now you
don't" judicial sleight of hand to literally change the applicable
limitations period overnight. After completing this trick, courts
informed lOb-5 plaintiffs, "Surprise, you lose!" Not to be outdone, Congress pulled its own rabbit out of a hat by enacting section 27A, thereby turning back the legal clock to make Lampf and
Beam disappear.
Section 27A raises a number of thorny constitutional issues
in areas of the law that are not well developed. A uniform limita412. See, e.g., Gray, [1993 Tranfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
96,265 (nothing that finding that Beam controls power of Congress "stretches
the Court's actual holding far beyond its intended constitutional boundaries");
Berning, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,099 ("Beam does
not hold that Congress lacks the power to change the law for pending cases or
that courts are constitutionally compelled to disregard such changes.").
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tions period for lOb-5 actions is necessary. Having that period
apply retroactively to govern all cases pending at the time the law
changed does not seem necessary, prudent or fair. Most of us
would object strenuously if the rules were changed during the
course of the game. Yet, this is precisely what Lampf and Beam
did. The Court's Chevron Oil approach to applying changes in limitations periods seems more consistent with justice and fairness.
Perhaps the Court will reconsider its decision in Beam at least
for cases involving statutes of limitation. The Court even could
decide that the limitations rule in Lampf is remedial and therefore
not subject to the Beam rule. However, it appears unlikely that
either of those two possibilities will take place. Accordingly, the
courts will continue to face constitutional challenges to section
27A.
Whatever else Klein presently means, Robertson suggests that a
statutory change in the underlying law is sufficient to meet the
constitutional precepts in Klein. Congress clearly changed the law
in section 27A if, as the courts have uniformly held, Beam requires
that Lampf apply retroactively to all pending cases. The combination of Beam and Lampf means simply that all nonfinal cases filed
before Lampf and Beam are governed by the one-and-three-year
rule. Section 27A changes this rule by requiring the courts to apply their pre-Beam and pre-Lampf law to Rule lOb-5 limitations
issues. In most instances, the effect of section 27A will be that the
jurisdiction will apply the borrowing rule, not the uniform oneand-three year-rule. Clearly, section 27A changes the law in a
way that comports with Klein.
The separation of powers challenge to section 27A claiming
that section 27A unconstitutionally reverses Beam should also fail.
First, it is doubtful that the rule in Beam is constitutionally based.
Second, section 27A in essence requires that Lampf be applied
purely prospectively, an approach that does not violate the Beam
rule forbidding selective prospectivity. Finally, Beam is a rule of
judicial derivation and application. Beam limits the power of the
judicial branch, not the legislative branch. Neither Beam nor any
other clear authority forbids Congress from enacting a retroactive
statute that requires that some cases be governed by one rule and
other cases by a different rule so long as the statute otherwise
comports with due process and equal protection guarantees. Section 27A passes both due process and equal protection scrutiny.
The vested rights challenge is more difficult to resolve. For
nonfinal cases that were barred under the Lampf and Beam rules
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before Congress enacted section 27A, the defendants' contentions will succeed only if the Court adopts the procedure/substance dichotomy, finds that the Lampf rule (or at least
the three-year repose part of the Lampf rule) is substantive and
finds that Danzer is still good law. As discussed, solid legal argu41 3
ments can be made to support all three propositions.
On the one hand, many legal results turn on characterization
issues and fine distinctions. The right/remedy distinction in limitations periods has a long history in law. Although International
Union may raise questions about the continued viability of that
distinction and Danzer, the questions arise because International
Union misinterpreted Chase. Moreover, there is a rational basis for
the right/remedy distinction. If a limitations period is substantive, that is, part of the cause of action, there would seem to be no
cause of action left once the period runs. The distinction seems
to be implicit in Lampf in which the Court recognized that the
three-year period of repose is not subject to equitable tolling.
The Lampf Court suggested that the three-year period operated as
the unconditional temporal limit for lOb-5 suits. It would seem
then that a defendant has a vested right not to be sued for lOb-5
violations if the three-year Lampf period has run. Thus, section
27A may be unconstitutional because it divests defendants of
vested rights.
On the other hand, although many legal results turn on characterizations, one is understandably hesitant to have so much turn
on the "somewhat metaphysical" distinction between procedural
and substantive limitations periods. Moreover, InternationalUnion
is difficult to reconcile with the argument that the rule announced
in Danzer is still good law. From a policy perspective, no good
reason exists why a defendant should be able to claim that he is
immune from suit based only upon the fortuity that the time period was shortened in a substantive way, thereby automatically incapacitating the plaintiff from bringing suit. The fact that the
defendant has no equity or policy considerations on its side is exemplified by the Court's holdings in Chase and Campbell. Finally,
the Court could determine that the judicially generated Lampf
limitations period is procedural, thereby making Danzer inapplicable in any event.
In any event, different issues are presented if the defendant
obtained a final judgment of dismissal based upon the Lampf rule
413. For a discussion of this aspect of the vested rights challenge to § 27A,
see supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
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before section 27A became effective. In this situation, the fortuitous change in Lampf'and Beam still leads to the dismissal but the
procedural posture of the case now becomes a dismissal resulting
in a final judgment. If final judgments are to constitute any basis
for ordering our affairs, we should not opt for a rule in which a
final judgment is meaningless and can always be reopened.
There should be repose for a defendant when a lawsuit comes to
a final end. Resurrecting previously dead claims ought to be
done sparingly if at all.
Our legal system gives great weight to the interest of finality,
as it should. Otherwise, every case could potentially last forever.
Justice Souter recognized this interest in Beam, and the Supreme
Court cases holding that vested rights spring from final judgments are replete with statements emphasizing the importance of
finality. 41 4 Although none of those cases involved a vested right
arising from a final judgment of dismissal based upon the running
of a limitations period, the spirit of the notion that "final" really
means final should control.
Consequently, section 27A(b) should be held unconstitutional in those cases in which the plaintiff seeks to reinstate a previously dismissed cause of action if that dismissal was final. Any
other rule impinges too much on the ability of the judiciary to
render final judgments and on the need for parties to rely on the
finality of those judgments.
Of course, the Court must shoulder some of the blame for
this legal morass because of its decision and wavering rationale in
Beam. Beam simply does not give enough weight to the legitimate
interests of litigants in relying on the law that exists at the time an
action is taken. If Chevron Oil were still the rule, the need for section 27A would be obviated. Congress, on the other hand, could
have responded to the calls of the commentators and courts and
enacted a uniform limitations period for lOb-5 actions. This action would have solved many of the problems without the need
for a quick statutory patch job. However the constitutional issues
arising from section 27A are resolved, one lesson to be learned
from all of this may be that bad law makes hard cases.
414. For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases recognizing the importance of finality, see supra notes 295 & 307.
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